Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

M.T., a 16-year-old juvenile, was charged with simple assault and willful concealment. His parents expressed that they did not feel safe with him at home and requested residential treatment. M.T. was placed in shelter care but was removed due to dangerous behavior, including physical altercations and property damage. The shelter exercised its right to terminate treatment, leading to M.T.'s placement at the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC).The Circuit Court held an adjudicatory hearing where M.T. pled true to the charges. The court scheduled a dispositional hearing and, in the interim, heard arguments regarding M.T.'s placement. The juvenile probation and parole officer (JPPO) testified that no alternative placements were available. The court ordered M.T. to be detained at SYSC, citing the lack of less restrictive options and the need for M.T.'s safety and supervision.At the dispositional hearing, the State recommended that M.T. remain at SYSC due to his behavior and the lack of alternative placements. M.T. requested to return to his parents, but the court found this unsuitable. The court committed M.T. to SYSC for the remainder of his minority, emphasizing the need for intensive care and supervision and the unavailability of other options. The court also ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to continue searching for less restrictive placements, including out-of-state options.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in considering the lack of available placements and committing M.T. to SYSC. The court also found that M.T. waived his argument regarding the right to counsel during the Comprehensive Assessment for Treatment (CAT) interview. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law

T.B., a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for carrying a pistol without a license and possessing unregistered ammunition. The case arose from two Instagram live videos observed by Officer Moore of the Metropolitan Police Department. In the first video, T.B. was seen displaying a black Glock-style handgun. In the second video, T.B. was seen with a light-colored object in his waistband, which officers believed to be a firearm. When officers arrived at the scene, they found a tan-gold-colored pistol on the ground near where T.B. had been standing.The Superior Court incorporated Officer Moore’s testimony from a suppression hearing into the trial. Officer Moore testified about the events leading to T.B.'s arrest and the officers' observations from the Instagram videos. Officer Laielli also testified, describing T.B.'s behavior in the second video as characteristic of an armed gunman. The court found the evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.B. possessed the tan-gold-colored pistol and committed him to the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services for up to one year.On appeal, T.B. argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings and that the trial court erred in admitting the officers’ testimony. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the evidence, including the Instagram videos and the officers’ observations, was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. The appellate court also concluded that any error in admitting the officers’ testimony was harmless, as the trial court’s findings were based on its own viewing of the video evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of delinquency. View "In re T.B." on Justia Law

In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law

Hunter de la Garza, a former employee of the Northwest Arkansas Children’s Shelter, was convicted of raping a ten-year-old female resident of the Shelter. The incident occurred during an outing to a mall, where de la Garza followed the victim into a restroom, forcibly undressed her, and raped her. The victim disclosed the rape to her brother and a friend, and later to a professional interviewer. The Shelter’s staff observed behavioral changes in the victim consistent with sexual abuse. De la Garza was interviewed by police and provided inconsistent accounts of the events.The Benton County Circuit Court denied de la Garza’s motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court also allowed testimony from another young female resident of the Shelter, who described similar abuse by de la Garza, under the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. The jury found de la Garza guilty and sentenced him to life in prison. De la Garza’s motion for a new trial was denied.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the victim’s testimony, along with corroborating evidence, constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of the other young resident under the pedophile exception. Additionally, the court determined that de la Garza’s arguments regarding prosecutorial comments were not preserved for appeal, as he failed to contemporaneously object or request further relief during the trial. The court conducted a Rule 4-3(a) review and found no prejudicial error. View "HUNTER DE LA GARZA v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

B.V. and L.T. are the parents of two children, B.V. and B.V. The children were removed from their home in February 2021 after being left unattended at a crime scene for 13 hours. B.V. was arrested for attempted murder and burglary, and L.T. could not be located. A temporary custody order was issued to the Mountain Lakes Human Service Zone. B.V. was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with an estimated release date in January 2030. L.T. has not had contact with the Zone since the termination of parental rights petition was filed.The children were adjudicated as needing protection in October 2021, and a 12-month custody order was issued to the Zone. A permanency hearing in November 2022 extended the custody order by six months. The children were taken to Arizona by their maternal aunt in April 2023, but the placement was unsuccessful, and they returned to North Dakota in September 2023. L.T. sporadically attempted visitation but lost contact with the Zone in February 2024. B.V. had minimal contact with the Zone and did not engage in the services offered.The Juvenile Court of Rolette County terminated B.V. and L.T.'s parental rights on October 18, 2024. B.V. appealed, arguing that the Zone did not make active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious harm to the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination of B.V.'s parental rights. The court found that the Zone made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, including offering supervised visits and conducting relative searches. The court also found that continued custody by B.V. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children, supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness. View "Interest of B.V." on Justia Law

Mother conceived M.N. with Father in summer 2020. Before M.N. was born, Mother and her boyfriend initiated adoption proceedings without informing the adoption agency about Father. M.N. was born on March 23, 2021, and Father requested a DNA test at the hospital. In April 2021, Mother and her boyfriend signed adoption consent forms, and the adoption agency petitioned for termination of parental rights. After being identified as a potential father, Father was served notice of the adoption and filed a paternity action within the required timeframe. Genetic testing confirmed Father as the biological father.The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding he failed to file with the putative fathers registry. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court improperly terminated Father’s rights under § 8-533(B)(6) without considering his rights as a potential father under § 8-106. The court of appeals held that genetic testing established Father as a presumed legal father, exempting him from filing with the putative fathers registry.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if a potential father served with a § 8-106 notice must file a notice of a claim of paternity with the putative fathers registry under § 8-106.01. The court held that a potential father identified and served notice under § 8-106(G) is not required to file with the putative fathers registry. The court emphasized that the potential fathers statute and the putative fathers statute address separate classifications of fathers, each with distinct rights and obligations. The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the juvenile court’s termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.N." on Justia Law

Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law

The case involves three consolidated appeals concerning the constitutionality of the Child Victims Act of 2023, which retroactively eliminated the statute of limitations for child sexual abuse claims. The plaintiffs, who are alleged survivors of childhood sexual abuse, filed lawsuits against various institutions, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, the Board of Education of Harford County, and The Key School, Inc. The defendants argued that the 2023 Act unconstitutionally abrogated their vested rights by reviving claims that were previously time-barred.In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the court denied the Archbishop’s motion to dismiss, determining that the relevant statute was a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and thus did not create vested rights. The Circuit Court for Harford County reached a similar conclusion regarding the Board of Education of Harford County. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the court certified the question of the 2023 Act’s constitutionality to the Supreme Court of Maryland without ruling on The Key School’s motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2017 statute, which the 2023 Act amended, was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations is a procedural device that does not create vested rights, whereas a statute of repose creates substantive rights that cannot be retroactively abrogated. The court concluded that the 2023 Act did not retroactively abrogate vested rights and was constitutional as applied to the defendants. The court applied heightened rational basis review and found that the 2023 Act bore a real and substantial relation to addressing the problem of delayed reporting of child sexual abuse and the need for justice for survivors. The judgments of the lower courts were affirmed, and the certified question was answered in the negative. View "Archbishop of Washington v. Doe" on Justia Law

Benjamin Trane established a private therapeutic boarding school for troubled youth, which was shut down after a police raid. Trane was charged with sexual abuse of a minor, sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, and child endangerment. The first two charges involved an underage female victim, while the third charge involved two boys placed in isolation rooms. A jury found Trane guilty on all counts. On direct appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court conditionally affirmed his convictions but remanded for a hearing on a rape shield issue, preserving his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief (PCR) proceedings.In the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Trane alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to sever the child endangerment count and for not objecting to the marshaling instruction on that count. The district court rejected the severance claim, finding Trane made an informed decision to forego a motion for severance to avoid delay. However, the court ordered a new trial on the child endangerment charge, finding that the marshaling instruction allowed a nonunanimous verdict, thereby prejudicing Trane.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's finding that Trane chose to forego a motion to sever the child endangerment count. However, the court reversed the district court's order for a new trial on the child endangerment charge. The court agreed that the marshaling instruction was erroneous but found no prejudice because both child victims were similarly situated, and there was no reasonable probability that jurors did not find Trane guilty of endangering both children. Thus, the court affirmed the denial of relief on the severance claim and reversed the order for a new trial on the child endangerment charge. View "Trane v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law