Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Before the Alaska Supreme Court in this case was a constitutional claim arising from the application of a juvenile jurisdiction waiver statute. A minor subject to the statutory provision did not testify at his waiver hearing and did not overcome the presumption enumerated in the statute; the superior court granted the State’s waiver petition. The minor appealed, contending the statutory rebuttable presumption and shifted burden of proof violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his constitutional due process rights. The Supreme Court explained that fundamental fairness required adopting an exclusionary rule when a minor bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of being unamenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system: the minor’s testimonial evidence at the waiver hearing cannot be used as substantive evidence over the minor’s objection at any subsequent juvenile adjudication or adult criminal proceedings. View "C.D., a Minor v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In 1994, sixteen-and-a-half-year-old Stephen McGilberry brutally murdered four family members, including his three-year-old nephew. McGilberry premeditated and planned his crime, enlisting a younger neighbor’s help. A jury found McGilberry guilty of four counts of capital murder and sentenced him to death. But in 2005, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty for offenders who committed their capital crimes before reaching the age of eighteen. McGilberry's death sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to life without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of life without parole for crimes committed before the offender turned eighteen violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Mississippi Supreme Court granted McGilberry permission to seek post-conviction relief from his sentence. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the record supported the trial court's determination that McGilberry should have been sentenced to life without parole based on his "irreparably corrupt nature," the Court found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing decision. View "McGilberry v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals vacated the disposition imposed by the district court in three juvenile matters, holding that the language in State v. J.R., 191 A.3d 1157 (Me. 2018), could be read to suggest that a court imposing an indeterminate commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections facility must specify a commitment no shorter in duration than up to the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, and the trial court here may have proceeded under such a belief.In this consolidated appeal, P.S. argued that the district court abused its discretion in ordering that he be committed to Long Creek Youth Development Center for an indeterminate period up to age eighteen. The Court of Appeals noted that, once the district court decided to commit P.S. to Long Creek, it may have felt compelled to order him committed up to his eighteenth birthday. The Court then acknowledged that its language in J.R. may have contributed to such a belief and clarified that the language of J.R. does not constrain a juvenile court's discretion to impose a shorter period of indeterminate commitment than up to a juvenile's eighteenth birthday so long as that commitment is for at least one year. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter. View "State v. P.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denying Appellant's petition for habeas corpus, holding that this appeal presented issues that were moot and that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied.Appellant was charged with multiple juvenile offenses. The district court ordered him held at Long Creek Youth Development Center while awaiting trial. The proceedings were suspended when Appellant was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking release from Long Creek. The single justice denied the petition. Appellant appealed. Before oral argument, Appellant was released from Long Creek and placed in a residential treatment facility, and the charges against him were dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was moot and that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "A.I. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dominick Humphrey pled guilty to four counts of robbery (counts 2, 3, 4 and 24). For three of these counts (counts 2, 3, and 4), Humphrey admitted that he used a deadly weapon (a knife) during the commission of the offenses, and used a firearm during the commission of one of the counts (count 24). Humphrey also admitted that he was 16 years old when he committed the crimes within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The trial court sentenced Humphrey to prison for 19 years. Five years into Humphrey's sentence, an employee of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote a letter to the superior court, stating that the abstract of judgment "may be in error, or incomplete[.]" In 2018, the trial court clarified that Humphrey was sentenced to 15 years for count 24 and the associated firearm enhancement and consecutive 16-month terms for counts 2, 3, and 4 (including their deadly weapon enhancements). An amended abstract of judgment was issued showing a sentence of 19 years in state prison. Thereafter, Humphrey moved to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620. The trial court denied the motion because Humphrey's conviction became final before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620. Appellate counsel filed a "Wende" brief, indicating that he had not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal, but asked the Court of Appeal to review the record for error as Wende mandated. In reviewing the record, the Court discovered an issue to be briefed, and the parties were requested to brief whether the trial court erred in finding Humphrey ineligible for relief under Senate Bill 620 after the trial court acted to correct the abstract of judgment. Find that the trial court only made plain how the original sentence should have appeared on the amended abstract of judgment, the Court of Appeal determined Humphrey did not file a notice of appeal following the original 2011 sentence. His case became final in 2011. Senate Bill 620 took effect January 1, 2018, and Humphrey's was not entitled to retroactive application of the law to his sentence. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying his motion for resentencing. View "California v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied relief.Appellant was sixteen years old when four delinquency complaints were filed in juvenile court. The cases were transferred to adult court where Appellant was convicted of five felony counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixteen years. Appellant later filed this habeas corpus petition alleging that the juvenile court did not fully comply with the procedures for transferring jurisdiction to the adult court because it did not timely notify his father of a hearing in one of the cases that led to the transfer of some of the charges. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court's failure to provide timely notice was not a defect that deprived the adult court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Smith v. May" on Justia Law

People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, does not apply to a mandatory minimum juvenile restitution fine. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court's order requiring M.B. to pay a $100 restitution fine does not violate his due process rights. To the extent that Dueñas purports to state a rule of California criminal procedure, the court questioned whether the Court of Appeal, as opposed to the Supreme Court, has the authority to do so. The court explained that it was not bound by a sister appellate court opinion and it was obligated to follow the California Constitution, Article 6, 13. Therefore, the court concluded that a $100 mandatory juvenile restitution fine did not result in a miscarriage of justice. View "People v. M.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings, holding that, for revocation of pretrial probation in the juvenile court based on a new criminal offense, the Commonwealth must prove that there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense.At issue in this case was the standard of proof and procedural requirements necessary for the revocation of pretrial probation in the juvenile court. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58B does not govern the revocation of pretrial probation of a juvenile; (2) to revoke a juvenile's pretrial probation based on a new criminal offense, a judge must find probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense, and all other violations must be proved, at an evidentiary hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) for a revocation of a juvenile's pretrial probation, due process requires notice of the alleged violations, the opportunity to be heard, and a judicial finding that the juvenile committed the violation. View "Commonwealth v. Preston P." on Justia Law

After L.W. was charged in a juvenile wardship petition with committing sexual battery against two minor females, the juvenile court issued temporary restraining orders against defendant as to the two alleged victims under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 213.5 and rule 5.630 of the California Rules of Court.The Court of Appeal held that because the People presented no evidence of an emergency or other urgency and made no attempt to give defendant prior notice of their intent to seek the temporary restraining orders, the juvenile court erred in issuing those orders without notice. However, the court held that the juvenile court did not err in issuing the pre-adjudication three-year restraining order, because the order was a reasoned and reasonable response to defendant's conduct and the other relevant facts of the case. Furthermore, the order was entirely consistent with the public policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws generally and section 213.5 specifically. Accordingly, the court affirmed the three-year restraining order. View "People v. L.W." on Justia Law

Shortly before turning 18 Andrew committed an armed robbery; his accomplice shot and killed a police officer. After his conviction, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 24 years. The court of appeal reversed one special circumstance. On remand, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to LWOP plus 24 years. After a second remand following the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller decision (2012), Judge Brady imposed LWOP plus 23 years, finding Andrew’s actions “were not those of an irresponsible or impulsive child," nor the product of peer pressure, coercion, or surprise and finding no realistic chance of rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court returned the case with directions to consider whether legislation rendering juvenile LWOP defendants eligible for parole suitability hearings mooted Andrew’s challenge.While Andrew’s appeal was pending Proposition 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to “direct file” charges in criminal court against minors of a certain age. These minors may be tried in criminal court only after the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing to consider specific factors. The court rejected Andrew’s LWOP challenge but concluded he was entitled to a Proposition 57 hearing. The superior court granted the prosecution's motion to assign that hearing to Judge Brady. The court of appeal rejected a mandamus petition. A conditional reversal and limited remand for a Proposition 57 transfer hearing are not a “new trial” under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61, which permits parties in civil and criminal actions to move to disqualify an assigned trial judge based on an allegation that the judge is prejudiced against the party. View "Andrew M. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law