Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was adjudicated a delinquent juvenile for committing a sexual offense that required him to register as an offender under the Wyoming Sexual Offender Registration Act (WSORA). Appellant later entered a conditional guilty plea to two felony counts for failing to report changes in his address, as required by the WSORA. Appellant appealed his convictions, claiming that the WSORA is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Wyoming Juvenile Justice Act does not conflict irreconcilably with the WSORA’s registry requirements for adjudicated juvenile offenders; (2) the WSORA does not violate the Wyoming Constitution’s equal protection clause; (3) Appellant failed to establish that the WSORA’s lifetime registration requirement violates his due process rights; and (4) the WSORA does not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. View "Vaughn v. State" on Justia Law

The minor was 13 years old when he engaged sexual conduct with a four-year-old boy and seven-year-old girl. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021, the minor admitted one count of conduct that if committed by an adult would constitute lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code 288(a)); two other counts were dismissed. The parties appeared several times before Judge Johnson for “restitution setting.” The case was set for a contested hearing on victim restitution six months after the disposition hearing. On the day of the contested restitution hearing, the minor’s counsel sought a continuance because Johnson was absent. The visiting judge denied the request, conducted a hearing, and ordered the minor to pay $12,501.39. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the juvenile court violated People v. Arbuckle in denying the minor’s request to have Judge Johnson preside over the restitution hearing. Arbuckle does not apply to juvenile court restitution hearings, but even if it applied, any error was harmless because the minor received a fair hearing and did not demonstrate that the restitution was excessive. The court upheld restitution for the male victim’s bedroom furniture, clothing, and costs associated with a therapy dog. View "In re Cristian S." on Justia Law

The State charged twelve-year-old K.J.R. with seven felony and misdemeanor offenses. The district youth court subsequently adjudicated K.J.R. to be a delinquent youth. The youth court committed K.J.R. to the supervision of the youth court until age eighteen, or sooner released, for placement at a specific therapeutic group home. Over the next three years, the juvenile probation officer moved K.J.R. in and out of a sequence of juvenile facilities and foster care homes. When K.J.R. was fifteen years old, the State filed a petition to revoke his youth court probation. After a dispositional hearing, the youth court revoked K.J.R.’s original commitment to the youth court and committed K.J.R. to the supervision of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) at a state youth correctional facility until age eighteen or sooner released. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err when it revoked K.J.R.’s original youth court commitment and recommitted him to DOC for placement at a state youth correction facility; and (2) K.J.R.’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the delinquency proceedings was without merit. View "State v. K.J.R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals, in a divided full-court (15-judge) decision, certified to the Georgia Supreme Court a single question of statutory construction: whether OCGA 15-11-521 (b) required dismissal with prejudice when the State neither filed a petition alleging juvenile delinquency within the applicable 30-day period nor seeks an extension of time in which to file such petition. At the time the Court of Appeals certified its question, the Supreme Court had granted petitions for certiorari in two other cases ("M.D.H." and "D.V.H.") to address the same question. The Court held in a single opinion that “if the State fails to file a delinquency petition within the required30 days or to seek and receive an extension of that deadline, the case must be dismissed without prejudice,” and thus affirming the decision in M.D.H. and reversing the decision in D.V.H. Because the answer to the certified question submitted by the Court of Appeals in this case “may be found in the decision of this [C]ourt in [another case,] we will not again undertake to consider the question[]submitted.” View "In the Interest of J.F." on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Department of Social Services filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 petition concerning three minors, alleging their mother was unable to care for them, and that Father’s whereabouts were unknown. Mother and Minors were enrolled members of the Hopland Band of Pomo Indians. The case was governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901). The Department located Father in a Florida jail. He requested services. Father was released and submitted evidence that, while incarcerated, Father had completed substance abuse classes and a dog training program. The court sustained an allegation that Father “has a pattern of criminal behaviors that includes a drug-related arrest and conviction in 2014 that severely impairs his ability to care for” his children. He had not seen Minors in more than five years nor spoken to them in two years. At a six-month hearing, Father argued reasonable services were not provided, citing a delay in creating Father’s case plan and failure to provide drug testing or regular phone visitation. The court found reasonable services had been provided; that Father had not complied; and the Department made active efforts to prevent the Indian family's breakup. The court ordered continued services with weekly telephone visits. The court of appeals reversed, finding that, although the likelihood of reunification may be low, the Department was obliged to provide services, regardless of Father’s out-of-state location View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest, was charged as an adult with robbery and aggravated assault. Defendant was subsequently interviewed by police in connection with an assault of a female. The day after he made a statement, Defendant was charged as an adult with residential burglary, sexual assault in the second degree, and aggravated assault. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he made to police. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant was unable to waive his right to counsel because he was in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services at the time of the interview. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-317(g) and therefore erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Defendant, age 16, was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder and tried in adult court under the “automatic transfer” provision of the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/5-130. He was convicted only of the uncharged offense of second-degree murder, 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2). The court found that the state had proved the elements of first-degree murder but also found that “at the time of the killing [defendant] believed the circumstances to be such that if they existed would have justified or exonerated the killing under the said principles of self-defense, but his belief was unreasonable.” The state had not filed a written motion requesting that defendant be sentenced as an adult pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii), nor did defendant object or argue at the time of sentencing that he should have been sentenced as a juvenile. Instead, the trial court and the parties proceeded directly to sentencing. Defendant was sentenced, as an adult, to 18 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in automatically sentencing defendant as an adult pursuant to section 5-130(1)(c)(i) because second-degree murder was not a “charge[ ] arising out of the same incident” as the first-degree murder charges. View "People v. Fort" on Justia Law

Samuel S., a juvenile, was adjudicated a youthful offender and a delinquent juvenile as the result of a single sexual offense. As part of his sentence, Samuel was committed to the Department of Youth Services. The juvenile court judge also ordered Samuel to register as a sex offender and to submit to GPS monitoring, stating that both consequences were “mandatory.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judge’s decision, holding (1) the pertinent section of the sex offender registration statute required the judge to make an individualized determination whether Samuel must register as a sex offender because he was not “sentenced to immediate confinement” within the meaning of the statute; and (2) the GPS monitoring statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Hanson H., does not require youthful offenders to submit to GPS monitoring. View "Commonwealth v. Samuel S." on Justia Law

J.D.M. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing child molestation which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a Class C felony. The juvenile court ordered placement of J.D.M. at the Wernle Youth and Family Treatment Center. Prior to J.D.M.’s release from Wernle, the juvenile court issued an order that required J.D.M. to register as a sex offender. J.D.M. appealed, arguing that the statutory prerequisites for placing a juvenile on the sex offender registry were not met. The Supreme Court reversed the order requiring J.D.M. to register as a sex offender, holding that the juvenile court could not order J.D.M. to register as a sex or violent offender prior to his discharge from Wernle. Remanded. View "J.D.M. v. State" on Justia Law

The two petitioners in this case were juveniles who were adjudicated juvenile delinquents for sexual assault. At issue before the circuit court was whether the juveniles should be required to register as lifetime sexual offenders upon reaching the age twenty-one. The circuit court certified two questions to the Supreme Court regarding the sex offender statutes in relation to juvenile offenders. The Supreme Court answered (1) a juvenile adjudicated of certain acts of delinquency is not required to register under the sex offender registration statute; and (2) the nature of the crimes underlying the two juvenile delinquency petitions - first and second degree sexual assault - allows for the public disclosure of the names of the juveniles. View "State v. J.E." on Justia Law