Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff T.C. sought an order of protection against stalking or sexual assault (SSA order) against defendant L.D. Plaintiff was seventeen at the time she sought the order; defendant was thirteen. The court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without reaching the merits, holding that the statute pertaining to SSA orders did not permit claims against a minor defendant. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing in the SSA statute that expressly limited who may be the subject of an SSA complaint. View "T.C. v. L.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed these consolidated appeals in which Appellants argued that the county court erred by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide motions to transfer their felony criminal cases to juvenile court, holding that the county court lacked jurisdiction, and therefore, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction.The State filed complaints in county court charging Appellants with felonies. Appellants filed motions asking the county court to transfer their respective cases to juvenile court. In both cases, the county court issued orders stating that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to transfer to juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellants' motions to transfer to juvenile court; and (2) because the county court lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer, this Court lacked jurisdiction over these appeals. View "State v. A.D." on Justia Law

J.H., a 14-year-old pretrial detainee, was placed in segregated housing in Williamson County’s juvenile detention facility after other juveniles alleged that he threatened to assault them. J.H. suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (PANDAS), which often manifests in psychiatric symptoms. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, J.H. alleged that his placement in segregated housing for a month in 2013 amounted to unconstitutional punishment; that a detention monitor, Cruz, sexually assaulted him during this period, as a result of Williamson County’s failure to train Cruz; and that during that period, officials failed to provide adequate medical care.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The official is entitled to qualified immunity. While the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive in relation to the verbal threats he made, the right at issue was not established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013. J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals, none of whom requested that the facility make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault; it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. View "J.H. v. Williamson County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction for murdering two juveniles and held that the trial court's error in admitting into evidence defendant's rap song video glorifying gang violence was harmless.However, the court vacated defendant's life sentence because it was unable to conclude that the trial court's sentence complied with the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The court held that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), does not moot defendant's abuse of discretion claim. The trial court then examined and illuminated the transient immaturity versus irreparable corruption legal standard applicable to juvenile life without parole sentencing. The court concluded that, to faithfully apply this deeply rooted in the Eighth Amendment sentencing standard, a trial court must affirmatively and expressly find the circumstances that justify imposing a life without parole sentence upon a juvenile offender. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Botello" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court's orders granting respondent Brandon Brown’s (defendant) petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacating his sentence, and resentencing him to 16 years eight months in prison, which was eight years shorter than his original sentence. The trial court granted his writ petition because his strike for carjacking as a juvenile did not qualify as a strike under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) and Penal Code section 667(d)(3). The trial court also concluded that defendant’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by not objecting to the strike during sentencing. The State contended on appeal that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s writ petition because: (1) defendant’s juvenile carjacking adjudication qualified as a strike under the 2006 law; (2) the trial court erred in applying California v. Gallardo, 4 Cal.5th 120 (2017), retroactively; (3) the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by vacating the carjacking strike entered in Los Angeles (case No. VA 076709) and Orange County (case No. 03NF1824) cases; (4) defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective, because the record of conviction established defendant’s carjacking adjudication qualified as a strike; and (5) defendant’s delay in filing his writ petition prejudiced the People’s ability to oppose it. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in applying Gallardo retroactively and granting defendant’s writ petition on the ground defendant’s juvenile carjacking adjudication did not qualify as a strike. Therefore, the Court concluded it did not need to address the State's additional IAC challenge. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State’s other objections and affirmed the writ petition order and judgment. View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

After committing crimes when he was seventeen years old, defendant Atorrus Rainer was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of aggravated robbery. For these crimes, the district court sentenced Mr. Rainer to 224 years in prison. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. But the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered modification of the sentences, concluding that the prison terms for attempted first-degree murder and first-degree assault should have run concurrently, rather than consecutively, because the crimes could have been based on identical evidence. The Colorado Court of Appeals thus modified Mr. Rainer’s sentences to run for 112 years. After the direct appeal, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), that the Eighth Amendment prohibited life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. Under Graham, these juveniles were entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Defendant sought habeas relief, claiming the State of Colorado deprived him of this opportunity by imposing the 112-year sentence for the crimes he committed as a juvenile. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the State provided defendant with the required opportunity through the combination of the Juveniles convicted as Adults Program, and the general parole program. View "Rainer v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Nevik Howard, when sixteen years old, was convicted of first-degree assault (a crime of violence) and first-degree criminal trespass after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court. During the sentencing hearing, Howard argued that he was subject to a more severe penalty for a crime of violence conviction under the transfer statute than he would be if this were a direct-file case because direct-filed juveniles were exempted “from the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in [the crime of violence statute],” whereas transferred juveniles were not. To address that equal protection concern, the district court determined that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute would not apply in this transfer proceeding, just as they would not have applied in a direct-file proceeding. The court further determined, however, that this ruling did not make Howard eligible for probation. Instead, the court concluded that the statutory scheme only allowed either: (1) a youth offender services (“YOS”) sentence with a suspended Department of Corrections (“DOC”) sentence; or (2) a DOC sentence. The court ultimately sentenced Howard to six years in YOS with a suspended fifteen-year DOC sentence. Howard, appealed, arguing the district court erred in its reasoning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review, affirming the court of appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, there was no equal protection violation because neither direct-filed juveniles nor transferred juveniles convicted of crimes of violence were eligible for probation, and the district court did not apply the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the crime of violence statute. Hence, Howard was treated the same as a direct-filed juvenile would have been with regard to probation and the applicable sentencing range. View "Howard v. Colorado" on Justia Law

A juvenile court found that Amber had committed felony assault by force likely to produce great bodily harm, adjudged her a ward of the court, and imposed conditions of probation. The conditions included a requirement that she submit her electronic devices to warrantless searches of any medium of communication likely to reveal whether she is complying with the conditions of her probation. The court of appeal held that the condition is appropriate but too broad to withstand scrutiny. It imposes a burden that is not proportionate to the legitimate interest it serves of ensuring that Amber does not have contact with a specific person. View "In re Amber K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking body cam footage and other related records regarding juveniles and then-State Senator Aaron Ford's interaction with the police due to the confidentiality of juvenile justice records, holding that the petition was correctly denied as to all portions of the bodycam footage but that the district court erred in granting the petition as to the other requested records.Officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) arrested numerous juvenile suspects after responding to an incident. Ford, a parent of one of the suspects, arrived at the scene. The Republican Attorneys General Association's (RAGA) requested records from LVMPD related to the incident in accordance with the Nevada Public Records Act. LVMPD refused the request, citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 62H.025 and 62H.030 to justify its assertion of confidentiality. RAGA petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding that all portions of requested bodycam footage contained confidential juvenile justice information; but (2) failed sufficiently to assess whether the other requested records contained any nonconfidential material. View "Republican Attorneys General Ass'n v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court dismissing a minor's appeal challenging the juvenile court's neglect of its mandatory duty under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 702 to declare a wobbler offense to be a misdemeanor or a felony, holding that the minor may not bring such a challenge in an appeal from a later dispositional order after the time to appeal the original disposition expired.Two wardship petitions were filed against G.C. alleging that G.C. committed three wobbler offenses. G.C. admitted all three allegations. The court, however, did not declare on the record whether the offenses were felonies or misdemeanors. Thereafter, G.C. was adjudged a ward and placed on probation. G.C. did not appeal the disposition. After G.C. violated the terms of her probation the juvenile court maintained G.C. in her mother's custody under the supervision of the probation department with various conditions. G.C. appealed, arguing that the court failed expressly to declare whether the offenses were misdemeanors or felonies. The appellate court determined that the issue was not timely raised. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although section 702 is mandatory, noncompliance did not make the original dispositional order an unauthorized sentence that could be corrected at any time. View "In re G.C." on Justia Law