Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Andrew McCurdy entered a plea agreement in February 2022, pleading guilty to felony criminal mischief and agreeing to pay restitution. The District Court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which included McCurdy’s juvenile records without a Youth Court order. McCurdy filed motions to strike the juvenile records from the PSI and to determine his ability to pay certain fees. The District Court denied the motion to strike, stating the records were provided pursuant to a court order, and imposed a $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs without inquiring into McCurdy’s ability to pay.The Eleventh Judicial District Court denied McCurdy’s motion to strike his juvenile records, reasoning that the records were provided under a court order and could be considered at sentencing. The court also imposed the PSI fee and probation supervision costs without determining McCurdy’s ability to pay, despite his motion requesting such an inquiry. McCurdy appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision to include McCurdy’s juvenile records in the PSI, finding that any error in the procedure was harmless as McCurdy did not demonstrate prejudice. However, the Supreme Court reversed the imposition of the $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs, noting that the District Court failed to inquire into McCurdy’s ability to pay, as required by law. The case was remanded for the District Court to conduct the necessary inquiry into McCurdy’s financial situation before imposing these costs. View "State v. McCurdy" on Justia Law

Kenneth D. was born prematurely and tested positive for amphetamine and syphilis. His mother admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The Placer County Department of Health and Human Services filed a juvenile dependency petition to remove Kenneth from his mother and her partner, T.D., due to suspected drug use. Initial inquiries about potential Native American heritage were made, but both mother and T.D. denied having any. Kenneth was placed in temporary custody.The Placer County Superior Court recognized T.D. as the presumed father based on a voluntary declaration of paternity and Kenneth’s birth certificate. Kenneth was adjudged a dependent and removed from the parents' custody. The court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. Later, J.T. was confirmed as Kenneth’s biological father, but the court did not inquire about his potential Native American heritage. The court terminated parental rights and approved an adoption plan, again finding ICWA did not apply. J.T. appealed, arguing the failure to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, absent exceptional circumstances, an appellate court may not consider postjudgment evidence to conclude that an ICWA inquiry error was harmless. The court emphasized that the sufficiency of an ICWA inquiry must generally be determined by the juvenile court in the first instance. The Court of Appeal’s consideration of postjudgment evidence was deemed erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and directed a conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights, remanding the case for compliance with ICWA and California implementing statutes. View "In re Kenneth D." on Justia Law

Tina Sully, a foster parent for the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was charged with multiple counts of abusing her three adopted children. The charges stemmed from an incident where 13-year-old C.S. ran away from home and reported to neighbors and authorities that Sully had physically abused her and withheld food. An investigation revealed similar allegations from two other foster children, D.F.H. and G.S. Sully was indicted on ten counts, including assault with a dangerous weapon and felony child abuse.The first trial in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. The court scheduled a second trial to begin eighteen days later. Sully requested a continuance twice, citing her counsel's scheduling conflicts and the unavailability of key defense witnesses, but both motions were denied. The second trial proceeded, and Sully objected to the admission of several out-of-court statements under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) and 807, which the court admitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sully's motions for a continuance, as she failed to demonstrate how the denial prejudiced her defense. The court also found that even if the admission of the challenged hearsay statements was erroneous, it was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence against Sully, including testimony from C.S., medical professionals, and other witnesses.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Sully's convictions on all counts related to C.S. The court concluded that the denial of the continuance and the admission of hearsay evidence did not warrant a new trial. View "United States v. Sully" on Justia Law

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

In 1984, Roger Scott Helm, Jr., then 14 years old, murdered his adoptive parents and stepsister. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder. Helm pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder with eligibility for parole after 25 years, followed by consecutive sentences totaling an additional 42 years for the other counts.Helm's case was transferred from juvenile to adult court, and he was sentenced after a detailed hearing where the court considered mitigating factors such as his age and drug influence, as well as aggravating factors like his lack of remorse and dangerousness. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the consecutive sentences on direct appeal.Helm later filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Helm's habeas corpus petition. The court assumed, for argument's sake, that Helm's sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. However, it concluded that Helm's sentence complied with Miller because the trial judge had discretion and considered Helm's youth before imposing the sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Helm's habeas corpus petition, holding that Helm's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and clarified in Jones v. Mississippi. View "Helm v. Thornell" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

A juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender for unarmed carjacking, unarmed assault with intent to rob, and assault and battery on an elder. The charges stemmed from an incident where the juvenile, after escaping from a secure facility, attacked an elderly man and stole his car. The juvenile pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years in a house of correction followed by five years of probation.The Juvenile Court initially sentenced the juvenile to a house of correction, but after multiple probation violations, including missing appointments and being involved in new offenses, the court sentenced him to State prison. The juvenile appealed the sentence, arguing it was unlawful and that the judge did not adequately consider his well-being and the impact of recent literature on juvenile brain development.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile's sentence was lawful under G. L. c. 119, § 58, which allows for adult sentences, including State prison, for youthful offenders. The court determined that the Juvenile Court judge had appropriately considered the juvenile's criminal history, noncompliance with probation, and the need for public safety. The court also concluded that the judge did not need to make specific written findings on the impact of juvenile brain development literature.Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Appellate Division of the Superior Court is authorized to review sentences to State prison imposed by the Juvenile Court on youthful offenders. This ensures that youthful offenders have the same procedural safeguards as adult criminal defendants. The court affirmed the juvenile's sentence and allowed for the appeal to the Appellate Division. View "Commonwealth v. Y." on Justia Law

Brandon H. was the subject of three juvenile wardship petitions. He sought to have the first and third petitions dismissed and sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The juvenile court denied his request, reasoning that the sustained allegations in the second petition precluded the dismissal and sealing of any of the petitions. The court failed to consider each petition individually.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially adjudged Brandon a ward of the court and placed him on probation following the first petition, which alleged felony grand theft. While on probation, a second petition was filed, alleging second-degree robbery and other offenses, which was sustained, and Brandon was committed to a treatment program. A third petition, filed in San Francisco County, alleged felony grand theft and misdemeanor battery. Brandon admitted to these charges, and the case was transferred back to Contra Costa County, where his wardship continued. Upon completing probation, Brandon requested the dismissal and sealing of the first and third petitions, which the court denied, treating the petitions as a single entity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court erred by not considering each petition individually for dismissal and sealing under section 786. The appellate court found that the third petition must be dismissed and sealed as Brandon met the criteria for satisfactory completion of probation for that petition. However, the first petition could not be dismissed and sealed because Brandon did not meet the criteria due to new findings of wardship for felony offenses during the probation period for the first petition. The appellate court remanded the case to dismiss and seal the third petition but affirmed the decision regarding the first petition. View "In re Brandon H." on Justia Law

The juvenile in this case was on probation after being adjudicated as a youthful offender for breaking and entering a vehicle with intent to commit a felony. While on probation, he began experiencing severe mental health issues, including hallucinations and delusions, which led him to obtain a firearm illegally. His mother called the police, and he was found in possession of a loaded firearm without a license. This led to new criminal charges and a notice of probation violation for not obeying state laws.The Juvenile Court judge found that the juvenile violated his probation by possessing the firearm and revoked his probation, sentencing him to incarceration. The judge ruled that the defense of lack of criminal responsibility was not available in probation violation hearings but considered the juvenile's mental illness in determining the disposition. The juvenile appealed, arguing that due process requires allowing the defense of lack of criminal responsibility in probation violation hearings.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility is not required in probation violation hearings. The court reasoned that the primary inquiry in such hearings is whether the probationer violated a condition of probation, not whether the probationer is criminally responsible. However, the court acknowledged that evidence of mental illness is relevant to determining whether a violation was willful and in deciding the appropriate disposition. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no error in the judge's ruling or abuse of discretion in revoking the juvenile's probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Z." on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved with A.N.'s family after the Rhode Island State Police informed them that A.N.'s father, Francis N., had been arrested on felony charges, including indecent solicitation of a child and electronically disseminating indecent material to a minor. Following his arrest, DCYF initiated an investigation and found that Francis had admitted to soliciting sex from a fictitious 13-year-old girl online. Consequently, DCYF filed a neglect petition against Francis, alleging that he failed to provide A.N. with proper care and supervision.The Family Court granted DCYF temporary custody of A.N. and later held a permanency hearing, ordering that A.N. remain in DCYF's care. Despite DCYF's efforts to engage Francis in services and case planning, he refused to comply, including declining to submit to a sex offender evaluation. During the neglect petition hearing, Francis invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination multiple times when questioned about his criminal charges and his involvement with A.N. The Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Francis neglected A.N., citing his failure to provide care, supervision, or guardianship, and his lack of engagement with DCYF.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decree. The Supreme Court held that it was proper for the Family Court to draw adverse inferences from Francis's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right in a civil proceeding. The Court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Family Court's finding of neglect, noting Francis's refusal to engage in necessary services, his lack of financial support for A.N., and his displacement of A.N. from the family home. The Supreme Court concluded that Francis's actions demonstrated a disregard for A.N.'s safety and needs. View "In re A.N." on Justia Law