Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of rape, and other offenses. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time he committed the crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to the maximum prison term for each count. The sentence totaled 141 years in prison. At issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether, pursuant to Graham v. Florida, a term-of-years prison sentence that exceeds a defendant’s life expectancy violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments when it is imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender. The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and remanded the cause to the trial court for resentencing, holding (1) Graham’s categorical prohibition of sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes applies to juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are sentenced to term-of-years sentences that exceed their life expectancies; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s 112-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant engaged in conduct that would be considered aggravated robbery if committed by an adult. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. The State filed a motion to transfer Appellant to the general division of the common pleas court to be tried as an adult pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2152.10(A)(2)(b) and 2152.12(A)(1)(b), which provide for mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court in certain circumstances. After a hearing, the juvenile court automatically transferred the case. Appellant moved to dismiss the ensuring indictment charging him with two counts of aggravated robbery with accompanying firearm specifications and transfer his case back to juvenile court, arguing that mandatory transfer of juveniles is unconstitutional. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant subsequently entered pleas of no contest to the two counts of aggravated robbery. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court without providing for the protection of a discretionary determination by the juvenile court judge violates juveniles’ right to due process. View "State v. Aalim" on Justia Law

J.W. was designated a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender and placed on probation, subject to several conditions. On June 30, 2014, the Youth Court issued a disposition order revoking J.W.’s probation, committing him to placement within a Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) facility, and requiring him to complete certain phases of the facility’s juvenile SOTP. The State filed a motion to revoke the disposition order and transfer J.W.’s case to the District Court pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-208. The Youth Court granted the motion. The Youth Court and District Court imposed house arrest with restrictive conditions on J.W. pending a final disposition of his case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Youth Court did not err in granting the State’s motion to transfer; and (2) the lower courts did not err in imposing house arrest with restrictive conditions on J.W. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by criminal information with sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. Based on the seriousness of the offenses and the allegation that Defendant’s conduct occurred when he was fourteen years old, the case was automatically transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault int he first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Appellate Court vacated the convictions, concluding that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s post trial motion to dismiss the information because the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct underlying the convictions had occurred after Defendant’s fourteenth birthday. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State did not establish, under any burden of proof, that Defendant was at least fourteen years old at the time he committed the offenses for which he was convicted. View "State v. Samuel M." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant committed the crime when he was seventeen years old. In 1992, Defendant was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment without parole. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing on the basis of recent changes to juvenile sentencing law. The trial court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that court precedent does not require a trial court to consider any particular mitigating factors associated with a juvenile’s age before imposing a sentence that includes an opportunity for parole, and therefore, Defendant has not raised a colorable claim of invalidity that would require resentencing. View "State v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Ray M. appealed an Imperial County juvenile court order denying his motion to conduct a new assessment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.11 and declaring him a delinquent ward under section 602. Ray filed his motion after the Kern County juvenile court determined he should be deemed a ward, and not a dependent, without providing notice to his dependency attorney or to the Imperial County court as required by section 241.1 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.512.2 Ray also argued, and the Imperial County Department of Social Services conceded, that the juvenile court erred at the outset of the dependency by failing to provide notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal agreed with Ray that because the Kern County juvenile court did not comply with the notice requirements set forth in section 241.1 and rule 5.512, the Imperial County juvenile court had the authority to revisit the Kern County court's assessment under section 241.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the orders and remanded the case for the juvenile court assigned to hear Ray's dependency matter to conduct a new assessment under section 241.1 and, if Ray was deemed a dependent, to comply with the notice provisions of ICWA. View "In re Ray M." on Justia Law

Defendant was two months short of his eighteenth birthday when he shot and killed Timothy Irving. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eight felonies, including first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison for the first degree murder charge. Defendant appealed the trial court’s refusal to appoint a neuropsychologist at the Commonwealth’s expense to assist in the preparation of his presentence report and its decision to impose a life sentence. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal with regard to the denial of his motion for a neuropsychologist but granted his petition with regard to the sentence imposed. The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant because a sentence of life did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder and that because Defendant was not facing a mandatory life sentence, Miller v. Alabama did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that mandated review by the court of appeals; and (2) Miller has no application to the present case. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services petitioned for wardship of M.I., a minor, 705 ILCS 405/2-3, alleging that M.I.’s mother had neglected her and that M.I.’s father had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court granted the petition, finding M.I. to be neglected. The court ordered father to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, submit to random drug testing twice monthly, undergo a psychological examination, and complete a parenting class. Until he dropped out of high school, father was enrolled in special education courses for learning disabilities. He had been unemployed since 2007. Father had been incarcerated on eight different occasions for approximately 18-19 years in total but had not been incarcerated since 2005. He suffers from bipolar disorder and admitted to regular marijuana use, indicating that he had been clean for two months. Father is functionally illiterate, and possesses an IQ of 58. The state asserted that he did not attend drug testing or participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and refused to provide an address to his caseworker. The court found both parents unfit. Thereafter, at five different permanency hearings, the juvenile court found that father had failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve the service plan and permanency goal. The court appointed DCFS as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the termination of father’s rights. The statute, 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), does not contain a willfulness requirement. The juvenile court considered father’s intellectual disability and other circumstances, such as his sporadic attendance at visitation, when it found him unfit under subsection (b). View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

A petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 alleged that E.G. committed four offenses. He pled no contest to battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft; the remaining charges were dismissed. The offenses E.G. pled no contest to were “wobblers,” offenses (Penal Code 17(b)(3)) that “are chargeable or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” The petition alleged them as felonies. The juvenile court placed E.G. on probation and committed him to a youth facility for nine months. The court of appeal remanded, finding the juvenile court had not exercised its discretion to declare the offenses misdemeanors or felonies as required by statute. Months later, E.G. moved to have his offenses reduced to misdemeanors under section 17(b), stating that the juvenile court had declared the offenses to be felonies. The state did not dispute this statement, although no such declaration was made on remand. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that section 17(b)(3) did not apply in juvenile proceedings. A bench officer subsequently stated he had declared the offenses to be felonies at disposition and did so again. The court then terminated E.G.’s wardship and probation. Holding that the “wobbler” provision applies in juvenile proceedings, the court of appeal remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law