Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A daughter was born to Carey and Knight in 2010. The child was hospitalized with a serious illness when she was about a month old. Knight ended his relationship with Carey and removed himself from his daughter’s life. Carey moved into Kilborn’s home when the child was two months old; they married weeks later, including an informal “adoption” ceremony. They held the child out as Kilborn’s “adopted” daughter. Kilbourn actively participated in the child’s life, including providing day-to-day care. The couple discussed formal adoption, but he understood that Knight was unwilling or unable to consent. Kilborn and Carey had two children together. The children were raised as full siblings.Carey’s daughter refers to Kilborn as “daddy.” Kilborn's parents have acted as grandparents to all three children. In 2014, Kilborn sought a divorce and requested that he be declared the de facto father of Carey’s daughter. Carey opposed Kilborn’s request and denied him access to the child, though he had visitation with his biological children. She attempted to reintroduce Knight into the child’s life. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is the child’s de facto parent. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the Maine Parentage Act, 19-A M.R.S. 1831-1938, will soon take effect and mirrors precedent. View "Kilborn v. Carey" on Justia Law

The father of Woodard’s child died seven months after the child’s birth. There is no evidence that Woodard is an unfit parent. Dorr, the mother of the deceased father, sought court-ordered visitation with Woodard’s child, alleging a sufficient existing relationship between herself and the child, or, in the alternative, that she had made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship, 19-A M.R.S. 1803(1)(B), (C). Before the child’s birth, Dorr attended a baby shower. Dorr was in the hospital on the evening that the child was born—September 3, 2012. Dorr had additional, unspecified contact with the child until Dorr’s son died and Woodard ceased contact with Dorr. Mediation was unsuccessful. Woodard moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Act infringes on her fundamental right to govern the care, custody, and control of her child, and is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The court dismissed Dorr’s petition, finding that the affidavit did not establish a sufficient existing relationship with the child or a sufficient effort to establish such a relationship, and did not make an initial showing of “urgent reasons” that would justify infringement on the mother’s rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, finding that Dorr lacked standing, given the lack of “urgent reasons.” View "Dorr v. Woodard" on Justia Law

In 2014, Hailey’s mother petitioned the Cumberland County Probate Court for Hailey’s paternal grandparents to be appointed as guardians so that Hailey could attend school in Freeport. She withdrew the petition weeks later, stating that the arrangement was “for an educational purpose that [was] no longer needed.” .Weeks later, the grandparents petitioned to have themselves appointed as guardians of the child, stating that the child needed a safe and supportive environment and had threatened to run away from her mother’s house. The child began to live with her grandparents in January 2015. The child’s father consented to the guardianship, but her mother did not. The court heard testimony from the child, then 15 years old; her parents; and a clinician who had provided treatment services to the child and her mother, and entered a judgment finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had created a living situation that was at least temporarily intolerable for the child and that a guardianship with the grandparents was in the child’s best interest; mother had shown an inability to meet the child’s needs that threatened the child. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s findings and to the award of a full, rather than limited, guardianship, with no arrangement for transition back to mother’s home. View "Guardianship of Hailey M." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Cranston Police Department filed delinquency petitions alleging that, when B.H. was 13 years old, he committed two offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of first-degree child molestation and one offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offense of second-degree child molestation. The victims were 11-year-old boys.The Family Court found the B.H. delinquent for the violations under G.L. 1956 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded, finding that the evidence at the delinquency proceeding was insufficient to establish sexual penetration—an element of both of the charges of first-degree child molestation of which the respondent was adjudged to be delinquent. The court directed the Family Court to enter adjudications of delinquency on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation sexual assault (second-degree child molestation). View "In the Matter of B.H." on Justia Law

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

In this case, the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing determined that Ivan N. (the minor), who had admitted to a felony sex offense, should have been placed out of his home for treatment in a community-based organization (CBO), which could include, if necessary, education at a juvenile court school. During further dispositional proceedings, the court denied the minor's motion for an additional hearing to consider whether he could be returned to his high school of origin after he received a short period of such treatment. On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion and he should be entitled to further hearings on his educational preferences (i.e., returning him to his school of origin), as a person who fits the definition of a "foster child" under Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a) by remaining "the subject of a petition filed under [section 602]." After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court was correct in determining that the Education Code provisions and related California rule of court relied upon by the minor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651) did not require it to grant a separate hearing on the request. "The procedures created by Education Code section 48853.5, subdivisions (a) through (g) were intended to be primarily directory toward state and local educators and their designated staff educational liaisons who act on behalf of foster children. Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (h) carves out an exception to those administrative procedures, and prevents interference with the discretion granted to a juvenile court that has made section 602 jurisdictional findings that a minor is a ward of the court, to make related placement orders giving the probation officer the authority to determine the appropriate placement for the ward. Once the true findings on the section 602 petition were made, the procedures of section 727 controlled the minor's dispositional proceedings. Based on the court's placement order under section 727, subdivision (a)(4), the probation officer could exercise authority without regard to the definitions of a "foster child" in Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a)." The Court affirmed the order and judgment. View "In re Ivan N." on Justia Law

Michigan charged and tried the named plaintiffs as adults for acts they committed while under the age of 18. Each received a conviction for first-degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2010, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan statutory scheme that barred them from parole eligibility. Since then, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama (2012), “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” Michigan amended its juvenile offender laws in light of Miller, but made some changes contingent upon either the Michigan Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court announcing that Miller applied retroactively, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is retroactive. The district court held, in 2013, that Miller should apply retroactively and issued an injunction requiring compliance with Miller. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of remedies in the context of the new legal landscape and to determine whether class certification is required to extend relief to non-plaintiffs. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with misdemeanor sexual misconduct and felony possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. Appellant entered an unconditional admission to amended charges. The district court subsequently entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court initially granted discretionary review to address Appellant’s constitutional claims. However, because Appellant entered what amounts to an unconditional guilty plea, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with directions that the appeal be dismissed, holding that Appellant waived his right to an appeal in this case. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

K.A., a twelve-year-old, middle-school boy, committed "inappropriate acts" outside his school, for which he was adjudged delinquent under a Vermont statute prohibiting lewd acts relating to prostitution. The charges stemmed from a school-yard game of four-square: "S.K." and K.A. were friends. K.A. approached, said his hands were cold, and asked to put his hands in her jacket pockets. S.K. said no, but K.A. reached his hands into her pockets anyway. Then K.A. began walking backward towards a snowbank a few feet away, pulling S.K. with him by her pockets. As he pulled her, K.A. pressed against S.K. and told her to kiss him or he would throw her in the snowbank. S.K. again said no and tried to remove his hands from her pockets. Then, the trial court found, K.A. tried to get his hands under the waistband of the girl’s jeans while his hands were still in her outside coat pockets. S.K.’s belt prevented K.A.’s hands from going down the front of her pants. Ultimately, K.A. did not kiss S.K. or throw her into the snowbank; instead, he pulled her back towards the school, again using his hands in her pockets as leverage. As the two neared the building, a teacher saw them and yelled at K.A. to take his hands out of S.K.’s pockets. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that K.A committed simple assault and engaged in a prohibited act, lewdness. The trial court granted the judgment of acquittal with regard to simple assault, but not with regard to engaging in lewdness. K.A. argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, K.A. attempted to commit a prohibited lewd act; and (2) the trial court improperly amended the charge from committing a lewd act to attempting to commit a lewd act. The Supreme Court concluded that the charge against K.A. failed for insufficient evidence that his actions were an attempt to engage in a lewd act of prostitution. “Discretion to prosecute persons who have committed crimes is one thing; prosecutorial discretion to decide whether conduct is criminal in the first instance is another. The latter invites arbitrary enforcement and contravenes the separation of powers inherent in our constitutional government.” View "In re K.A." on Justia Law

In 2012, J.C., a minor. admitted to second-degree​ burglary by shoplifting (Penal Code 459 & 460(b)), then a felony. In 2014, the electorate passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced several crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, including shoplifting, if the stolen property was worth less than $950. Proposition 47 also allowed a person serving a felony sentence for a crime reduced to a misdemeanor to petition for redesignation of the conviction and a reduction in sentence. J.C. petitioned to reduce her felony violation to a misdemeanor and to have her DNA record expunged from the state databank, on the theory she would not have been required to provide a DNA sample as a misdemeanant. The juvenile court reduced her violation to a misdemeanor, but declined to order expungement of her DNA record. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of expungement. After J.C.'s filing, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1492, prohibiting granting a request for expungement in connection with a petition for recall of sentence under Proposition 47. Because Bill 1492 clarifies, rather than changes, the meaning of the relevant provisions of Proposition 47, it applies to requests for expungement made prior to its enactment. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law