Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
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Hunter de la Garza, a former employee of the Northwest Arkansas Children’s Shelter, was convicted of raping a ten-year-old female resident of the Shelter. The incident occurred during an outing to a mall, where de la Garza followed the victim into a restroom, forcibly undressed her, and raped her. The victim disclosed the rape to her brother and a friend, and later to a professional interviewer. The Shelter’s staff observed behavioral changes in the victim consistent with sexual abuse. De la Garza was interviewed by police and provided inconsistent accounts of the events.The Benton County Circuit Court denied de la Garza’s motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court also allowed testimony from another young female resident of the Shelter, who described similar abuse by de la Garza, under the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. The jury found de la Garza guilty and sentenced him to life in prison. De la Garza’s motion for a new trial was denied.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the victim’s testimony, along with corroborating evidence, constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of the other young resident under the pedophile exception. Additionally, the court determined that de la Garza’s arguments regarding prosecutorial comments were not preserved for appeal, as he failed to contemporaneously object or request further relief during the trial. The court conducted a Rule 4-3(a) review and found no prejudicial error. View "HUNTER DE LA GARZA v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

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B.V. and L.T. are the parents of two children, B.V. and B.V. The children were removed from their home in February 2021 after being left unattended at a crime scene for 13 hours. B.V. was arrested for attempted murder and burglary, and L.T. could not be located. A temporary custody order was issued to the Mountain Lakes Human Service Zone. B.V. was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with an estimated release date in January 2030. L.T. has not had contact with the Zone since the termination of parental rights petition was filed.The children were adjudicated as needing protection in October 2021, and a 12-month custody order was issued to the Zone. A permanency hearing in November 2022 extended the custody order by six months. The children were taken to Arizona by their maternal aunt in April 2023, but the placement was unsuccessful, and they returned to North Dakota in September 2023. L.T. sporadically attempted visitation but lost contact with the Zone in February 2024. B.V. had minimal contact with the Zone and did not engage in the services offered.The Juvenile Court of Rolette County terminated B.V. and L.T.'s parental rights on October 18, 2024. B.V. appealed, arguing that the Zone did not make active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious harm to the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination of B.V.'s parental rights. The court found that the Zone made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, including offering supervised visits and conducting relative searches. The court also found that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children, supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness. View "Interest of B.V." on Justia Law

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Mother conceived M.N. with Father in summer 2020. Before M.N. was born, Mother and her boyfriend initiated adoption proceedings without informing the adoption agency about Father. M.N. was born on March 23, 2021, and Father requested a DNA test at the hospital. In April 2021, Mother and her boyfriend signed adoption consent forms, and the adoption agency petitioned for termination of parental rights. After being identified as a potential father, Father was served notice of the adoption and filed a paternity action within the required timeframe. Genetic testing confirmed Father as the biological father.The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding he failed to file with the putative fathers registry. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court improperly terminated Father’s rights under § 8-533(B)(6) without considering his rights as a potential father under § 8-106. The court of appeals held that genetic testing established Father as a presumed legal father, exempting him from filing with the putative fathers registry.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if a potential father served with a § 8-106 notice must file a notice of a claim of paternity with the putative fathers registry under § 8-106.01. The court held that a potential father identified and served notice under § 8-106(G) is not required to file with the putative fathers registry. The court emphasized that the potential fathers statute and the putative fathers statute address separate classifications of fathers, each with distinct rights and obligations. The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the juvenile court’s termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.N." on Justia Law

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Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law

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The case involves three consolidated appeals concerning the constitutionality of the Child Victims Act of 2023, which retroactively eliminated the statute of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. The plaintiffs, who are alleged survivors of childhood sexual abuse, filed lawsuits against various institutions, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the Board of Education of Harford County, and The Key School, Inc. The defendants argued that the 2023 Act unconstitutionally abrogated their vested rights by reviving claims that were previously time-barred.In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the court denied the Archbishop’s motion to dismiss, determining that the relevant statute was a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and thus did not create vested rights. The Circuit Court for Harford County reached a similar conclusion regarding the Board of Education of Harford County. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the court certified the question of the 2023 Act’s constitutionality to the Supreme Court of Maryland without ruling on The Key School’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2017 statute, which the 2023 Act amended, was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations is a procedural device that does not create vested rights, whereas a statute of repose creates substantive rights that cannot be retroactively abrogated. The court concluded that the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights and was constitutional as applied to the defendants. The court applied heightened rational basis review and found that the 2023 Act bore a real and substantial relation to addressing the problem of delayed reporting of child sexual abuse and the need for justice for survivors. The judgments of the lower courts were affirmed, and the certified question was answered in the negative. View "Archbishop of Washington v. Doe" on Justia Law

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Benjamin Trane established a private therapeutic boarding school for troubled youth, which was shut down after a police raid. Trane was charged with sexual abuse of a minor, sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, and child endangerment. The first two charges involved an underage female victim, while the third charge involved two boys placed in isolation rooms. A jury found Trane guilty on all counts. On direct appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court conditionally affirmed his convictions but remanded for a hearing on a rape shield issue, preserving his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief (PCR) proceedings.In the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Trane alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to sever the child endangerment count and for not objecting to the marshaling instruction on that count. The district court rejected the severance claim, finding Trane made an informed decision to forego a motion for severance to avoid delay. However, the court ordered a new trial on the child endangerment charge, finding that the marshaling instruction allowed a nonunanimous verdict, thereby prejudicing Trane.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's finding that Trane chose to forego a motion to sever the child endangerment count. However, the court reversed the district court's order for a new trial on the child endangerment charge. The court agreed that the marshaling instruction was erroneous but found no prejudice because both child victims were similarly situated, and there was no reasonable probability that jurors did not find Trane guilty of endangering both children. Thus, the court affirmed the denial of relief on the severance claim and reversed the order for a new trial on the child endangerment charge. View "Trane v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

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The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

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A juvenile was involved in an altercation at the Barnstable District and Juvenile Court, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The incident was captured on video, showing the juvenile and the victim engaging in a physical fight. The juvenile had a prior continuance without a finding (CWOF) after admitting to sufficient facts for an assault and battery charge.The Juvenile Court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on both charges and sentenced him to one year of probation for each. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge because a CWOF after an admission to sufficient facts should not count as a prior offense under G. L. c. 119, § 52. The Appeals Court did not review the case as it was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts is sufficient to establish a first offense under § 52. Therefore, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency for both disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The court affirmed the adjudications, concluding that the juvenile did not act in self-defense and that his actions met the criteria for disorderly conduct. View "Commonwealth v. Fayad F." on Justia Law

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J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

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Jennifer Harmon’s son, N.J., died by suicide while residing at the Bruce Normile Juvenile Justice Center (BNJJC) under the care of the Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri. Harmon filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her son’s death, including various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state wrongful death claims against the Second Circuit, several named defendants from both the Second Circuit and BNJJC, Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH), and several named defendants from PFH. All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Second Circuit and Government Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the claims against the Second Circuit were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and the state tort claims against the Government Defendants were barred by official immunity. Harmon appealed these immunity judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Harmon’s claims against the Second Circuit, holding that the Second Circuit is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Missouri has not waived. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants, concluding that the Government Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Harmon failed to show that any constitutional violation was clearly established. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s state tort claims against the Government Defendants, holding that the Government Defendants were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because Harmon failed to plead both the existence of a department-mandated policy and a breach of that policy. View "Harmon v. Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri" on Justia Law