Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on charges of conspiracy to commit murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. The grand jury found reasonable cause to believe that Defendant came within the provisions of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 707(d)(4). Defendant initially pleaded not guilty but later demurred to the indictment, arguing that section 707(d)(4) requires a determination that a juvenile qualifies for prosecution in adult court, and because he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses, the grand jury had no legal authority to inquire into the charged offenses. The trial court agreed with Defendant, allowed him to withdraw his plea, and sustained his demurrer. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 707(d) allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against certain juveniles accused of specified offenses in criminal court by grand jury indictment. View "People v. Arroyo" on Justia Law

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14) was sustained against A.A., a juvenile court dependent from 2007-2015. A.A. was committed to a period of confinement with the DJJ. A.A. subsequently turned 18 years old and the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over him. In this appeal, the court rejected A.A.'s contention that the juvenile court should have maintained dependency jurisdiction over him and provided him with services under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill No. 12. In this case, A.A. is not eligible for A.B. 12 benefits where A.A. is not a nonminor dependent; the juvenile court reasonably concluded that A.A. did not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction; and the juvenile court did not err in concluding that A.A. was not participating in a transition to living independently case plan where he was committed to a juvenile detention facility. Further, DCFS has complied with the requirements of section 391, subdivision (b), and the juvenile court's order did not violate section 303, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. A.A." on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

Alejandro, a minor, admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales and was found to be a ward of the court. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and his use of social media. The court of appeal modified that condition. The condition, while valid, is overbroad as imposed. Any probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition.The juvenile court should limit searches to sources of electronic information reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor is boasting about his drug use or otherwise involved with drugs, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social media accounts, so that data related to matters such as medical care and personal finances are not subject to search. View "In re Alejandro R." on Justia Law

In March 2013, when the minor (K.R.) was 13 years old, a delinquency petition was filed alleging he had committed the crimes of robbery, criminal threats, and brandishing a knife. In August 2013, Judge James Arguelles presided over a jurisdictional hearing on the petition in Department 97 and found the allegations true. At a disposition hearing in Department 97 in September, Judge Arguelles granted the minor probation with a number of conditions, including 150 days of confinement. In April 2015, the minor’s probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by remaining away from his home overnight without parental permission; failing to keep his probation officer informed of his address and telephone number; using marijuana; and committing the crimes of having marijuana on a school campus, falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer, and being a disruptive presence on a school campus. A week later, the People filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by committing the crimes of brandishing a firearm and brandishing a replica firearm. The parties appeared before Judge Jack Sapunor in Department 97 for a settlement conference. The minor’s attorney told the court the minor was prepared to admit the allegation in the first petition that he remained away from his home overnight without parental permission and the allegation in the second petition that he brandished a replica firearm. Judge Sapunor was a “regular visiting judge” in juvenile court. The settlement conference was continued, and when it resumed, Judge James Arguelles presided. He noted that there was “a minute order saying that May 28th the minor admitted a violation of probation” and “[a]pparently, probation is recommending that [the minor] just be shipped off to Vegas to live with his mother.” Judge Arguelles disagreed with that proposal and stated that his intention was “probably to send him to DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice]." The matter was continued again, and upon the resumption of the conference, the minor’s attorney objected to Judge Arguelles presiding over the disposition because “we have not affirmatively asserted an Arbuckle waiver in this case.” She requested that the matter be set for hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. Judge Arguelles reiterated his disagreement with the proposed disposition, set a schedule for the parties to brief the application of Arbuckle, and continued the matter to July 2. On June 25, the minor commenced the proceeding underlying this appeal, essentially requesting that the Court of Appeal order Judge Arguelles to either: (1) impose the disposition the parties had agreed upon in front of Judge Sapunor or (2) set the case for a disposition hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. The Court of Appeal denied the minor's petition for a writ of mandate: "[w]hile the minor certainly had a reasonable expectation that he would receive the agreed-upon disposition that was part of the plea agreement approved by Judge Sapunor, and the refusal by Judge James P. Arguelles to impose that disposition certainly entitles the minor to withdraw his negotiated plea, the minor has failed to show that he entered into the plea agreement in expectation of and reliance upon Judge Sapunor conducting the disposition hearing. Thus, the minor is not entitled to have the disposition hearing set in front of Judge Sapunor, nor is he entitled to an order requiring Judge Arguelles to impose the agreed-upon disposition." View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law

A family member reported to Michigan Children’s Protective Services (CPS) that Barber was neglecting J.B. Miller, a CPS social worker, interviewed J.B. at his public elementary school without a court order or Barber’s consent. Miller interviewed Barber, who defended his marijuana and prescription-drug use as medically authorized. Days later, Miller again interviewed J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent and spoke with J.B.’s paternal grandmother. Miller obtained a court order, placing J.B. in protective custody pending a hearing, Mich. Comp. Laws 722.638, and picked J.B. up from school. After a hearing, the judge found probable cause to support the petition, but returned J.B. to Barber’s custody conditioned on: Barber’s abstaining from marijuana, submitting to drug screening, and ensuring that J.B. has constant adult supervision. Barber sued Miller under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his substantive due process rights by interviewing J.B. without a court order or parental consent; falsehoods in the petition; and removing J.B. from school, and challenged the statute as facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity and found that Barber lacked standing for his constitutional challenge to the statute. View "Barber v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case centered Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, subsection (a.1)(1) elevated the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution apparently took the position that the finding of delinquency should be considered a “conviction” for purposes of the subsection (a.1)(1) enhancement. On appeal, however, the Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The intermediate court explained that the term “conviction” carried a discrete legal connotation that is not generally understood to encompass juvenile adjudications. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime. The Court held that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, did not encompass juvenile adjudications. View "Pennsylvania. v. Hale" on Justia Law

Appellant Chase C. (a minor) was charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. An adjudication hearing was held, at which the juvenile court found the allegation against Chase to be true. The court adjudged Chase a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation for one year or until Chase's 18th birthday, whichever was longer. These proceedings were instituted over an incident in May 2014, when a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy was conducting a foot patrol through Turtle Park, in the Forest Ranch area of San Diego. The deputy was not in full uniform at the time, but was wearing either an external raid vest with "Sheriff" written on it, or a Sheriff shirt with patches. The deputy was approached by a group of middle school children, who told him that two high school aged children had tried to sell them drugs. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a novel issue regarding whether Chase (once the deputy caught up with a group of teens matching the middle schoolers' descriptions) who allegedly urged his cohorts not to cooperate with a police investigation, rose to the level of a violation of Penal Code1 section 148. This case called for the Court to determine when a refusal to cooperate with police becomes unlawful interference with police activity under section 148. The Court concluded that refusal to cooperate only becomes criminal when it obstructs lawful police activity. Here, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding with regard to section 148(a)(1), and reversed. View "In re Chase C." on Justia Law

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law