Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

When he was fifteen years old, Z.L. was charged as an adult of rape. An Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) adjudication order was entered, and Z.L. was committed to the Arkansas Division of Youth Services (DYS). When Z.L. was twenty-one, DYS released him, and Z.L.’s case was set for a hearing in the circuit court to consider imposition of an adult sentence. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order in the juvenile division finding that Z.L.’s case should be transferred to the criminal division. A second juvenile order was subsequently entered finding that an adult sentence was appropriate. Z.L. was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Z.L. appealed, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to impose an adult sentence because he had reached the age of twenty-one before the EJJ review hearing was scheduled and conducted and before the sentencing order was entered. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an EJJ review hearing and impose an adult sentence on Z.L. View "Z.L. v. State" on Justia Law

The state sought adjudication of wardship against Michael, charging him with misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen. Count 2 alleged that he committed theft by deception. Following Michael’s conviction on Count 2, the probation officer recommended that Michael be placed on supervision for one year. The state recommended a sentence of one year’s probation and restitution of $160. The court continued the case under supervision for one year, referred Michael for evaluation, and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution. The continuance was memorialized in a “Supervision Order” and a “Sentencing Order.” On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box for “No finding or judgment of guilty entered.” The court did not adjudge Michael a ward of the court, but advised Michael of his appeal rights, and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent him. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. While a recent statutory change allows supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of guilt (705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)(b)), the change did not make such interlocutory orders appealable under any supreme court rule. View "In re Michael D." on Justia Law

The minor approached a parked vehicle, banged on the window, and demanded that the occupants open the door. Both saw a gun. The minor demanded their wallets and cell phones. The victims complied. The minor fled. Police located and stopped the getaway car. In the police car, the minor told his friend that he had used a loaded gun, and might and “have to go away.” One victim identified the minor and both identified their property. A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 . The minor admitted one robbery charge with a modified enhancement and admitted possession of a firearm capable of being concealed. The court committed the minor to Division of Juvenile Facilities for six years on the robbery charge, staying an additional period of eight months on the possession charge. The court of appeal affirmed. Despite the “near-absurdity of the rule,” a minor is only eligible for DJF if his “most recent offense” is DJF eligible. This minor was found to have committed robbery, which, alone, would expose him to a DJF commitment. He was also found to have committed gun possession, which is not DJF-eligible. The possession offense arguably occurred before the robbery, but even if the offenses were simultaneous, the “most recent offense” rule did not eliminate a court’s discretion to imposeDJF commitment if a minor is currently violent. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Trenton committed petty theft and other crimes. Under a negotiated disposition, the juvenile court sustained amended misdemeanor allegations of second degree commercial burglary and ammunition possession; remaining counts were dismissed. Trenton was placed on probation in his mother’s home. A supplemental wardship petition was later filed, alleging that Trenton had committed one felony count of discharging a firearm with gross negligence, implicating “The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act.” Trenton appeared for arraignment, represented by counsel. The attorney waived formal reading and advisement of rights and entered a plea of not guilty. The court scheduled a contested jurisdictional hearing. There was no discussion about the possibility of a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Following a contested hearing, the court sustained an amended felony count for being a minor in possession of a firearm, dismissed the original count, and committed Trenton to a rehabilitation facility for six months. The court of appeal remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing into eligibility for a DEJ. After a minor is properly notified of eligibility for a DEJ, the juvenile court has a duty to evaluate whether the minor is suitable for one. View "P. v. Trenton D." on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor student, committed burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 because he stole another student's cell phone out of a school locker. Defendant petitioned to change his juvenile felony burglary offense to a misdemeanor shoplifting offense under Proposition 47. The court affirmed the order denying defendant's petition for recall of sentence because the court, looking at the ordinary meaning of the statute, does not believe that the voters enacting Proposition 47 understood a public high school to be a commercial establishment or a theft from a school locker to be “shoplifting.” Therefore, the trial court correctly found defendant's burglary offense ineligible for reclassification. View "People v. J.L." on Justia Law

Minor J.B. appealed a condition of probation that the trial court imposed after he was convicted of petty theft. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, J.B. argued the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a condition of probation that required him to permit searches of and disclose all passwords to his electronic devices and social media sites. Because there was no evidence connecting the juvenile’s electronic device or social media usage to his offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct, the Court of Appeal concluded the condition was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike this condition. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant, 16 years old when the petition underlying this appeal was filed, had a troubled history. Since 1999, her family has had 36 child welfare referrals from Lake, Shasta, Siskiyou and Solano Counties; it had five voluntary family maintenance cases between 2002 and 2014 but did not fulfill any of the suggested or requested services. Appellant appealed juvenile court orders continuing her as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for placement in "New Foundations." She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she resisted or obstructed a peace officer; (2) the court erred in failing to dismiss the section 602 petition (which she claimed impermissibly increased her maximum confinement time); and (3) the court abused its discretion in terminating her status as a section 300 dependent child and adjudging her a delinquent minor. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and therefore reversed the orders. View "In re Amanda A." on Justia Law

Two weeks before Defendant’s eighteenth birthday, delinquency complaints were filed alleging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen. Defendant appeared in the juvenile court and was duly arraigned. After Defendant turned eighteen, the Commonwealth sought youthful offender indictments against Defendant on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the subject of the complaints. After the indictments were returned, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the delinquency complaints. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictments. In Mogelinski I, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the youthful offender indictments under the facts of this case. Thereafter, the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the juvenile court against Defendant essentially identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered in order to seek a transfer hearing. The juvenile court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court, in fact, had jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed complaint. View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski" on Justia Law

The government filed a juvenile information against Y.C.T. alleging two acts of delinquency. The government filed a motion for a discretionary transfer of Y.C.T. to the district court’s criminal jurisdiction. A magistrate judge issued a written report recommending that Y.C.T. be transferred to adult status for criminal prosecution. The district court adopted the recommendation after conducting a de novo review, concluding that the transfer best served the interest of justice. The First Circuit affirmed the transfer order, holding that the district court’s reliance on the record, as developed by the magistrate judge, to conduct its de novo review was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate Y.C.T.’s right to due process. View "United States v. Y.C.T." on Justia Law

Patrick, age 17, burglarized a neighbor’s home with an adult cousin who was on parole. Patrick admitted to a juvenile wardship petition allegation of second degree burglary. Patrick told the probation officer who prepared a report for the hearing that he stole because he wanted marijuana and did not want to ask his parents for money and that he smoked marijuana up to three times a day and had not attended school regularly for a long time because of his marijuana use. The court adjudged Patrick a ward and placed him on probation, with conditions requiring him to “[s]ubmit person and any vehicle, room or property [and] any electronics and passwords under your control to search by Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any time.” Defense counsel objected, arguing there was no nexus between electronics and the burglary. The court of appeal declined to strike the condition entirely, but modified the reference to electronics to read: Submit all electronic devices under your control to a search of any text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night, and provide the probation or peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the information specified. View "In re Patrick F." on Justia Law