Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Stewart, then 20 years old, was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. While the case was pending, Stewart turned 21. In 2017, a jury found Stewart guilty. The trial court found that Stewart was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b): When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. Stewart had a 2013 conviction for residential burglary, a Class 1 felony, and a 2014 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony. The trial court found Stewart eligible for Class X sentencing and sentenced him to the statutory minimum term of six years’ imprisonment.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that Stewart’s first felony offense, committed when he was 17 years old, was not a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing and could not serve as a basis for Class X sentencing eligibility. View "People v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In September 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition after taking six-year-old A.H. and her younger half-siblings into emergency protective custody and placing them in foster care. The petition alleged that the children’s mother had allowed A.H. to have unsupervised contact with an older relative suspected of having sexually molested the child. A.H.’s alleged father, J.H., had failed to provide care, support, or supervision for more than a year and it was indicated that his whereabouts were unknown, although the Department did have an address.The court of appeal reversed an order terminating J.H.'s parental rights. From the outset of the dependency proceedings through the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the Department’s efforts to locate J.H. and provide him notice requirements fell far short of the statutory requirements and left him in the dark about his parental status, how to assert his parental rights and how to participate in the proceedings. While its efforts may have improved later in the case, the Department never rectified its earlier failures by advising J.H. of his right to request counsel and his need to elevate his status to "presumed parent" to assert his parental rights. The Department violated his right to due process. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The State of California appealed after a juvenile court declared defendant-respondent T.O. a ward of the court and placed him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The State contended the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section 290.008, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re T.O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the family court adjudicating Minor as a law violator for sexually assaulting the nine-year-old complaining witness (CW), holding that the exclusion of certain evidence proffered in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Minor argued that the family court erred in excluding his proffered extrinsic evidence of CW's past false sexual assault allegations and by failing to make a preliminary determination as to the truth or falsity of those past sexual assault allegations. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and the family court's decree, holding (1) if a defendant seeks to admit a complaining witness's false allegations of sexual assault, admissibility of such evidence is not subject to Haw. R. Evid. 412; and (2) the family court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence based on the procedural requirements of Rule 412. View "In re GH" on Justia Law

Kelan, in Missouri with an adult accomplice, allegedly took Luterman’s 2019 Volkswagen by force or the threat of force. The two drove the car into Illinois, where they were apprehended. Kelan was 16 years old. He resides in Illinois with his mother. The state filed a petition to adjudicate Kelan a delinquent minor based on the Missouri carjacking and, under Illinois law, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a person under 21, and theft.The state argued that delinquency proceedings based on out-of-state conduct are explicitly permitted under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120). The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the charges that were based on Missouri law. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 of the Act unambiguously authorizes delinquency proceedings against a minor in Illinois who violates another state’s law. Illinois is likely to be in a better position than any other state to ensure that family and community are involved in our juveniles’ rehabilitative process, and it may help reduce disruption to the minor’s life to receive necessary services in his home state. View "In re Kelan W." on Justia Law

The State of Colorado filed a petition in delinquency against A.C. A.C.’s counsel moved for a competency evaluation, noting that A.C. had trouble paying attention and was on an individualized education plan at school due to his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). The magistrate granted the motion and ordered the Colorado Department of Human Services (“CDHS”) to perform a competency evaluation. Based on his evaluation, a doctor concluded that A.C. did not have the ability to (1) factually and rationally understand the proceedings or (2) assist in the defense. Ultimately, the doctor concluded A.C. was incompetent to proceed but that the “prognosis for restoring [A.C.] to competency . . . [was] fair to good.” The magistrate found A.C. incompetent to proceed, stayed the proceedings, and ordered CDHS to provide restoration services. Almost six months later, the magistrate held a hearing to determine whether A.C. had been restored to competency. The evaluating doctor and A.C.’s restoration services provider testified at the hearing, but neither opined as to whether A.C. had been “restored to competency.” The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether the Juvenile Justice Code authorized a magistrate to order a juvenile found incompetent to proceed to undergo a “reassessment evaluation” as part of the restoration review or restoration hearing procedures outlined in sections 19-2.5-704 to -706, C.R.S. (2022), to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency. A.C. argued that such an evaluation was prohibited by Colorado in Interest of B.B.A.M., 453 P.3d 1161. The Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court had the authority to order a reassessment evaluation after determining that a juvenile remains incompetent and that this type of evaluation was distinct from the second competency evaluation at issue in B.B.A.M. View " People v. A.C. " on Justia Law

Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate determined that probable cause existed to believe that A.S.M. had committed the delinquent acts alleged. A.S.M. timely sought review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination. But the juvenile court declined to review the matter on the merits, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding did not constitute a final order. A.S.M. then invoked the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause. After review, the Supreme Court held that while only a district court magistrate’s final orders or judgments namely, those fully resolving an issue or claim were reviewable under C.R.M. 7(a)(3), the preliminary hearing statute in the Children’s Code, section 19-2.5-609(3), C.R.S. (2022), specifically permitted review of a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding. "Therefore, we need not get in the middle of the parties’ tug-of-war over whether the magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in this case constituted a final order. Instead, we hold that section 19-2.5-609(3) entitles prosecutors and juveniles alike to ask a juvenile court to review a magistrate’s preliminary hearing finding in a delinquency proceeding." View "In re Interest of A.S.M." on Justia Law

Frank Heard was serving a sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life for two counts of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder for a drive-by shooting he committed at age 15, and one count of voluntary manslaughter for a homicide he committed just after he turned 16. After 15 years of incarceration, he petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him to a lesser sentence under Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1) (formerly (d)(2)). The trial court denied Heard’s petition, finding him ineligible for relief because he was not sentenced to an explicitly designated term of life without the possibility of parole. Heard appealed, presenting two issues of first impression: (1) the resentencing provision should be interpreted to apply not only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicitly designated terms of life without parole, but also to a juvenile offender, like him, who have been sentenced to multiple terms that are the functional equivalent of life without parole; and (2) a contrary interpretation of the resentencing provision would violate his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The Court of Appeal rejected Heard's his first contention, instead interpreting section 1170 (d)(1)(A), to limit eligibility to petition for recall and resentencing to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicitly designated life without parole terms. But the Court concluded denying juvenile offenders, who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole, the opportunity to petition for resentencing violated the guarantee of equal protection. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Heard" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court’s suppression of custodial statements 16-year-old Jeffrey Burton made during a video-taped interview with law enforcement officers who had arrested Burton for the murder of George Akins, Jr. The State contended the trial court erred in concluding that Burton clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent and that the State failed to show that Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Georgia Supreme Court did not decide whether the trial court erred in concluding that Burton clearly invoked his right to remain silent. However, it did conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights: a ruling that was supported by factual and credibility findings that were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed. View "Georgia v. Burton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court accepting an imposing a proposed youth court consent decree disposition, placing D.A.T. on supervised conditional probation for two years or until sooner released, and suspending the underlying youth court delinquency proceeding, holding that the youth court erred.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the youth court erred in concluding that the consent decree guilt admission required by Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-1501(2) constitutes or requires a change of answer under Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-1502(8), thereby effecting a delinquency adjudication. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative and remanded for entry of an amended dispositional order clarifying the effect of D.A.T.'s consent decree admission in according with Mon. Code Ann. 41-5-1501(1). View "In re D.A.T." on Justia Law