Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a mother, Brittany B., who appealed from juvenile court orders that found her two children, B.D. and C.D., to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and placed them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court sustained a petition based on allegations that C.D. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates, and that the mother’s substance abuse placed both children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The mother contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously reversed the orders. The mother had tested positive for opiates during her pregnancy and at the time of C.D.'s birth. However, C.D. did not display any symptoms of withdrawal, and the mother was attentive to both children. The DCFS did not seek to detain the children, but it did open a case and seek court supervision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three agreed with the mother's contention and reversed the juvenile court's orders. The court found that while the mother had used prescription drugs during her pregnancy, there was no substantial evidence that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the mother's substance abuse. The court also found that the mother's refusal to voluntarily submit to drug testing did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). View "In re B.D." on Justia Law

Joseph McGrain was sentenced to 264 months in prison for sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter and obstructing the investigation into the abuse. The district court applied a two-offense-level enhancement under section 2G2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines because the victim was in McGrain’s “custody, care, or supervisory control” when he abused her. The court also denied McGrain an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he merited an enhancement for obstruction of justice and continued to deny his sexual relationship with the victim and that he convinced her to send him sexually explicit images.McGrain appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that each was reversible error and that his sentence should be vacated. He also requested that his case be assigned to a different judge on remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court rejected McGrain's arguments, stating that the "custody, care, or supervisory control" enhancement was correctly applied given McGrain's relationship with the victim. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, stating that McGrain had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Finally, the court found no error in the district court's determination that McGrain was dangerous, which factored into his sentencing. View "United States v. McGrain" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old student, K.M., was found in possession of a folding knife on school grounds. The incident occurred when a campus supervisor took K.M. to the principal's office after a report of him vaping in the school bathroom. K.M. consented to a search of his backpack, which revealed two vape pens and a folding knife with two rusted blades. Later, the principal received a report that K.M. had threatened another student with the knife earlier in the day. Consequently, a police officer issued K.M. a citation for brandishing a knife and for possession of a knife on school grounds.The prosecution filed a wardship petition alleging that K.M. brought a weapon onto school property and brandished the knife. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing, where the principal and the police officer testified. The court found K.M. guilty of the first count, designating the offense a felony, and dismissed the second count due to insufficient evidence. The court did not check the box indicating that it had found clear proof that K.M. knew his action was wrong. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, K.M.'s counsel argued that K.M. did not know he was breaking any rules when he had the knife at school because his father told him the knife was legal. The court declared K.M. a ward of the court and placed him on probation for six months.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, K.M. argued that the prosecution did not prove, and the evidence does not support an implied finding, that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the incident. The court agreed with K.M., stating that there was no clear and convincing evidence that K.M. understood the wrongfulness of possessing a knife on school grounds. The court found insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's implied finding that K.M. understood the wrongfulness of bringing a knife onto school property at the time of the incident. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, A.M., who was convicted as an adult for a murder committed when he was 14 years old. A.M. was a member of a local gang and was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member, S.S. The jury found that A.M. had used a deadly weapon and committed the crime for the benefit of his gang. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in state prison.Years later, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court law. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment. A.M. contended that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, found that A.M.'s case was nonfinal when the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment. Therefore, Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391, which bars a juvenile court from transferring a 14- or 15-year-old to adult criminal court, applied. The court also agreed with A.M.'s contention that Assembly Bill 333 required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court and vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance. The court remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new order denying the district attorney’s motion and to hold a dispositional hearing treating A.M.’s murder conviction as a juvenile adjudication. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

In the summer of 2022, two cousins, 17-year-old B.K. and 15-year-old S.K., visiting from Illinois, threw stolen fireworks into a Costco trash bin, causing a fire that resulted in property damage. The juveniles admitted to one delinquent act of criminal mischief each, while allegations of theft were dismissed by the State. Costco sought restitution for approximately $25,000, an amount initially considered by the State as “very unreasonable.” After a restitution hearing, the juvenile court issued a restitution order for $28,750, enforceable as a civil-judgment lien, holding the juveniles jointly and severally responsible for payment in full.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, holding that the restitution orders amount to enforceable judgment liens. The panel acknowledged that the governing statute does not expressly state that the restitution order is a judgment lien or that the juvenile court may enter the restitution order as a civil judgment. However, the court found the criminal restitution statute, which does consider a restitution order as a judgment lien, instructive.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the juvenile court lacked the authority to enforce its order as a civil-judgment lien. The court found that the juvenile restitution statute does not contain language that characterizes restitution as a civil judgment. The court also emphasized that Indiana courts must construe the juvenile code liberally to ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation. The court concluded that reading a judgment-lien provision into the Juvenile Restitution Statute runs counter to these statutory directives. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the restitution order in light of the court's holding. View "B. K. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The appellant, A.G., was arraigned on four juvenile delinquency petitions for attempted robbery, attempted first degree assault, reckless conduct, and falsifying physical evidence when he was 17 years old. The Circuit Court found probable cause and determined that A.G. met the standard for secure detention, placing him at the Youth Detention Services Unit (YDSU). The State later filed a petition to certify A.G. as an adult and transfer the case to superior court, which remains pending. As A.G. was about to turn 18, a hearing was held to address his placement. The court ruled that A.G. would be transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Corrections (HOC) upon his eighteenth birthday.A.G. appealed this decision, arguing that the circuit court lacks authority to order his detention at the HOC. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, stating that the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute. The court found no statutory authority for the circuit court to detain A.G. at the HOC, as he has neither been adjudicated delinquent nor certified as an adult.The State argued that the circuit court could continue A.G.’s detention at YDSU, even after his eighteenth birthday, while awaiting action on the petition to certify him as an adult. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the term "minor" in the relevant statute continues to apply to A.G. after his eighteenth birthday. The court reversed the trial court’s order transferring A.G. to the HOC and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, Jose R., who was declared a ward of the court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. This followed his admission, as part of a plea deal, that he had committed an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The case arose from a shooting incident in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, resulting in a victim's death. Initially, Jose was charged with first-degree murder, but the charge was later amended to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, which Jose admitted to.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Jose's motion to apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term, instead applying the 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term. Jose appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err in applying Jose's precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement. The court based its decision on the clear statutory language in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement. The court also rejected Jose's argument that the legislative scheme violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not violate equal protection principles, even if they resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits. View "In re Jose R." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Audrey Mae Lessner, who was convicted of felony child abuse under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (2023) after a bench trial. The charges stemmed from an incident where Lessner, while babysitting an 11-year-old child identified as FF, spanked the child eleven times with a belt as punishment for lying. The spanking resulted in significant bruising on the child's thigh. Lessner appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue the trial and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that she did not engage in reasonable corporal punishment.Prior to the trial in the District Court of Sweetwater County, Lessner had sought to represent herself, a request that the court granted after advising her of the risks. She later filed a motion for an extension of time, claiming that the prosecution was not assisting her in obtaining information for a subpoena. However, she later informed the court that she no longer needed an extension and was ready for trial. On the first day of the bench trial, Lessner filed a motion for an emergency hearing, asserting that she was not ready to proceed because the State was denying some discovery. The court denied her motion and proceeded with the trial.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lessner's motion to continue the trial. The court also found that the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the physical injury inflicted on the child was not the result of reasonable corporal punishment. The court noted that Lessner's actions, including her decision to use a belt to avoid injuring her hand and her refusal to stop spanking the child other than to rest her arm, did not represent a method of correction but rather an adult who had lost control of her own responses. View "Lessner v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that three children were at risk due to the actions of their mother, M.S., and their alleged father, P.F. The Agency claimed that the children were at risk of suffering serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.'s domestic violence towards M.S. and his substance abuse issues. The Agency also alleged that M.S. had allowed P.F. to stay in her home despite a restraining order against him. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in part, released the children to M.S., and ordered the family to participate in therapy. M.S. appealed this decision.The lower courts had previously reviewed this case and made several findings. The juvenile court found that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm due to the domestic violence perpetrated by P.F. towards M.S. The court also found that P.F. had substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children. The court denied M.S.'s request to dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered M.S. and the children to participate in family therapy.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that an alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s declaration of dependency and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not granting M.S.'s request to dismiss the case and instead ordering family therapy. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law