Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, then age sixteen, was arrested and charged with ten offenses and arraigned as a youthful offender under General Statutes 54-76c et seq. Following the arraignment, the state filed a motion to transfer defendant's case to the regular criminal docket. At issue was whether the Appellate Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed for lack of a final judgment the interlocutory appeal of defendant from an order of the trial court transferring his case from the youthful offender docket of the Superior Court to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to sections 54-76c(b)(1). The court held that the trial court's order was not an appealable order under State v. Curcio where it did not conclude the rights of defendant regarding his status as a youth offender. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant appealed from the decision of the trial court granting the state's motion to transfer defendant's case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes 54-57c(b)(1). At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to transfer without first holding a hearing on the motion in violation of defendant's right to due process under the federal constitution. The court held that section 54-76c(b) required a hearing on the adult docket prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket, that this statutory requirement satisfied due process, and that neither section 54-76c(b)(1) nor due process entitled defendant to a hearing before the court on the youthful offender docket.

Meridian H. is a 3-year-old girl who had been in foster care for all but a few weeks of her life. Her presumed biological father had died before she was born, and her biological motherâs parental rights were terminated. She had two minor siblings who were adopted before she was born. Meridianâs adoptive parents, on behalf of the siblings, intervened in the juvenile courtâs proceedings to request that Meridian be placed in their home in Minnesota to keep the siblings together. Meridianâs maternal grandparents also intervened and filed a cross appeal seeking custody. The juvenile court denied the requests, and the adoptive parents and maternal grandparents appealed. The Supreme Court was ânot persuaded that it would be logical or prudent to conclude that a constitutionally protected sibling relationship somehow [rose] from the ashes of a lawfully terminated or relinquished parent-child relationship.â The Court concluded that neither the adoptive parents, the siblings nor the maternal grandparents had standing to challenge the juvenile courtâs ruling. The Court dismissed the appeals.

Appellant petitioned for his son's transfer to Israel for custody adjudication alleging that his son had been wrongfully detained in Iowa by the child's mother. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the parties' intention was to make Iowa the habitual residence where the district court emphasized the son's perspective that the settled purpose of his relocation to Iowa was to reside there habitually. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the parties' intent at the time of the move was to make Iowa the son's habitual residence whether the district court emphasized the son's perspective or the parents' perspectives; that the parties maintained no home in Israel after coming to Iowa and appellant spent two months closing down his business before rejoining his family in the United States; that it appeared that the family did intend to "abandon" Israel; and any agreement of the pair to return to Israel would have involved staying in the United States for the indefinite amount of time it would take the mother to finish her doctorate.

The biological mother of the child at issue appealed from the order allowing the father and stepmother's petition to adopt the minor child to proceed without the mother's consent because she did not pay child support for a year before the petition was filed. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the petition for adoption to proceed without the consent of the mother and whether evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the mother had willfully failed to pay child support. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother willfully failed to support her child where she failed to take the necessary steps to become employed and support her child and that she failed to demonstrate that, through whatever means were available to her, she had not forgotten her legal obligation to support her child. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's findings.

The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.

The mother of a child who was the subject of care and protection in a proceeding in Juvenile Court appealed from a judgment denying her petition for relief from an order placing the child in temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families ("department"). At issue was whether the denial of extraordinary relief was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the judge's findings clearly supported her determination where the department made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child by placing the mother in two successive foster homes to help her learn better parenting skills and there was no reason to believe that a third placement would have been more successful. The court also held that the judge did not err in holding that the child was suffering from serious abuse or neglect in the mother's custody.

After a jury found defendant guilty of various federal sex crimes, the district court sentenced her to 120 months in prison and the court reversed the sentence, holding that it was unreasonable. The Supreme Court subsequently granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Pepper v. United States. The court again vacated the 120 month sentence and remanded for resentencing where the district court could consider evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation on defendant's part, including, but not limited to, any rehabilitation after sentencing. The court also ordered the district court to ensure the child victim received any restitution to which she was entitled from defendant.

The government sought an injunction under the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201-219, based on the boarding school's use of uncompensated minors in its kitchen and housekeeping departments, agricultural operations, auto repair shop, Sanitarium, and other operations. The district court concluded that the students are not employees and, therefore, not subject to the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected the school's claim that students in a vocational program can never be considered employees and the government's argument that the test of whether "trainees" are employees should apply, and applied a "primary benefit" test. The school staff is sufficient to perform the work even if the students did not work and the school is not at competitive advantage with respect to the work; the students benefit from hands-on training in an accredited program that is run consistently with their parents' religious beliefs.