Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed an order of the circuit court transferring appellee’s criminal case to the juvenile division of circuit court, asserting that the circuit court’s order granting the transfer was clearly erroneous. According to Ark. R. of App. P. Crim. 3, the appellant may not bring an interlocutory appeal from a juvenile-transfer order. The State argued it was not required to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3, as its right to appeal is derived from Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(l), which provides that any party may appeal from a transfer order. Based on precedent, when there is a conflict between the court’s procedural rules and a statutory provision, the statute is given deference only to the extent it is compatible with the rules. The Court held Rule 3 and Section 9-27-318(l) to be in direct conflict with each other and determined that Rule 3 governed the appeal. Because the appeal was not specifically permitted by the rule, the appeal was dismissed. View "State v. A.G." on Justia Law

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution. View "Kelso v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a thirteen-year old was denied due process rights when she was not appointed counsel at a truancy hearing. Despite a district court's order to attend school, E.S. missed classes from 2005 to 2007. At first, E.S. and her mother attended the hearings, but were not represented by counsel, nor did they ask that counsel be present. The court explained that E.S. would be "sentenced" to house arrest, work crew and detention if she did not comply with the order, but she continued to miss school. At E.S.' last court appearance, she was represented by counsel. She was ordered to spend six days in detention with electronic monitoring. E.S., through her attorney, filed a motion to have the home detention set aside, which was denied. The Court of Appeals vacated E.S.' sentence, finding that the child's "interests in her liberty, privacy and right to education [were] in jeopardy" at the truancy hearings, and that due process required counsel at each appearance. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the School District argued that Washington courts never required the appointment of counsel to protect a child's privacy and education interests. The Supreme Court agreed with the District. Upon review of the record, the state constitution and the applicable legal authority, the Court found that E.S. was not denied due process rights because she was not appointed counsel in the initial truancy hearings. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S." on Justia Law

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings. View "In the matter of J.A. " on Justia Law

D.B. and another boy were under 13 years of age when they engaged in sexual activity. The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent for rape based on the violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01(A)(1)(b), which prohibits one from engaging in sexual conduct with a person under the age of 13. On appeal, D.B. argued that application of the statute violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection. At issue was whether a child's constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected by the statute, the child is adjudicated as a delinquent based upon a violation of the statute. The appeals court affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that (1) as applied to offenders who are under 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is encouraged; and (2) application of the statute in this case violates equal protection because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly situated were not. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Respondent Cedric Kikuta was convicted by a jury for assault in the third degree after a physical altercation with his stepson. Respondent appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the parental discipline defense and on whether the assault in the third degree occurred during the course of a scuffle, or affray, entered into by mutual consent. The court of appeals (1) held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the parental discipline defense and (2) chose not to address Respondent's argument regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court regarding the parental discipline defense but vacated the judgment as to the lack of disposition regarding a mutual affray instruction. The Court held that (1) an instruction on the parental discipline defense is not per se precluded by the fact that substantial bodily injury occurred; (2) an instruction on the parental discipline defense must be given if there is some evidence to support each element of the defense; and (3) a mutual affray instruction must be given where there is some evidence the injury was inflicted during a fight entered into by mutual consent. View "State v. Kikuta" on Justia Law

Defendants, minors, committed arson by setting off a firecracker on a brush-covered hillside in Pasadena, causing a fire that burned five acres of forest land. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the requisite mental state of malice, as defined in the arson statutes, because defendants lit and threw the firecracker without intent to cause a fire or any other harm. The court held that, under the circumstances of the case, defendants' acts of intentionally igniting and throwing a firecracker amidst dry brush on a hillside, although done without intent to cause a fire or other harm, were sufficient to establish the requisite malice for arson. View "In re V.V.; In re J.H" on Justia Law

Colorado state law makes it a felony for a person to have unlawful sexual contact with a child while occupying a "position of trust." Petitioner Mark Pellman appealed an order of the Court of Appeals that found that he was in a position of trust at the time of the unlawful contact between himself and his child victim. Petitioner was a friend of the victim's family, and from 2000-2005, visited with the family, attended the same church, and babysat the victim. In 2005, Petitioner chaperoned a trip to an amusement park when the alleged contact took place. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was only in a position of trust at specific times, the last of which was when he chaperoned the amusement park trip. The appellate court rejected this argument, and after review, the Supreme Court rejected it as well. The Supreme Court found that under the language of the applicable statute, a defendant might be in a position of trust through an ongoing a continuous supervisory relationship with the victim, regardless of whether or not the defendant was performing a specific supervisory task at the time of the unlawful contact. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the appellate court and affirmed its decision. View "Pellman v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Appellant, a 15-year-old, was convicted of murdering her mother and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm possession. At issue was whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce, over defense counsel's objections, various items of evidence seized from appellant's bedroom during the police investigation, including photographs of her with dyed black hair and dark make-up; a document bearing the words of a "curse;" and seven different inscriptions of song lyrics and quotations attributed to various singers and other artists bearing themes of anguish, enslavement, atheism, and violence. The court held that the evidence was improper prejudicial character evidence where the nature of the evidence was highly inflammatory and evidence of appellant's guilt was entirely circumstantial and not overwhelming. Accordingly, the court could not say that it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict and therefore, reversed appellant's conviction.

In 2009, a petition for abuse and neglect was filed in circuit court regarding N.A, I.A, C.P. and M.P. The petition was filed against the children's biological mother and their maternal grandparents, all of whom were alleged to have care and custody of the children as they all resided at the grandparents' home. The petition was based on allegations of domestic abuse between the mother and grandfather in the presence of the children. At an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children's mother had neglected her children. The circuit court ordered that the Department of Health and Human Resources retain legal custody of the children while physical custody remained with the grandparents so long as the mother had no contact with them. DHHR found that the grandparents consistently violated the "no-contact" order of the court. The children were eventually placed in foster care. "Joshua G." was listed on the petition, but was not accused of any abuse. Joshua was the biological father of M.P. He petitioned the court for sole custody of M.P. The court denied his request. Among the issues all parents brought on appeal were whether the circuit court erred by (1) denying Joshua custody of M.P.; and, (2) denying the grandparents' request for physical custody of all the children. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the issues presented on appeal. Rather, the Court remanded the case for additional hearings at the circuit court. The Court considered that though the record reflects the extent to which the children were abused, it acknowledged that the children still have strong bonds with their grandparents. "It is imperative . . . that the circuit court focus on whether such continued contact [with the grandparents] is in the best interest of the children." The Court advised DHHR to develop a permanency plan for the children so that the siblings remain together. "The lower court faces a Herculean task of requiring wisdom, compassion and the strength to protect the children to the greatest degree possible from physical and emotional harm, and to create stability and safety."