Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, a delinquency petition was filed against G.W., a 17-year-old, alleging that he had committed acts that would be considered theft and criminal trespass if committed as an adult. G.W. admitted to one allegation of theft and one allegation of criminal trespass. After G.W. went missing and was later found in Mississippi, he was returned to Indiana for his dispositional hearing. The juvenile court rejected G.W.'s request for home detention and ordered wardship of G.W. to the Department of Correction (DOC). However, the court's dispositional order did not include specific findings to support G.W.'s commitment, as required by statute.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision but acknowledged that the order failed to comply with the applicable statutory requirements. The panel remanded the case for an amended dispositional order which includes the written findings and conclusions required by the statute. After the Court of Appeals had delivered its decision, but before it had certified that decision, the juvenile court issued an amended dispositional order which included the required statutory findings.The Indiana Supreme Court held that when a juvenile court fails to enter the requisite findings of fact in its dispositional order, an appellate court should neither affirm nor reverse. Instead, the proper remedy is to remand the case under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C)(8) while holding the appeal in abeyance. This process adheres to the applicable statutory requirements, preserves the distinct roles played by trial courts and appellate courts, and (in some cases) justifies the cost of juvenile detention. The court remanded the case to the juvenile court for entry of its amended dispositional order. View "G.W. v. State" on Justia Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court concerns a juvenile, A.W., who was adjudicated for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm. The court was asked to determine if these adjudications violated the principle of double jeopardy under Indiana law. A.W. asserted that he did not know the firearm he possessed had been modified to function as a machine gun.The court found that A.W.'s exclusive possession of the modified gun, along with his abrupt flight from police, supported the conclusion that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. This satisfied the first part of the court's inquiry.On the issue of double jeopardy, the court noted that while the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile proceedings, it avoided deciding that issue. Instead, it focused on whether possession of a dangerous firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of a machine gun under the test set out in the case Wadle v. State. The court found that it was, meaning A.W.'s adjudications for both offenses violated his rights under the principle of double jeopardy. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding that A.W. knowingly possessed a machine gun but reversed the adjudication that he committed dangerous possession of a firearm. View "A. W. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying T.D.'s motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and 60(B)(8) asserting that his juvenile adjudication should be set aside because his delinquency admission was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, holding that there was no error.T.D. agreed to admit to an auto-theft charge. Without informing T.D. of his constitutional rights or confirming that he waived those rights the court accepted T.D.'s admission and granted the delinquency petition. T.D. later filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that he was not "informed of a single right on the record." The trial court denied the motion, concluding that his admission was voluntary and knowingly given with adequate assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that T.D. made a prima facie showing that the trial court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute before accepting his admission, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by denying T.D.'s motion for relief from judgment. View "T.D. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court denying Appellant's request for relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), holding that the new jurisdictional rule announced in K.C.G. v. State, 156 N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. 2020), does not apply retroactively in a collateral attack to render a final delinquency adjudication void.Prior to 2021, the Juvenile Code defined a "delinquent act" only as an act committed by a child "that would be an offense if committed by an adult." In K.C.G., the Supreme Court concluded that Ind. Code 35-47-10-5 (the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm statute) expressly applied only to child and thus could never be committed by an adult. At issue in this case was whether the jurisdictional rule announced in K.C.G. applies retroactively to collaterally attack a final delinquency adjudication as void. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court in this case denying the relief sought by Appellant under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), holding that this Court's K.C.G. decision does not apply retroactively. View "M.H. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court against the State on the State's delinquency petition that it filed against Anthony Neukam, holding that neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had jurisdiction in this case.Neukam allegedly molested his young cousin both before and after he was eighteen. When Nuekam was twenty, the State brought charges against him in criminal court. When Neukam was twenty-two, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court for acts Neukam allegedly committed before turning eighteen. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided that juvenile courts lack jurisdiction over delinquency petitions once the accused is age twenty-one. The State then dismissed the juvenile case and moved to amend the criminal case to add counts of child molesting Neukam allegedly committed before he was eighteen. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that courts lack jurisdiction when an individual is alleged to have committed a delinquent act before turning eighteen but is over twenty-one when the State files charges. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding that no court had jurisdiction over the charges arising from arising from Neukam's alleged misconduct before his eighteenth birthday. View "State v. Neukam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of attempted murder, holding that the trial court did not err in not allowing Defendant's mother as a witness to stay in the courtroom during Defendant's trial.Defendant was fifteen years old when he was waived into adult criminal court and convicted. Before trial, the State listed Defendant's mother as a potential witness, and at trial, the State requested a separation of witnesses order. The court ordered Defendant's mother to leave the courtroom, and the State never called her to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a child in adult criminal court may use Ind. R. Evid. 615(c) to establish that a parent is "essential" to the presentation of the defense and is thus excluded from a witness separation order; (2) Defendant did not make the requisite showing under the rule; (3) Defendant waived his argument that a juvenile defendant has a due process right to have a parent present for criminal proceedings; and (4) Defendant's challenges to his sentence were unavailing. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated K.C.G.'s delinquency adjudication and the modification of his probation based on that adjudication, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The delinquency at issue alleged that sixteen-year-old K.C.G. committed the offense of dangerous possession of a firearm in violation of Ind. Code 35-47-10-5. The juvenile court adjudicated K.C.G. a delinquent and modified his probation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the plain terms of the dangerous-possession statute showed it could not be a delinquent act. The Supreme Court vacated the delinquency adjudication, holding that because the statute defines the offense solely in terms of a "child" with an unauthorized firearm, the dangerous-possession statute does not apply to adults, and therefore, the State's petition did not allege a jurisdictional prerequisite - that K.C.G.'s conduct was "an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult." View "K.C.G. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's maximum 138-year sentence imposed for crimes Defendant committed as a juvenile and revised the sentence to a total sentence of eighty-eight years, holding that the 138-year sentence was inappropriate.Defendant was seventeen years old when he and two others committed murder in 1991. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of 138 years, which was the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. In 2016, Defendant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief challenging the propriety of his sentence in light of the fact that he was a juvenile when he committed the crimes. The post-conviction court granted the petition and imposed an aggregate sixty-eight-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting relief and revisited its prior decision regarding the appropriateness of his sentence but revised the sentence to an aggregate term of eighty-eight years, holding (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not bar consideration of Defendant's appropriateness argument due to two major shifts in the law; and (2) Defendant's maximum term-of-years sentence imposed for crimes he committed as a juvenile was inappropriate. View "State v. Stidham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court's adjudication of K.C.G. as a delinquent child for dangerously possessing a firearm, as well as its modification of K.C.G.'s probation based on that ruling, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.The delinquency petition here alleged that K.C.G., age sixteen, committed the offense of dangerous possession of a firearm. After a hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent and modified his probation. The Supreme Court vacated the adjudication, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the State's petition did not allege a jurisdictional prerequisite - that K.C.G.'s conduct was "an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult." View "K.C.G. v. State" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court held that under the clear and unambiguous language of several relevant statutes, a juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive two individuals into adult criminal court because neither fit the definition of a "child" at the time their respective delinquency petitions were filed.The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against D.P. and N.B. for committing, when they were under the age of eighteen, what would be felony child molesting if committed by an adult. Both individuals were twenty-one or older at the time the delinquency petitions were filed. The State requested that D.P. and N.B. be waived into adult criminal court, and D.P. and N.B. moved to dismiss their respective cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied in D.P.'s case and was granted in N.B.'s case. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's dismissal in N.B. and reversed in D.P. and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss, holding that a juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive an alleged delinquent offender into adult criminal court if the individual is no longer a "child." View "D.P. v. State" on Justia Law