Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Eluterio Martinez-Garcia, a juvenile offender, attacked his 11th-grade English teacher and subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted murder, attempted sexual assault, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The district court sentenced him to two consecutive prison terms of 8 to 20 years and a concurrent term of 6 to 15 years, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 years with parole eligibility after 16 years. Martinez-Garcia moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was illegal and that he was entitled to parole eligibility after 15 years under NRS 213.12135(1)(a). The district court treated the motion as one to correct an illegal sentence and denied it.Martinez-Garcia appealed the district court's decision, contending that his sentence should reflect parole eligibility after 15 years as mandated by NRS 213.12135(1)(a) for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. He argued that the sentence imposed was illegal because it provided for parole eligibility after 16 years, contrary to the statute. The State argued that the sentence complied with the statutes governing the offenses to which Martinez-Garcia pleaded guilty.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 213.12135(1)(a) provides for parole eligibility for juvenile nonhomicide offenders after 15 years by operation of law, without requiring resentencing or amendment of the judgment of conviction. The court concluded that the statute does not render a sentence illegal if it otherwise conforms to the sentencing statutes for the offenses committed. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order denying Martinez-Garcia's motion to correct an illegal sentence, acknowledging that he will be eligible for parole after 15 years despite the longer parole-eligibility period stated in the judgment of conviction. View "GARCIA VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, D.C. Jr., who was charged with murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. Jr., who has an IQ of 66, was 14 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. His counsel requested a competency determination before proceeding to the certification hearing. After an initial finding of incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile court declared D.C. Jr. competent to proceed. However, the court did not explicitly address the conflicting expert testimony regarding D.C. Jr.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel.The juvenile court certified D.C. Jr. for prosecution as an adult. The court's decision was based on the assumption that the competency standards for juvenile court applied, which was a mistake. The court did not adequately support its determination with findings, and it appears to have applied an incorrect standard.The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the certification order and the competency determination. The court held that a juvenile facing the possibility of prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges must meet the adult criminal court standard for competence. The court remanded the case for the juvenile court to reassess D.C. Jr.'s competency using the correct standard. The court emphasized that the stakes were high, and the record did not show that the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C. Jr.'s competency to proceed. The court also vacated the order certifying D.C. Jr. for criminal proceedings as an adult, which followed the competency determination. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

In 2016, 21-year-old Kwame De-Markquise Morrison initiated a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl, A.M. In 2017, A.M. became pregnant and gave birth to a child, who was later adopted. Morrison was charged with six counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. Morrison admitted to having sex with A.M. but claimed he believed she was 16 years old.The district court convicted Morrison of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. The court instructed the jury that a lack of knowledge or a mistake as to the victim's age is not a defense to a charge of using a minor in producing pornography. Morrison appealed, arguing that the instruction was inaccurate because the State is required to prove that the defendant "knowingly" used "a minor" in producing pornography.The Court of Appeals of Nevada agreed that the instruction was inaccurate. However, it found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Morrison admitted that he believed A.M. was 16 years old—and therefore a minor—during their sexual relationship. The court also rejected Morrison's other claims on appeal, including that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss counsel and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, the court affirmed Morrison's judgment of conviction. View "Morrison v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking body cam footage and other related records regarding juveniles and then-State Senator Aaron Ford's interaction with the police due to the confidentiality of juvenile justice records, holding that the petition was correctly denied as to all portions of the bodycam footage but that the district court erred in granting the petition as to the other requested records.Officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) arrested numerous juvenile suspects after responding to an incident. Ford, a parent of one of the suspects, arrived at the scene. The Republican Attorneys General Association's (RAGA) requested records from LVMPD related to the incident in accordance with the Nevada Public Records Act. LVMPD refused the request, citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 62H.025 and 62H.030 to justify its assertion of confidentiality. RAGA petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding that all portions of requested bodycam footage contained confidential juvenile justice information; but (2) failed sufficiently to assess whether the other requested records contained any nonconfidential material. View "Republican Attorneys General Ass'n v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting uncharged acts as evidence in this juvenile proceeding.The State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court charging N.J. with one count of battery and one count of harassment. N.J. objected to the admission of testimony regarding two uncharged acts. The district court overruled the objections based on the res gestae doctrine and adjudicated N.J. delinquent on both counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony regarding the two uncharged acts. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

When a minor is arrested solely for solicitation or prostitution but is charged in juvenile court with offenses other than prostitution or solicitation, Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.240 applies, precluding formal adjudication of delinquency and ensuring counseling and medical treatment services as part of a consent decree.Petitioner, a juvenile, was arrested for soliciting prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution and was charged with obstructing an officer. Petitioner was adjudicated as a delinquent. The State subsequently filed several petitions alleging violations of Petitioner’s probation. The juvenile court committed Petitioner to placement at the Claliente Youth Center. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders adjudicating her as a delinquent and apply the provisions of section 62C.240. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition, holding that A.J. was entitled to protections afforded under 62C.240 and that the juvenile court arbitrarily and capriciously abused its discretion by adjudicating her as a delinquent. View "A.J. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law