Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Garcia died in August 2011 after receiving multiple stab wounds. Mendoza, Martell, and Ramirez were convicted following a joint trial, for second degree murder (Pen. Code 187, 189) with gang enhancements (section 186.22(b)) for killing Garcia. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by: excluding statements of a co-perpetrator; allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct during the opening statement; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of gang-related intimidation; failing to properly instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication, the required mental state for guilt as an aider and abettor, and the evidence necessary to prove the gang enhancement; allowing the prosecution to commit misconduct during its examination of a prosecution witness; admitting unduly prejudicial out-of-court statements; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity; and allowing the gang expert to show unduly prejudicial slides in the slideshow that accompanied his expert testimony. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance and a claim that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, should be applied retroactively to Ramirez because he was 16 years old at the time of the offense and his judgment was not final when voters approved Proposition 57. View "People v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A.T. is enrolled in high school. Her attendance is regular; she earns passing grades. She was riding with another minor in a car driven by her brother, also a minor with no delinquent history. Police stopped the car because its registration had expired. No one inside the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s license. Police arrested her brother for driving without a license. During an inventory search, officers found a handgun inside a backpack, in the trunk. A.T. waived her Miranda rights, and told police that her brother had found the gun that morning; they had agreed to put it in her backpack inside the car trunk to show to their father. The father of her brother’s girlfriend subsequently reported the gun was stolen from him. The juvenile court denied A.T.’s request to be released to her mother’s custody pending the disposition of charges. A.T. alleges the court improperly considered her refusal to accept a “package-deal” plea bargain and the suitability of the Vallejo neighborhood where her mother lives in an apartment, in deciding to detain her. The girl was released, upon pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, after serving 16 days in custody. A.T. moved to withdraw her plea. The court of appeal directed the lower court to decide that motion, considering that “[t]he Legislature has indicated that children should be released except under certain specific conditions of ‘immediate and urgent necessity’” and that the record reveals no such necessity. View "A.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, including a mandatory minimum term of incarceration. Defendant was also ordered to pay $150,000 in mandatory restitution to the victim’s estate. Defendant was later resentenced and received immediate parole eligibility because the mandatory minimum period of incarceration had been deemed unconstitutional. The restitution was left in place. Defendant appealed, challenging the $150,000 in restitution to the victim’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the $150,000 mandatory restitution for juvenile homicide offenders is not facially unconstitutional; and (2) the $150,000 mandatory restitution was not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. View "State v. Breeden" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. The district court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of incarceration and ordered Defendant to pay $150,000 in mandatory restitution to the victim’s estate. Defendant appealed, challenging the $150,000 restitution award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Iowa Code 901.5(14) does not authorize the district court to modify a restitution award otherwise required by Iowa Code 910.3B(1), and restitution under chapter 910 is mandatory; and (2) section 910.3B is not unconstitutional either as applied to all juvenile homicide offenders or as applied to Defendant. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

A family magistrate of the circuit court for Baltimore County found that Cody H. had committed the delinquent act of assault by punching a sixteen-year-old victim in the face and breaking his jaw. The magistrate judgment made a recommendation for a restitution award of $1,489 to the victim for medical expenses but did not award restitution for lost earnings. The State filed exceptions to the recommendation. A juvenile court judge sustained the State’s exception and imposed an additional restitution amount of $5,000 for loss of earnings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the loss of earnings restitution award in this case was proper under the restitution statute, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. 11-603. View "In re Cody H." on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Keighton Budder was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of several violent nonhomicide crimes committed when he was sixteen years old. After sentence modification on direct appeal, he received three life sentences and an additional sentence of twenty years, all to run consecutively. He was not be eligible for parole under Oklahoma law until he served 131.75 years in prison. Budder filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. In support, he cited “Graham v. Florida,” (560 U.S. 48 (2010)), which held that sentencing juvenile offenders who have not committed homicide crimes to life in prison without a meaningful opportunity for release was unconstitutional. The district court denied Budder’s petition, and he appeals. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Budder’s petition. The Court found under the categorical rule clearly established in “Graham,” Budder’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. “The [Oklahoma Supreme Court’s] judgment was contrary to this clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Budder’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, to vacate Budder’s sentence, and to direct the State of Oklahoma to resentence Budder within a reasonable period.” View "Budder v. Addison" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the juvenile court's adjudication order declaring him a ward of the court and sustained a petition filed by the People alleging that defendant had committed vandalism charges based on his "tagging" of buildings. The court agreed with defendant that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding on the felony vandalism count, under Penal Code 594, subdivision (b)(1) & (2), that defendant caused $400 or more in property damage, which was the amount of damage necessary to punish vandalism as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor. In this case, the court concluded that the people provided insufficient evidence of the actual cost of repair to the property damage defendant caused, and the graffiti cost removal list failed to satisfy the criteria for use of average costs in restitution cases. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded. View "In re Kyle T." on Justia Law

Proposition 57 eliminated the State's ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court and instead authorized the State to file “a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” Prior to the passage of Proposition 57, the State directly filed a complaint against real party in interest, a minor, in adult court under the authority of former section 707(d)(2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. A preliminary hearing took place May 26, 2016; on June 10, 2016, the State filed an information charging real party in interest with felony violations of Penal Code sections 209(b)(1), 286(c)(2)(B), and 288a(c)(2)(B). On November 16, 2016, real party in interest filed a motion requesting “a fitness hearing in juvenile court pursuant to recently enacted legislation via Proposition 57.” After considering written opposition from the State, who argued Proposition 57 could not be applied to real party in interest's case retroactively, the trial court granted the motion on November 29, 2016. Noting that the issue was “novel,” the trial court stayed its order until December 20, 2016, so the State could seek appellate intervention. The State's petition in this case followed three days later, seeking an emergency stay and asserted there would be “widespread confusion and continued litigation” if the trial court's order in this case stood. In addition, the petition introduced evidence that there were 57 other direct-file cases pending, and that 10 motions to transfer to juvenile court had already been received. The Court of Appeal denied the State's petition and published this opinion because "we recognize that trial courts may need guidance deciding whether and how to apply Proposition 57 to cases that were directly filed in adult court before its passage. We caution that we need not and therefore do not opine about anything other than the retroactivity of the portion of Proposition 57 that requires the juvenile court to permit trial of a minor in an adult criminal court. We do not address the equal protection argument real party in interest advanced in his informal response. In addition, although the People asked for advice about how courts should handle direct-filed cases that are transferred to juvenile court and then back to adult court after a successful motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a), we do not purport to guide trial courts regarding other procedural aspects of cases against juveniles now that Proposition 57 has passed. Any such issues are best left for cases that squarely present them." View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Cervantes was 14 years old when he attacked a 13-year-old girl and her 20-month-old brother. After breaking into their home, he stabbed them repeatedly as they slept, raped and sodomized the girl, forced her to orally copulate him, and passed out. He had been drinking heavily. His defense rested on voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. He was convicted of 15 charges, including sex offenses, first-degree burglary, and two counts each of attempted murder, torture, and aggravated mayhem. He received a prison sentence of 50 years to life under Penal Code 667.61, a consecutive 11-year term for one attempted murder (sections 187, 664), plus a consecutive life term for the other attempted murder. The court of appeal reversed as to the eight specific intent counts, noting serious deficiencies in counsel’s performance, and affirmed as to the general intent crimes. The court concluded that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, requires that the case be remanded for a “fitness hearing” to determine whether adult criminal court or juvenile court will handle any retrial on the reversed counts and sentencing. The court noted that a sentence requiring Cervantes to serve at least 66 years in prison before he would first become eligible for parole exceeds his life expectancy, and is the functional equivalent of life without parole, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "People v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The San Francisco County Human Services Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of the Minor. At an initial detention hearing, Father appeared. The court appointed counsel. Counsel asked to set the matter for a contested detention hearing but explained she could not proceed immediately because her witnesses were not available and because she was in trial in another department. After a discussion about a continuance, the court found there had been a prima facie showing there was a substantial danger to Minor’s physical and emotional well-being and there were no reasonable means by which Minor’s physical and emotional safety could be safeguarded without removing Minor from Father’s custody. The court ordered Minor temporarily detained and approved Minor’s placement with his mother. Father’s counsel filed a declaration and disqualification motion, which the court found untimely because the court had “made substantive rulings on the detention.” Father sought review of the denial of his disqualification motion. The court of appeal granted the petition, finding that the court’s rulings did not preclude Father from making his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge because they did not “involv[e] a determination of contested fact issues related to the merits.” View "Johnny W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law