Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Nicole, a minor, arranged for a friend to lure the victim, E.Y., to Heron Park in Brentwood. A school official obtained from an anonymous student a video depicting an attack on E.Y. by four females, including Nicole, who admitted her involvement but blamed others for arranging the assault. She said she gave her phone to another individual to record the fight. Following a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Nicole a ward of the court and ordered that she be removed from her father‟s custody and detained in juvenile hall pending placement. The court imposed probation conditions, including a condition permitting searches of Nicole’s cell phone and other electronic devices. Nicole was placed at the Warner Mountains Group Home, approximately 340 miles from her father’s home, although there were closer facilities. The court of appeal upheld removal of Nicole from her home, but concluded no substantial evidence justified her distant placement. On remand, the trial court is to modify the search condition and specify the maximum time of confinement. View "In re Nicole H." on Justia Law

Four children were referred to the Mendocino County Human Services Agency, based on neglect. Their mother, who had a substance abuse problem, disappeared for days and left the children with their maternal uncle, Rafael, who was unable to provide adequately for their needs due to disabilities. The Agency had received seven prior referrals for mother and her children, members of the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians. The Agency contacted Cloverdale's Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, who stated that Cloverdale Rancheria opposed placement with Rafael. Mother was eventually arrested; the children were taken into protective custody. Rafael indicated that he loved the children and had provided care since they were born. Social workers helped him apply for relative placement. No Indian homes were available. Mother initially requested that Rafael be considered for placement. The children, who were found to have multiple developmental, physical, and emotional problems, were ordered into long-term foster care. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Rafael’s claims that he was not given mandatory ICWA notices as an Indian custodian; that active efforts were not provided to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; that the detriment finding was defective; and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the juvenile court failed to promptly investigate his Indian custodian status, any errors were harmless, given that mother revoked the custodianship. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other charges. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, claiming that recent scientific findings concerning juvenile psychology and neurology were newly discovered material facts that entitled him to post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to present a colorable claim because the advancements in juvenile psychology and neurology offered by Defendant merely supplement then-existing knowledge of juvenile behavior that was considered at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. View "State v. Amaral" on Justia Law

Mark, then age 14, was being escorted to the office at his high school in connection with a fight during the lunch period. When a campus supervisor reported that she saw a suspicious bulge near Mark’s waistband, an officer pat searched him and retrieved a folding pocket knife with a blade two and three-fourths inches long. A search of Mark’s backpack revealed a canister of pepper spray, which is considered contraband at the school. Mark stated that he carried the items for self defense. Mark was arrested, and the district attorney filed a wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a). The matter was referred to the probation department for consideration of informal supervision pursuant to section 654.2. The juvenile court received the probation department’s report, which concluded that Mark was suitable for informal supervision, even though his alleged violation made him presumptively ineligible under section 654.3. Mark unsuccessfully argued that informal supervision was appropriate because he had a stable family. Mark later admitted the allegations in the petition. The juvenile court imposed conditions of probation, including a requirement that he submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords” The court of appeal affirmed, but modified to strike the electronics search condition. View "In re Mark C." on Justia Law

A social services agency removed a toddler from his parents’ custody when his mother ran out of medication and experienced a relapse of schizophrenic episodes that involved violent hallucinations of harming their child. The agency was concerned that father was in denial about the gravity of mother’s illness. The law requires a court to decide, at six months, whether a parent has been offered “reasonable services" to aid in overcoming the problems that led to the removal, Welfare and Institutions Code 366.21(e). The agency apparently did not try to diagnose the mother as part of a case plan or help the parents more effectively manage her medication. The agency got court approval for psychiatric examinations, not in order to facilitate reunification services, but to potentially bypass reunification. Mother had a treating psychiatrist, but that individual was not called as a witness. Her social worker did not know if mother was on the right medication; there was no evidence the agency offered services to improve mother’s ability to take her medication as prescribed. The court of appeal reversed the six-month order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing to establish a permanent plan for adoption. No substantial evidence supported findings that adequate reunification services were provided to either parent. View "Patricia W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

K.S. was removed from an abusive home at age four. At age five she was placed with Andrea, who adopted her. K.S., has reactive attachment disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a learning disorder, which qualified K.S. for the Adoption Assistance Program. When K.S. was nine a Program assessment identified problems including chronic lying and stealing, aggression, property destruction, enuresis, and sexualized behavior. K.S. carried a knife to school. In ninth grade, she was assaulted. K.S. ran away several times and a suspect in a burglary. After one run-away incident, school staff found a note K.S. had written saying “When you get this I will be dead!” A crisis counselor determined K.S. was not a danger to herself or others. Mother disagreed and felt K.S. should be placed on a psychiatric hold. She refused custody of K.S. Police were called and K.S. was placed in protective custody. K.S. was in foster care for two months. Andrea unsuccessfully requested that the petition be dismissed because she planned to move with K.S. to Sacramento where K.S. would have extended family support. The court of appeal affirmed K.S.’s placement with her biological aunt, rejecting Andrea’s challenges the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over K.S., and the disposition order. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree assault and an associated armed criminal action count under Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.015.1. Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, moved to dismiss the armed criminal action charge on the ground that the application of the sentencing provisions of section 571.015.1 to juvenile offenders is unconstitutional. The trial court agreed with Defendant, concluding that section 571.015.1 is unconstitutional as applied to all juvenile offenders and declared unconstitutional the three-year mandatory minimum incarceration requirement for juveniles who are certified to stand trial as adults. The State subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s determination regarding the constitutional validity of section 571.015.1. The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal, holding that the State has no right to appeal this interlocutory decision under section 547.200.1, nor does the trial court’s decision constitute a final judgment from which the State is entitled to appeal under section 547.200.2. View "State v. Smiley" on Justia Law

Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy in Louisiana. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty without capital punishment,” which carried an automatic sentence of life without parole. Nearly 50 years later, the Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The trial court denied his motion for relief. His application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in state collateral review. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts must give retroactive effect to new watershed procedural rules and to substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive constitutional rules include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, which is retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. A state may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. This would neither impose an onerous burden nor disturb the finality of state convictions and would afford someone like Montgomery, who may have evolved from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member of the prison community, the opportunity to demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change. View "Montgomery v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thurston was convicted of felony driving in disregard for safety of persons or property while fleeing from a police officer, with three prior strike convictions for robberies in 1990 and 1984, and two prison priors for the 1990 robbery and a 1999 violation of Vehicle Code section 2800. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for the 2002 conviction plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. He appealed denial of his request for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The appeal court affirmed the denial, rejecting his arguments that the trial court erred in finding he was not eligible for resentencing due to a 1975 juvenile adjudication of rape because that adjudication was not pleaded and proved in the third strike case; a prior juvenile conviction is not a “prior conviction” for purposes of determining eligibility for resentencing; the record of the juvenile adjudication was not properly before the court; the court’s statement that it would not resentence Thurston even if he was eligible for resentencing should be disregarded; and the evidence did not support the court’s statement that, if he was eligible, it would find that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. View "People v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) because she participated in the murder of a 13-year-old when she was 16-years-old. Based on the intervening decision in Miller v. Alabama, and with the agreement of the prosecution, the trial court vacated the LWOP sentence and conducted a new sentencing hearing in 2015. The trial court ruled inadmissible defendant's proffered evidence of her rehabilitative conduct in prison and again sentenced defendant to LWOP. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's evidence of rehabilitation in prison where the state Supreme Court in People v. Gutierrez held that, under Miller, “a sentencing court must consider any evidence or other information in the record bearing on ‘the possibility of rehabilitation’” before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile who kills. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Lozano" on Justia Law