Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a seventeen-year-old, was convicted of the abduction and murder of eighty-nine-year-old Elleze Kennedy. Along with his co-defendants, the defendant followed Ms. Kennedy home, assaulted her, and placed her in the trunk of her car. They later set the car on fire, resulting in Ms. Kennedy's death from carbon monoxide poisoning. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole.The Superior Court of Onslow County initially sentenced the defendant to life without parole. The Court of Appeals upheld this sentence, finding no error. The defendant then filed a motion for appropriate relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which requires consideration of a juvenile's age and potential for rehabilitation before imposing a life without parole sentence. The Superior Court held a resentencing hearing and reaffirmed the life without parole sentence, considering the Miller factors.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant's J.E.B. claim, alleging gender bias in jury selection, was procedurally barred because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to sentence the defendant to life without parole, finding that the sentencing court properly considered the Miller factors, including the defendant's age, immaturity, ability to appreciate risks, prior record, mental health, and potential for rehabilitation. The court concluded that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in weighing these factors and that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Sims" on Justia Law

In this case, the Alameda County Social Services Agency removed an eight-year-old girl, L., from her mother, L.W., after the mother was hospitalized due to a mental health crisis. L. had been living with her mother, stepfather, maternal grandmother, and siblings. The family had recently moved to a homeless shelter. When the mother left the shelter and did not return, the shelter called the police, and L. was taken into protective custody. The mother later contacted the Agency, explaining she had a mental health breakdown and was hospitalized. She had bipolar disorder and schizophrenia but had resumed taking her medication and was receiving psychiatric care.The juvenile court found that the mother’s mental health issues and the lack of a safe caregiver justified dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The court ordered L. to be placed with her biological father and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The mother appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the court’s findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found no evidence that L. was left without a safe caregiver, as she was with her grandmother at the shelter. The court also found that the mother’s mental health was stable, and she was receiving treatment. There was no substantial evidence that the mother’s mental illness or purported substance abuse placed L. at substantial risk of physical harm or illness. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g).The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and vacated the disposition order and all subsequent orders as moot. View "In re L.W." on Justia Law

A mother (TH) appeals a juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan for her minor child (LH) from reunification to adoption. LH was taken into state custody shortly after birth due to both mother and child testing positive for opiates. The mother has another child, RH, who remained in her custody. The mother argues that the juvenile court did not consider LH's relationship with RH and that it abused its discretion by changing the plan to adoption despite her maintaining sobriety for six months.The District Court of Park County initially placed LH in the custody of the Department of Family Services (Department) and ordered the mother to abstain from controlled substances and undergo drug testing. Despite entering inpatient treatment and attending counseling, the mother continued to test positive for illegal substances, leading to suspended visitations with LH. The Department recommended changing the permanency plan to adoption after the mother failed to maintain sobriety and secure stable housing and employment.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the juvenile court had ample evidence of LH's relationship with RH and the potential for sibling separation. The juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan to adoption was based on the mother's failure to make sufficient progress on her case plan goals, particularly her sobriety and obtaining a stable living environment, within the statutory timeframe. The court emphasized that children have a right to stability and permanency, which outweighed the mother's progress in the months leading up to the permanency hearing.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, allowing the Department to cease reunification efforts. View "In re L.H. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2001, a 17-year-old Morris Mullins killed a 78-year-old widow, Amy Davis, and was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At the sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins’s dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluation but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins’s appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the sentencing court properly considered Mullins’s youth and potential for change as required by Miller and subsequent cases. The court found that the sentencing judge’s comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins’s capacity for change, undermining confidence in the constitutionality of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider the constitutional implications of Mullins’s youth and potential for rehabilitation. View "Galassi v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2001, Morris Mullins, then seventeen, killed a seventy-eight-year-old widow, Amy Davis, in her home. He was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins's dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluations but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory JLWOP for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins's appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether Mullins's JLWOP sentence was constitutional. The court held that the sentencing judge's comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins's capacity for change, which undermined confidence in the appropriateness of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins's sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider Mullins's youth and potential for rehabilitation in light of Miller and its progeny. The court did not find the sentencing statute unconstitutionally vague or the JLWOP categorically unconstitutional but required a more thorough consideration of Mullins's youth and potential for change. View "State v. Mullins" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old, J.Q.R., sold fentanyl-laced pills to two classmates, B.H. and R.J., resulting in R.J.'s death from an overdose. During the investigation, police discovered evidence implicating J.Q.R.'s father in illegal drug activities. The father waived J.Q.R.'s Miranda rights twice, leading to J.Q.R. making incriminating statements to the police.The Hendricks Superior Court admitted J.Q.R.'s statements into evidence over his objections, arguing that his father had an adverse interest due to his own criminal conduct. The court adjudicated J.Q.R. as a delinquent child. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that an adverse interest may arise if an adult stands to personally benefit from waiving a child's rights to the child's detriment. The court found that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the father had no adverse interest when he waived J.Q.R.'s rights, given the evidence of the father's own drug activities. Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting J.Q.R.'s statements.However, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the error was harmless because independent evidence, such as text messages, established that J.Q.R. knew the pills contained fentanyl. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's adjudication of J.Q.R. as a delinquent child. View "J.Q.R. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) became involved with a family after law enforcement discovered child pornography in the parents' home. Both parents admitted to possessing child pornography, and the mother admitted to posting inappropriate images of their daughter, M.V., online. M.V. was subsequently placed with her paternal grandparents, and the juvenile court sustained allegations of sexual exploitation against both parents, declaring M.V. a dependent child and removing her from her parents' custody. The parents received reunification services until November 2020, and in December 2021, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights. However, this order was vacated on appeal, and the case was remanded for a supplemental bonding study and a new permanency planning hearing.On remand, a new expert conducted a bonding study, and the permanency planning hearing took place in June 2024. The court reviewed extensive documentary evidence, including reports on M.V.'s well-being, her relationship with her parents and grandparents, and her expressed wishes to be adopted by her grandparents. The expert, Dr. Gonzalez, concluded that M.V. had a secure attachment to both parents and that terminating the parental relationship could be detrimental to her. However, the court found that the parents had not proven the beneficial parental relationship exception, noting that the expert's opinions were based more on general psychological principles than on the specific facts of the case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the expert's opinions and that the evidence did not compel a finding in favor of the parents. The court also addressed and dismissed allegations of judicial bias and due process violations raised by the parents. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

D.F. (father) appealed the juvenile court's orders appointing a guardian for his son, J.F., and terminating jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He argued that the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to meet their initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes (Cal-ICWA).The juvenile court had appointed a guardian for J.F. and terminated its jurisdiction. Father sought a conditional reversal of the guardianship order and a remand to ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. No respondent's brief was filed, but father, the child's counsel, and the Department filed a joint stipulation for conditional affirmance of the guardianship, limited reversal of the termination of jurisdiction, and remand for further inquiry.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found that the Department failed to contact maternal relatives to inquire about the child's potential Indian ancestry, constituting reversible error. However, the court disagreed with the need to contact the paternal great-aunt, as she is not considered an "extended family member" under ICWA.The court conditionally affirmed the guardianship order but conditionally reversed the order terminating dependency jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to order the Department to interview the maternal grandmother and aunt about the child's Indian ancestry and report the findings. If no further inquiry or notice to tribes is necessary, the termination order will be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is required, the court must ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

J.B. (Minor) was placed with A.R. (De Facto Parent) for nearly two years after being removed from B.B. (Mother) and J.S. (Father). Parents filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking additional reunification services and increased visitation. The trial court granted these petitions but did not remove Minor from De Facto Parent's care. De Facto Parent appealed, arguing that the juvenile court should not have granted additional reunification services as Parents failed to show changed circumstances and that it was not in Minor’s best interest.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted the section 388 petitions, providing Parents with six months of reunification services and increased visitation. The court noted that Minor would remain with De Facto Parent for the time being, with the goal of eventually returning Minor to Parents. The section 366.26 hearing, which would address the termination of parental rights and adoption, was vacated.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services that De Facto Parent did not have standing to appeal the grant of the section 388 petitions. The court noted that as a de facto parent, A.R. did not have the right to reunification services, visitation, custody, or placement of Minor. The appeal was dismissed for lack of standing. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Johnny Brown was born on August 27, 1998. On August 26, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court alleging that Brown committed child molesting between June 1, 2015, and August 31, 2016. The juvenile court authorized the petition and held an initial hearing. After Brown turned twenty-one, he objected to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, but the court denied his objection and later waived the case to adult court. Brown was convicted of Class C felony child molesting in adult court.Brown filed a motion to correct error, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction because he was over twenty-one at the time of the waiver hearing. The trial court denied his motion and sentenced him to four years, with credit for time served and the remainder suspended to probation. Brown appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that retroactive application of new jurisdictional amendments would violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of Brown's trial because he fell into a jurisdictional gap identified in previous cases. The court also determined that the amendments to the jurisdiction statutes, enacted while Brown's case was pending, did not apply retroactively. As a result, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed Brown's conviction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law