Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, A.M. became a ward of the Alameda County Juvenile Court and was placed on probation but absconded from his mother’s home. In 2017, A.M. admitted to assault with force likely to produce bodily injury in exchange for dismissal of a related robbery count. He was placed at Camp Sweeney and absconded. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was released to home supervision on GPS monitoring. A.M. removed his GPS monitor and absconded. A month later, A.M., then 16 years old, was arrested in possession of a loaded automatic handgun, suspected methamphetamine, pills believed to be opioids, and a digital scale. He waived his Miranda rights and admitted he was a gang member. A.M. appealed the juvenile court’s subsequent order placing him in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), arguing that under Welfare and Institutions Code 706.5, 706.6, the probation department was required to, but did not, convene a child and family team (CFT) meeting before the disposition hearing.The court of appeal considered the matter although A.M. has been released from the STRTP. The issues are of public importance and likely to recur and continue to evade review. The juvenile court erred in placing a minor in an STRTP based upon a probation department recommendation that failed to consider the input of a CFT. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as narcotics-conspiracy and firearm-possession charges related to his membership in the 10th Street Gang of Buffalo, New York. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, participated in a double murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's challenges to the introduction into evidence of a gun seized from his home; the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on a Bruton violation; the denial of his Batson challenges, and the denial of his requests for certain jury charges. However, the court held that the district court imposed defendant's sentence without explicitly considering his age at the time of the double murders, and thus violated the principle recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Miller stated that those under the age of eighteen are different because the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing in light of Miller. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for crimes he committed when he was 11 years old. Afterwards, Senate Bill No. 439 amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 to provide that any minor who is between the ages of 12 years and 17 years, when he or she violates any law is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and may be adjudged to be a ward of that court.The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court's jurisdiction over the minor terminated, by operation of law, when that amendment went into effect. While the court concluded that, under the procedural posture of this case, minor is not entitled to dismissal of the proceedings, including the original charges and wardship determination, that occurred prior to January 1, 2019, the court also concluded that the juvenile court now lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violations of probation that occurred after the amendment's effective date. The juvenile court's order denying minor's notice and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under section 602(a) is affirmed insofar as the motion sought dismissal of proceedings. The court affirmed the order in all other respects. View "The People v. David C." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's federal habeas petition and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment and amend his habeas petition to add a new claim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism.In regard to the habeas petition, the panel applied the deferential standard in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's statements were voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights; the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession; and the state court did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of the interview were not coercive. Furthermore, the video recording of the interview refutes petitioner's argument that those tactics overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. In regard to the Rule 60(b) motion, the panel held that the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

C.S., age 17, made threatening statements to a confidential informant in an online chatroom dedicated to discussing terroristic attacks. Law enforcement searched C.S.’s home and cell phone. In his home, agents discovered assault rifles, ammunition, a crossbow, a headscarf, smoke bombs, grenade casings, military-style ammunition vest and gear, and a long-bladed knife. His cell phone revealed Internet searches, literature about making explosives, Islamic Jihadi propaganda videos depicting beheadings, and photos of C.S. posing with his assault rifle while wearing military gear and headscarf. C.S. was adjudicated delinquent, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). During several conversations, C.S. made threats against a local church. Although juvenile proceedings are usually sealed, the court permitted the government to notify the church that it was the subject of a threat and that the party who communicated the threat had been prosecuted. The order did not identify C.S.The Third Circuit affirmed. C.S.’s statements qualified as threats under section 875(c). A rational factfinder could find that a reasonable person could consider C.S.’s statements to be “a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury.” The court did not violate the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 5031-5038), in allowing the government to notify the church of the threats and acted well within its discretion in issuing the notification order. View "United States v. C.S." on Justia Law

An Alaska Native teenage minor affiliated with the Native Village of Kotzebue (Tribe) was taken into custody by the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) and placed at a residential treatment facility in Utah. She requested a placement review hearing after being injured by a facility staff member. At the time of the hearing, the minor’s mother wanted to regain custody. At the hearing the superior court had to make removal findings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), as well as findings authorizing continued placement in a residential treatment facility under Alaska law. At the hearing, the minor’s Utah therapist testified as a mental health professional. The minor, as well as her parents and the Tribe, objected to the witness being qualified as an ICWA expert, but the superior court allowed it. The minor argued the superior court erred in determining that the witness was qualified as an expert for the purposes of ICWA. Because the superior court correctly determined that knowledge of the Indian child’s tribe was unnecessary in this situation when it relied on the expert’s testimony for its ICWA findings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of April S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Davontae Sanford filed suit against the state of Michigan, seeking compensation under the Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA). Another man confessed to the crimes committed in 2007 to which plaintiff had pled guilty when he was 15 years old: four counts of second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. In 2008, plaintiff was sentenced to concurrent terms of 37 to 90 years in prison for the murder convictions, plus a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction, with credit for the 198 days he spent in the Wayne County Juvenile Detention Facility. After an investigation into the other man’s confession and with the stipulation of the prosecutor, the circuit court vacated plaintiff’s convictions and sentences on June 6, 2016, and plaintiff was released from the Michigan Department of Corrections June 8, 2016. Defendant admitted that plaintiff was entitled to $408,356.16 in compensation for the 8 years and 61 days he spent in a state correctional facility pursuant to the WICA’s damages formula set forth in MCL 691.1755(2)(a), but defendant disputed whether plaintiff was entitled to $27,124.02 in compensation for the 198 days he spent in local detention. The Court of Claims held that the time plaintiff spent in local detention was not compensable under the WICA, and it awarded plaintiff $408,356.16. Plaintiff appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court that the WICA did not authorize compensation for the time plaintiff spent in detention before he was wrongfully convicted of a crime, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Sanford. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

In early 2019, Devils Lake Police Officer Gilbertson was dispatched on a report of a possibly impaired driver. Gilbertson pulled the vehicle over and as he reached the back of the vehicle, the vehicle fled the scene. Gilbertson pursued; another officer attempted to deploy road spikes. The vehicle avoided the spikes and zig-zagged through a field until it became stuck in the snow. When the occupants did not leave the vehicle, Gilbertson approached the vehicle, reached in, put it in park, smelling a strong odor of marijuana. After removing and arresting the driver, officers removed passenger, K.V. Another responding officer, Officer Engen, Engen did a pat down search of K.V. and found drug paraphernalia, a bong, and a bag of meth in K.V.’s jacket. Engen averred he patted down K.V. to search for weapons as a safety issue and to look for illegal drugs. K.V. was alleged to be a delinquent child, charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. K.V. filed a motion to suppress, contending there was no exception for the warrantless search and the search was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress on the record, finding: “There was marijuana in the vehicle. You were in the vehicle [K.V.]. Once [the officers] establish that they had the smell of marijuana in the vehicle, they had the right to search you and they found the methamphetamine in the coat pocket that you were wearing.” The court denied K.V.’s renewed motion to suppress at the adjudication hearing. K.V. was adjudicated a delinquent child for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Although the juvenile court court received testimony about the officers’ concern for their safety and the smell of marijuana, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the juvenile court did not make specific findings on the reasonableness of the pat down or subsequent search. "It did not identify which exception to the warrant requirement justified the search in its conclusions of law. We are unable to understand the court’s reasoning for its decision and are left to speculate as to the law and facts the court relied on in denying the motion to suppress." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for reconsideration of the suppression order. View "Interest of K.V." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that a juvenile court judge has authority to hear a motion to dismiss as part of a transfer hearing after arraignment and that a juvenile does not have an automatic right of appeal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 where the motion is denied.A juvenile argued that the prosecutor improperly delayed bringing criminal charges against her until after her nineteenth birthday and filed a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial delay. The juvenile court judge denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss, determining that the motion should be heard after the transfer hearing was complete and any subsequent complaint was issued in an adult court. The juvenile filed a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The single justice denied the petition, and the juvenile was arraigned. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding (1) with certain exceptions, a juvenile court judge generally has no authority to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment; and (2) a juvenile has no automatic right to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay. View "Ulla U. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Raymundo M. was charged in juvenile court with assault with a deadly weapon, making a criminal threat, and brandishing a weapon after he raised a switchblade-like knife head-high and chased another minor while orally threatening him. The juvenile court found the charges and certain of the enhancement allegations true, declared Raymundo a ward of the court, and placed him with his mother under the supervision of the probation department. On appeal, Raymundo contended: (1) insufficient evidence supported the true finding on the assault count because he never got within striking distance of the victim or made stabbing or slashing motions with the knife; (2) the juvenile court failed to expressly declare whether it was treating the "wobbler" assault count as a felony or a misdemeanor, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702; and (3) the court erred by imposing duplicative punishment on the criminal-threat and assault counts, in violation of Penal Code section 654. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Raymundo M." on Justia Law