Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the single incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, voluntarily tested for drugs and alcohol, and agreed to participate in services. The court also highlighted that Elizabeth's children were healthy, well cared for, and showed no signs of abuse or neglect.The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(D). The court reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law

In 2018 and 2019, the appellant, a minor, committed a series of crimes, including seven street robberies, two burglaries, an attempted robbery resulting in murder, and the sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. The appellant was 16 and 17 years old at the time of these offenses. The People filed an 18-count petition against the appellant, including charges of murder, robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and sought to transfer the appellant to adult criminal court.The juvenile court held a transfer hearing and considered extensive evidence, including the appellant's family and social history, conduct in custody, and expert testimony. The court found that the appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system's timeframe and ordered the transfer to adult criminal court. The court's decision was based on the severity and sophistication of the crimes, the appellant's delinquent history, and the lack of sufficient time for rehabilitation before the juvenile court's jurisdiction expired.The appellant appealed the transfer order, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion and that the evidence did not support the transfer. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court found that the juvenile court had properly considered the statutory criteria for transfer and that substantial evidence supported the finding that the appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system. The order transferring the appellant to adult criminal court was affirmed. View "People v. J.S." on Justia Law

M.L., a 17-year-old, challenged a civil harassment restraining order issued to protect E.G., her mother's former romantic partner. E.G. sought the restraining order after M.L. posted E.G.'s personal information on social media, alleging E.G. supported M.L.'s mother in abusive conduct against M.L. and her younger brother, S.L. The restraining order prohibited M.L. from publishing E.G.'s contact information online and from defaming or harassing her. M.L. contended there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment and argued the trial court failed to consider circumstances making it unlikely the alleged harassment would continue or recur.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order and later granted a three-year civil harassment restraining order against M.L. The court found that M.L.'s social media posts constituted harassment, causing E.G. to receive threats and harassment from third parties. The court concluded that E.G. had met her burden by clear and convincing evidence, noting that M.L.'s conduct was likely to continue absent a restraining order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the imposition of the restraining order against M.L. but determined that the order should not extend beyond M.L.'s 18th birthday. The court modified the restraining order to expire on M.L.'s 18th birthday and affirmed the order as modified. The court directed the trial court to transmit a copy of the modified order for entry into the California Restraining and Protective Order System. View "E.G. v. M.L." on Justia Law

G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with her alleged father, R.R. In 2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services became involved when the mother failed to secure necessary mental health services for G.R. The mother did not have contact information for R.R. The juvenile court initially found R.R. to be G.R.'s alleged father, later amending the order to reflect this accurately. R.R. was incarcerated for domestic violence and had an extensive criminal history. The court denied services to R.R. and ordered no visits until he contacted the Department.In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her mother's custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In November 2020, R.R. expressed a desire to have a relationship with G.R., but did not follow through with setting up visits. In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition, which the juvenile court denied. By June 2023, G.R. had spoken with R.R. by phone but was not ready for in-person visits. In September 2023, the juvenile court appointed G.R.'s caregiver as her legal guardian, ordered monitored visits for R.R., and terminated its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court dismissed R.R.'s appeal of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visits, stating that as an alleged father, R.R. could not show he was aggrieved by the order. The court emphasized that an alleged father has no rights to custody, reunification services, or visits unless he establishes paternity and achieves presumed father status. R.R. did not establish paternity, and thus had no standing to appeal the visitation order. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law

The case involves a father (H.B.) appealing a juvenile court's disposition order that declared his two sons dependents of the court, placed them in the custody of their mother, and provided family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The father contested the findings, arguing that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings.The juvenile court sustained the petition's allegations, assumed jurisdiction over the children, and ordered their placement with the mother. The court found that the father posed a substantial danger to the children due to his substance abuse and poor parenting decisions, including providing drugs to his son. The court applied section 362, subdivision (c), rather than section 361, subdivision (c), concluding that the children were not removed from a custodial parent since they remained with their mother.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c), as the children were effectively removed from the father's custody. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding of substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's care. However, it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. The appellate court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing, instructing the juvenile court to make its decision based on the facts existing at the time of the new hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

A minor child, Baby Girl R., was abandoned by her mother, S.R., shortly after birth. S.R. gave birth in a homeless encampment and was using methamphetamines daily. Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to paranoia, delusions, and aggression. After being discharged, S.R. left Baby Girl R. at the hospital and returned to the encampment. The Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The court found that S.R.’s location was unknown despite reasonable efforts to locate her. Baby Girl R. appealed, arguing that the court should have bypassed reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.R. at the six-month review hearing and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot due to the termination of reunification services but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown despite a diligent search. The juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no legal guardian was available. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was absent from the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was argued to be his right under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously declared Juan a dependent, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. These services were terminated in August 2021. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights and ordered Juan to remain in foster care. In subsequent hearings, the court found Juan’s placement appropriate and continued to order permanent placement services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a right to be present at the hearing under section 349. The appellate court determined that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have led to additional support services to help him achieve his educational and employment goals. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024, permanency planning review hearing and remanded the case for a new hearing, ensuring Juan’s right to be present is upheld. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

The defendant, a 16-year-old student, was charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) under an aiding and abetting theory. The incident involved two other students, TI and CB, who attacked the victim by hitting and kicking him. The defendant did not participate in the physical attack but recorded the incident on his cell phone and shared the video with other students. The prosecution argued that the defendant's recording of the attack encouraged the assailants. Instead of filing a juvenile petition, the prosecution sought to try the defendant as an adult under the automatic waiver statute, arguing that the shoes worn by the assailants were used as dangerous weapons.The 53rd District Court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had aided and abetted the assault and bound him over to the criminal division of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the charges, concluding that a shoe could be used as a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the shoes did not constitute dangerous weapons and that the defendant was not armed with a dangerous weapon.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that for the criminal division of the circuit court to have jurisdiction under the automatic waiver statute, the juvenile defendant must be armed with a dangerous weapon. The Court found no evidence that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the assault. Consequently, the statutory requirements for automatic waiver were not met, and the criminal division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court to grant the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and transfer the case to the family division of the circuit court. View "People Of Michigan v. Oslund" on Justia Law

In 2013, an eleven-year-old juvenile was charged with rape of a child by force and assault and battery on a child with substantial injury after allegedly biting his four-year-old cousin's penis. The rape charge was dismissed, and the juvenile was placed on one year of pretrial probation for the reduced charge of simple assault and battery. The juvenile completed probation without incident, and the charge was dismissed. In 2023, the now twenty-two-year-old juvenile, with no other record, petitioned to expunge his record under a statute allowing expungement if the offense is no longer a crime.The Juvenile Court denied the expungement petition. The court found that the offenses of rape of a child by force and assault and battery remain criminal acts, regardless of the age of the perpetrator, and thus do not qualify for expungement under the statute. The court also noted that the juvenile's records were ineligible for time-based expungement due to the serious nature of the offenses.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Juvenile Court's decision. The court held that the 2018 legislative change, which excluded children under twelve from the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, did not alter the definition of what constitutes a "crime" for the purposes of expungement under the statute. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct itself has been decriminalized, not whether the individual can be prosecuted due to age. Since the conduct in question remains criminal, the juvenile's records do not qualify for expungement. View "Commonwealth v. Ambrose A." on Justia Law

In April 2022, H.H., the mother of A.E.E., was arrested for the murder of A.E.E.'s father. H.H. provided written consent for A.E.E. to be placed with the maternal aunt and uncle, A.V. and E.V., as emergency co-guardians. The maternal aunt and uncle filed a petition to be appointed as emergency and permanent co-guardians, which the paternal grandparents, K.B. and T.B., opposed, seeking guardianship themselves. The juvenile court appointed the maternal aunt and uncle as emergency co-guardians pending a full hearing. After a full hearing, the court appointed the maternal aunt and uncle as co-guardians, and the paternal grandparents did not appeal.Following H.H.'s conviction for murder and her life sentence without parole, the maternal aunt and uncle sought to relocate out of state with A.E.E. The paternal grandparents opposed this motion and sought to remove the maternal aunt and uncle as co-guardians. The juvenile court granted the relocation and denied the motion to remove the co-guardians, finding that the reasons for the original appointment had not changed and that it was in A.E.E.'s best interests to remain under their guardianship.The paternal grandparents appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the juvenile court erred in its decision, citing H.H.'s conviction and alleging false testimony by the maternal aunt and uncle. They also requested a presumption against appointing family members of a parent convicted of murdering the other parent as guardians. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court's findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the denial of the motion to modify the guardianship, concluding that the paternal grandparents failed to prove that removal or modification of the guardianship was in A.E.E.'s best interests. View "Interest of A.E.E." on Justia Law