Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a juvenile male, was charged with second-degree murder and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order granting the government's motion to transfer juvenile proceedings for adult prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 5032. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by making findings regarding defendant's intellectual development and psychological maturity; the district court did not abuse its discretion by making a finding about the alleged discrepancy in individualized attention and counseling programs when comparing the adult and juvenile detention systems; and the district court's presumption of guilt for purposes of the transfer decision did not violate defendant's due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. JJ, Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the youth court found that E.M.R., a youth under the age of eighteen, had committed five misdemeanor offenses of "dog at large" and one felony offense of aggravated animal cruelty. The convictions stemmed from E.M.R.'s treatment of her dogs and horses. E.M.R. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the youth court's instruction to the jury on the legislative purpose of the Youth Court Act was prejudicial error and required reversal of the aggravated animal cruelty adjudication; and (2) the youth court correctly declined to dismiss the "dog at large" charges.View "State v. E.M.R." on Justia Law

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law

Two petitions were filed alleging that fifteen-year-old A.K. was a delinquent child for committing three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and four counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse involving three different children. After a hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated A.K. a delinquent on all seven counts. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that A.K. committed three acts of sexual abuse in the second degree and three acts that would constitute assaults with intent to commit sexual abuse; but (2) the State did not meet its burden to prove A.K. committed one count of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

After an amended petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging the Candice H., a juvenile, had possessed marijuana and drug paraphernalia, the juvenile court placed Candice under the supervision of a probation officer for an open-ended period of time. The next year, the juvenile court ordered that its jurisdiction should be terminated because Candice had reached the age of majority. The court also ordered that the record be sealed. The State appealed, contending that the juvenile court erred in ordering that the record be sealed without giving prior notice to the county attorney and without determining that Candice had satisfactorily completed her probation. The Supreme Court vacated the order sealing Candice's juvenile record, holding that the juvenile court erred in ordering that the record be sealed because (1) the order did not include a finding that Candice had satisfactorily completed her probation, and (2) the county attorney was not given the required notice of the proceeding to seal the record. View "In re Candice H." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, was indicted for murder in the second degree. The superior court judge dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to the grand jury to support an indictment of murder in the second degree. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the order dismissing the indictment, holding (1) contrary to the superior court judge's ruling, the evidence before the grand jury supported the indictment for murder in the second degree; but (2) the grand jury should have been, but was not, instructed by the prosecutor on the elements of murder and on the legal significance of the mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Walczak" on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 2152.83(A)(1) requires that a juvenile court issue on order classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time of the child's release from the custody of a secure facility. When he was eighteen years old, Appellant, a native of Haiti, was adjudicated to be a delinquent child and ordered to be committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS). After Appellant was released from DYS, he was held in jail until hearings could be conducted to determine his citizenship. When Appellant was released from jail and after he turned twenty-one, he filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the juvenile court from proceeding to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant. Appellant claimed the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to proceed because he was over twenty-one years old and because the court failed to hold a classification hearing within a reasonable time of his release from DYS. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that he juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to classify Appellant, who was no longer a "child" under the applicable statute. View "State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

Appellee committed an act on September 1, 2007 that, if committed by an adult, would constitute rape. On May 19, 2010, the juvenile court classified Appellee as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10. Appellee appealed, asserting that he should not be classified as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his offense before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute. The First District Court of Appeals agreed and reversed. Noting, however, that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered by stating that S.B. 10's classification, registration, and community-notification provisions may not be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007 repeal of Megan's Law and the January 1, 2008 effective date of S.B. 10's aforementioned provisions. View "In re Bruce S." on Justia Law

After a youth violated the terms of his initial probation agreement, the judicial district youth court revoked that agreement and entered a dispositional order that extended the youth's probationary period for an additional three years. The youth appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the youth court did not exceed its statutory authority and correctly and interpreted and applied the Youth Court Act by imposing on revocation an additional three-year probationary term that lasted until the youth's twenty-first birthday; and (2) the imposition of an additional three-year term of probation did not violate the youth's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. View "In re S.M.K." on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Hickman County, received a referral regarding allegations of abuse concerning the Andrews. A social worker was attempting to make contact when DCS received a second referral concerning the Andrews. Due to references to guns in the home and because the site visit was to be carried out at night, DCSs requested law enforcement to assist. The Sheriff’s Department dispatched two officers. Andrews was outside working when the group arrived and asked the officers to wait outside while he called the sheriff’s office. The Andrews claim that when Mr. Andrews opened the door, he was immediately followed into the house by a “whoosh of presence.” The Andrews claim that they granted permission for interviews of the children because they feared arrest or losing their children. The officers left the house and the Andrews acquiesced to the walk-through. No charges were filed and the assessment was closed as “no services indicated.” The Andrews filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the social workers, but affirmed with respect to an officer. View "Andrews v. Hickman County" on Justia Law