Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the younger child, a boy aged 2½ years, was brought to the emergency room by his mother. He had second-degree burns on his face. His mother had found him, injured, at the home of her boyfriend, who had been babysitting her two children. She did not live with the boyfriend. The children were determined to be neglected based on a finding of “environment injurious to their welfare.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court, noting that the evidence did not show that the mother had any prior indication that the boyfriend would not provide a safe environment and also noting that she immediately took the child to the hospital. The finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

In 2009, the State filed a petition against John Doe, charging that he was within the purview of Idaho's Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA) for delivery of a schedule III controlled substance, hydrocodone. The State and Doe's counsel reached an agreement whereby Doe admitted to the charge and, in exchange, the State waived proceedings to bring Doe into adult court. At the conclusion of Doe's sentencing hearing, the magistrate judge memorialized his ruling in a "decree" that was issued that same day. The decree stated, "It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that [Doe] is within the purview of the [JCA] and shall be placed on Formal Probation supervision not to exceed 2 years." In the first year of Doe's probation, he had two probation review hearings, both of which demonstrated good behavior. At Doe's one-year probation review hearing, Doe's counsel argued that the magistrate should convert his formal probation to an informal adjustment. Doe's counsel could not cite any authority for converting the sentence, but believed that the court had broad authority to do so based on the interests of justice. The State objected and argued that the court did not have authority to convert the formal probation to an informal adjustment. Ultimately, the magistrate court stated that it had the authority to convert the sentence and entered a "supplemental decree nunc pro tunc to date of original order," granting Doe an informal adjustment and dismissing the case. The magistrate then issued an Order Supplementing Decree that provided "Formal Probation converted to Informal Adjustment, nunc pro tunc 05/05/09." The State filed an appeal to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's order. The State timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Because it was improper for the magistrate to convert Doe's sentence, any subsequent dismissal or termination of the improperly substituted informal adjustment could not be upheld. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the 2009 decree. View "Idaho v. Doe (2012-09)" on Justia Law

Murdock, then 16, was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged his statements were the product of police coercion that rendered them involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the absence of a concerned adult during defendant's police detention. Defendant was able to clearly communicate and understand the questions posed to him. He was able to understand and give assent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. On tape defendant appeared mostly calm and collected. He did not appear frightened or under any intense coercion. Defendant was never threatened physically or mentally and there were no promises or assurances to defendant to contribute to a coercive atmosphere. Defendant was allowed access to food, drink, and restroom; his statements were the result of his own decisions. View "People v. Murdock" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Ashley W. as a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(1) for possession of marijuana. Ashley appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The court of appeals declined to address issues previously raised by Ashley in a motion to suppress, concluding she had failed to preserve the alleged errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Ashley's motion to suppress and in finding that she had waived her objection to the evidence at the adjudication hearing and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the order of adjudication. View "In re Ashley W." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a hearing to determine a juvenile's amenability to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system may be waived, and if so, what the standard for waiver should be. In this case, the juvenile court found an amenability hearing was not required because he had found probable cause, and the juvenile had been bound over to adult court in a prior case. The juvenile was subsequently found guilty of burglary, theft, vandalism, and criminal damaging. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a juvenile has a right to an amenability hearing to determine if the juvenile can remain within the juvenile justice system or be bound over to adult court; (2) the juvenile may waiver the right to the amenability hearing; and (3) here, the juvenile failed to conduct an amenability hearing before transferring the juvenile to adult court and erred by failing to ask the juvenile whether he was waiving the hearing. Remanded for an amenability hearing or proper waiver of it. View "State v. D.W." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a juvenile placed on juvenile probation, pleaded guilty to failing to follow an order of probation by violating curfew and failing to obey household rules. The circuit court then placed Petitioner in secure detention. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence was illegal. The second district court of appeal denied Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and certified conflict with the fifth district court of appeal's decision in M.P. v. State. The Supreme Court (1) approved the decision of the second district court of appeal denying Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (2) disapproved the decision of the fifth district court of appeal in M.P. to the extent it was inconsistent with this opinion. View "J.M. v. Gargett" on Justia Law

S.B., 14 years old, and a four-year-old girl played a game; both got undressed. S.B. was charged as a juvenile with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Evidence indicated that he suffered mild retardation and functioned as if seven or eight years old, not as a pedophile. The judge found him unfit for trial and set the matter for a “discharge” or “innocence only” hearing. The provision is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure but not in the Juvenile Court Act and allows an unfit individual to be ordered held for treatment. The evidence was found sufficient to support the charge, so S.B. was found “not not guilty.” Following outpatient evaluation, the court found S.B. still unfit, although neither mentally ill nor a threat to public safety, and ordered him to register as a sex offender. Because he had never been adjudicated delinquent, the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute on “discharge” or “innocence only” hearings may be applied to juveniles. S.B. can be required to register. Registration is required after “a finding not resulting in an acquittal,” following a discharge hearing on an applicable charge. The court construed the statute to allow petition for registration termination (not specified in the statute).View "In re S.B." on Justia Law