Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

While J.S. was a dependent of the juvenile court, a delinquency petition was filed alleging that she committed vandalism and used force and violence against another minor. The juvenile court declared her a "dual status" child, making her both a dependent and a ward of the court. On appeal, J.S. argued that: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petition and declaring her a dual status youth; (2) the court erred by detaining her in juvenile hall pending placement in a residential treatment facility; and (3) she was prejudiced by being declared a ward. The Court of Appeal rejected J.S.'s arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought wardship of 9-and-10-year-old children, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The minors then lived with their father, Larry, who had a criminal history. Larry entered into an agreed order of protection, allowing the minors to reside with their paternal grandparents. Larry subsequently disclosed the name of the mother, who filed an answer. No information concerning mother was presented at the hearing. The court found that the minors were neglected and that mother did not contribute to the injurious environment. A subsequent report stated that mother had stable housing and had obtained a certified nursing assistant certificate. She was not addicted to alcohol or illegal substances, had passed a random drug screening, and had never been arrested. She takes prescription medication for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and depression. Mother completed a parenting class and a domestic violence class, had engaged in an intact family program and indicated a willingness to participate in services. The caseworker took no position as to who should be appointed guardian. The state and the guardian ad litem agreed that mother was fit, but argued that DCFS should be appointed guardian. Mother requested custody and guardianship. The court ordered DCFS appointed as guardian, found mother to be fit, and found that placement was necessary, “based on all that was presented in the materials for my review for this disposition and upon considering argument.” The appellate court concluded that the trial court violated 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. The Act does not authorize placing a ward of the court with a third party absent a finding of parental unfitness, inability, or unwillingness to care for the minor. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Montano, for 29 counts of first-degree murder, arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Solano, and 4 counts of attempted murder and 1 count of aggravated battery, arising out of the shooting of Maza. Montano was 15 years old at the time of the offenses. The charges were brought in criminal court, under section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act as then in effect. While the charges were pending, a statutory amendment raised the age for automatic adult prosecution for the enumerated offenses from 15 to 16. The prosecution objected to a transfer, arguing that because the implementation of the amendment was delayed until January 1, 2016, it was presumed to have a prospective effect. The court transferred the cause to juvenile court, reasoning that, because the legislature had not indicated the temporal reach of the amendment, the temporal reach was determined by section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. The court concluded that the juvenile transfer statute was procedural and would apply retroactively. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the state’s petition for mandamus. The amendment was retroactive under the Statute on Statutes and belongs in juvenile court, unless it is transferred to criminal court pursuant to a discretionary transfer hearing. View "Alvarez v. Howard" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Jason Dakota Baxter (who then was sixteen years old) was arrested and charged with aggravated sexual battery. Baxter was detained pending indictment and trial. About a month after his arrest, Baxter executed a written waiver of his entitlement to have his case presented to the grand jury within 180 days, and Baxter and the State filed the waiver with the superior court. In October 2014, however, Baxter filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, asserting that his case had not been timely presented to the grand jury as required by OCGA 17-7-50.1 and that his waiver was ineffective. The superior court granted the motion, and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that presentation to the grand jury within 180 days of detention was an absolute requirement (unless the time was extended for good cause), that such presentation was essential to the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that parties could not by agreement, consent, or waiver confer jurisdiction upon a court that otherwise was without it. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals misunderstood OCGA 17-7-50.1 when it concluded that the statute did not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the transfer from the superior court to the juvenile court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia v. Baxter" on Justia Law

In 2013 while he was in custody, investigators questioned a then- 18-year-old Tyler Estrada abut a Gwinnett County homicide. Estrada had been in custody in DeKalb County. At an evidentiary hearing, audio recordings of Estrada’s custodial statement were placed into evidence, the trial court determined that though Estrada invoked his right to counsel, he never waived his Miranda rights either in writing or verbally. Accordingly, the trial court granted Estrada’s motion to suppress the statement. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error to that suppression order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Georgia v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Carlos H. committed two counts of sexual battery against a female high school classmate. Prior to adjudication, the juvenile court issued a restraining order against Carlos prohibiting him from, among other things, contacting the victim through a third party, and directing him to stay 100 yards away from the victim. The court was unpersuaded by the premise inherent in Carlos’s argument that the Legislature intended that persons threatened by a minor should enjoy less protection than persons threatening the minor. The court held that the order form used by the juvenile court to enter the order, including the "other orders" in section 9 of the form, was a reasoned and reasonable response by the juvenile court to Carlos’s conduct and the other relevant facts of the case (e.g., the fact that Carlos and the victim no longer attend the same school). The court also concluded that the order was entirely consistent with the public policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws generally and section 213.5 specifically. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order because the juvenile court’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. View "In re Carlos H." on Justia Law

Contra Costa County Children and Family Services filed petitions concerning P.W., then 12 years old, and his sister, M.W., 11, alleging Mother caused P.W. serious physical harm during an altercation and her untreated mental condition impaired her ability to adequately parent. The children reported that they did not feel safe. Family members and close friends reported concern for the children’s well-being and had asked Mother to seek treatment, suspecting she might be bipolar. The children were placed in foster homes. Mother was granted supervised visitation. The disposition report advised that Mother had several previous dependency cases since 1994. Her parental rights to two other children had been terminated. There was an earlier dependency case involving P.W. and M.W., which concluded in reunification. Mother did not appear at a continued permanency review hearing 18 months later. The court found that returning the children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety and physical or emotional well-being, remarking this was “not even a close call.” It found Mother had been offered reasonable reunification services and declined to continue the matter, noting that the children still feared Mother and opposed visitation. The court scheduled a hearing for terminating Mother’s reunification services. The court of appeal declined Mother’s petition to set aside the order scheduling that hearing. View "N.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Calvin S. was declared a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed to the DJF for a maximum term of 15 years four months after he committed assault with a firearm and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense. The court concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing Calvin to the DJF rather than letting him remain in juvenile hall. The court also concluded that the juvenile court should have stayed the term imposed for assault with intent to commit a sexual offense under Penal Code section 654. Accordingly, the court reversed the commitment order and remanded for a new disposition hearing. The juvenile court is directed to stay execution of any term of confinement imposed on the sustained allegation of assault with intent to commit a sexual offense. View "In re Calvin S." on Justia Law