Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order. View "People v. I.B." on Justia Law

In a juvenile wardship proceeding, the minor's counsel declared a doubt about the minor's competency to stand trial. Consequently, the juvenile court suspended the proceedings and referred the minor for a competency evaluation. The court's protocol mandated the disclosure of the minor's mental health records to the court-appointed expert for evaluation. The minor objected, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under California Evidence Code section 1014. The court overruled the objection and ordered the disclosure, prompting the minor to file a writ petition challenging this decision.The Contra Costa County Superior Court overruled the minor's objection, stating that Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 permits the compelled disclosure of all available records, including mental health records, for competency evaluations. The court also referenced Evidence Code section 1025, which it interpreted as allowing such disclosures in competency proceedings. The minor's request for a stay to seek appellate review was denied, leading to the filing of the writ petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Evidence Code section 1016 renders the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable in juvenile competency proceedings once the minor's counsel declares a doubt about the minor's competency. The court reasoned that the issue of the minor's mental or emotional condition is tendered by the minor through their counsel, thus falling under the patient-litigant exception to the privilege. The court denied the minor's writ petition and dissolved the partial stay of the juvenile court's order. View "T.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A child in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) suffered severe abuse by his adoptive mother. Just before his 21st birthday, he filed a tort suit against OCS and his adoptive mother. OCS moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. The child argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled for three reasons: it was tolled while he was in OCS custody until age 19, collateral estoppel should prevent OCS from arguing he was competent to file suit, and equitable tolling should apply. The superior court rejected these arguments and dismissed the suit as untimely.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that the child’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims. The court concluded that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care past age 18, as the age of majority in Alaska is 18. The court also found that the child was competent to file suit and that equitable tolling did not apply because the child had not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care because the age of majority is 18, and the extended foster care statute does not create an exception. The court also held that OCS was not estopped from arguing the child was competent because the issues in the conservatorship and partial guardianship proceedings were not identical to the issue of competency to file suit. Finally, the court held that equitable tolling did not apply because the child did not demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file on time. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Blake J. v. State" on Justia Law

In this juvenile proceeding, the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) received several reports in 2021 regarding the respondent mother’s interactions with her children, Amanda, Jade, and Juliet. Incidents included the mother breaking a car window to reach Jade, hitting her with a belt, and leaving her outside in cold weather. DSS filed petitions alleging neglect and dependency for the children. The trial court admitted statements from Jade, who did not testify, and concluded that all three children were neglected and that Jade and Juliet were dependent.The District Court of Pitt County entered an order based on these findings. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that many of the trial court’s findings were based on inadmissible hearsay and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the juvenile petitions. The Court of Appeals held that the remaining findings were insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusions of neglect and dependency.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals did not adequately examine whether the remaining findings supported the trial court’s conclusions or whether the record contained sufficient evidence to support necessary findings. The Supreme Court determined that while some findings were unsupported, the record contained clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that could support the necessary findings for neglect and dependency adjudications. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings, allowing the trial court to enter a new order based on the existing record or conduct further proceedings as necessary. View "In re A.J., J.C., J.C" on Justia Law

Andrew McCurdy entered a plea agreement in February 2022, pleading guilty to felony criminal mischief and agreeing to pay restitution. The District Court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report, which included McCurdy’s juvenile records without a Youth Court order. McCurdy filed motions to strike the juvenile records from the PSI and to determine his ability to pay certain fees. The District Court denied the motion to strike, stating the records were provided pursuant to a court order, and imposed a $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs without inquiring into McCurdy’s ability to pay.The Eleventh Judicial District Court denied McCurdy’s motion to strike his juvenile records, reasoning that the records were provided under a court order and could be considered at sentencing. The court also imposed the PSI fee and probation supervision costs without determining McCurdy’s ability to pay, despite his motion requesting such an inquiry. McCurdy appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision to include McCurdy’s juvenile records in the PSI, finding that any error in the procedure was harmless as McCurdy did not demonstrate prejudice. However, the Supreme Court reversed the imposition of the $50 PSI fee and probation supervision costs, noting that the District Court failed to inquire into McCurdy’s ability to pay, as required by law. The case was remanded for the District Court to conduct the necessary inquiry into McCurdy’s financial situation before imposing these costs. View "State v. McCurdy" on Justia Law

Kenneth D. was born prematurely and tested positive for amphetamine and syphilis. His mother admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. The Placer County Department of Health and Human Services filed a juvenile dependency petition to remove Kenneth from his mother and her partner, T.D., due to suspected drug use. Initial inquiries about potential Native American heritage were made, but both mother and T.D. denied having any. Kenneth was placed in temporary custody.The Placer County Superior Court recognized T.D. as the presumed father based on a voluntary declaration of paternity and Kenneth’s birth certificate. Kenneth was adjudged a dependent and removed from the parents' custody. The court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply. Later, J.T. was confirmed as Kenneth’s biological father, but the court did not inquire about his potential Native American heritage. The court terminated parental rights and approved an adoption plan, again finding ICWA did not apply. J.T. appealed, arguing the failure to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice provisions.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, absent exceptional circumstances, an appellate court may not consider postjudgment evidence to conclude that an ICWA inquiry error was harmless. The court emphasized that the sufficiency of an ICWA inquiry must generally be determined by the juvenile court in the first instance. The Court of Appeal’s consideration of postjudgment evidence was deemed erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and directed a conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights, remanding the case for compliance with ICWA and California implementing statutes. View "In re Kenneth D." on Justia Law

Tina Sully, a foster parent for the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was charged with multiple counts of abusing her three adopted children. The charges stemmed from an incident where 13-year-old C.S. ran away from home and reported to neighbors and authorities that Sully had physically abused her and withheld food. An investigation revealed similar allegations from two other foster children, D.F.H. and G.S. Sully was indicted on ten counts, including assault with a dangerous weapon and felony child abuse.The first trial in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. The court scheduled a second trial to begin eighteen days later. Sully requested a continuance twice, citing her counsel's scheduling conflicts and the unavailability of key defense witnesses, but both motions were denied. The second trial proceeded, and Sully objected to the admission of several out-of-court statements under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) and 807, which the court admitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sully's motions for a continuance, as she failed to demonstrate how the denial prejudiced her defense. The court also found that even if the admission of the challenged hearsay statements was erroneous, it was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence against Sully, including testimony from C.S., medical professionals, and other witnesses.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Sully's convictions on all counts related to C.S. The court concluded that the denial of the continuance and the admission of hearsay evidence did not warrant a new trial. View "United States v. Sully" on Justia Law

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

In 1984, Roger Scott Helm, Jr., then 14 years old, murdered his adoptive parents and stepsister. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder. Helm pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder with eligibility for parole after 25 years, followed by consecutive sentences totaling an additional 42 years for the other counts.Helm's case was transferred from juvenile to adult court, and he was sentenced after a detailed hearing where the court considered mitigating factors such as his age and drug influence, as well as aggravating factors like his lack of remorse and dangerousness. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the consecutive sentences on direct appeal.Helm later filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Helm's habeas corpus petition. The court assumed, for argument's sake, that Helm's sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. However, it concluded that Helm's sentence complied with Miller because the trial judge had discretion and considered Helm's youth before imposing the sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Helm's habeas corpus petition, holding that Helm's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and clarified in Jones v. Mississippi. View "Helm v. Thornell" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law