Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The state sought adjudication of wardship against Michael, charging him with misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen. Count 2 alleged that he committed theft by deception. Following Michael’s conviction on Count 2, the probation officer recommended that Michael be placed on supervision for one year. The state recommended a sentence of one year’s probation and restitution of $160. The court continued the case under supervision for one year, referred Michael for evaluation, and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution. The continuance was memorialized in a “Supervision Order” and a “Sentencing Order.” On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box for “No finding or judgment of guilty entered.” The court did not adjudge Michael a ward of the court, but advised Michael of his appeal rights, and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent him. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. While a recent statutory change allows supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of guilt (705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)(b)), the change did not make such interlocutory orders appealable under any supreme court rule. View "In re Michael D." on Justia Law

M.A., then 13 years old, fought with her 14-year-old brother and cut him with a kitchen knife. M.A. was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses and ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILCS 154/1. M.A. argued that the registration provisions violated her rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. The Appellate Court rejected the substantive due process claim, but found the registration provisions unconstitutional for violating procedural due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the registration requirement. Current dangerousness is not relevant to the duty to register, so M.A. did not have a due process right to a hearing to address that issue. The Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or adjudication, which M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, and that those charges require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement,” there is a rational relationship between M.A.’s registration and protection of the public. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law