Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, loss prevention agent Marcus Nealy and manager Stephanie Garza, were working at a Sears department store in Yuba City, when they observed "H.W." enter the store via the store’s closed circuit surveillance system. Nealy saw the minor enter with “a backpack that looked empty” and noticed he was “looking around very suspiciously.” Nealy and Garza took up separate positions on the sales floor and communicated by cell phone as they continued to observe the minor. Garza told Nealy the minor removed the antitheft tag from a pair of jeans using a pair of pliers, carried the jeans into the restroom, and, when the minor came out of the restroom, Garza no longer saw the jeans. Nealy checked the restroom but found no jeans. Meanwhile, Garza alerted Nealy the minor was leaving the store without stopping at a cash register or attempting to pay for the jeans. Nealy headed outside to apprehend the minor, stopped him, and called police. When Yuba City Police Officer Joshua Jackson arrived at the store, Nealy and Garza informed him the minor used “a pair of diagonal cutters or wire cutters” to remove the security tag on the jeans and placed the jeans in the backpack before leaving the store without paying for them. A search of the minor’s backpack revealed the jeans and a pair of pliers. The minor had no wallet, no money, no credit cards, and no identification. A delinquency petition was filed, alleging the minor committed theft, possessed of burglary tools, and trespassed. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the theft and burglary tool possession allegations, but found the trespass allegation had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on juvenile probation. The juvenile court committed the minor to two days in juvenile hall with credit for time served, and set a maximum term of confinement of eight months. The minor appealed, challenging the evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

Hand entered no-contest pleas in Montgomery County to first-degree felonies (aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping) and two second-degree counts of felonious assault. Each count had a three-year firearm specification attached, to which Hand also entered no-contest pleas. During the plea hearing, the parties agreed to a total six-year prison term with three of the years being mandatory because they are related to the merged firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145. The parties disputed whether the three years for the other offenses was also a mandatory term, based on whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) should operate as a first-degree felony conviction to enhance his sentence. The court ruled that Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication required imposition of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.13(F). The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Treating a juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime is inconsistent with Ohio’s system for juveniles, which is predicated on the fact that children are not as culpable for their acts as adults and should be rehabilitated rather than punished. In addition, juveniles are not afforded the right to a jury trial. View "State v. Hand" on Justia Law

The juvenile Appellant in this case, "Bill," a fifteen-year-old eighth-grade boy, was charged with multiple public offenses based on his sexual conduct with his thirteen-year-old girlfriend "Carol", who was not charged. He entered an unconditional admission to amended charges, and the district court entered an adjudication finding that he committed the alleged conduct. After disposition of his case, he appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied his motion for discretionary review, but the Supreme Court granted it initially to address constitutional challenges that Bill raised. After consideration of those challenges, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal should have been dismissed by the circuit court, with no consideration of any of the substantive issues raised, because Bill entered an unconditional admission to the offenses and thereby waived an appeal in this case. View "B. H. v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Timothy Deal, Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, were juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences, and who had a constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." At issue in this case was the manner in which juvenile homicide offenders were classified and placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. Specifically, the issue was whether the department's practice of using "discretionary override codes" to block qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the individual received a positive parole vote violated: (1) G. L. c. 119, section 72B (as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, section 2); or (2) their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the department's current classification practice violated G. L. c. 119, section 72B, because the department's failure to consider a juvenile homicide offender's suitability for minimum security classification on a case-by-case basis amounted to a categorical bar as proscribed by the statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the department's practice did not violate petitioners' constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because there was no constitutionally protected expectation that a juvenile homicide offender would be released to the community after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his sentence. View "Deal v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant, originally adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for assault of a federal officer, appealed the district court's imposition of a combination of official detention and juvenile delinquent supervision following revocation of his prior supervision term. Defendant argues that the total combined term of detention and supervision exceeds the maximum possible term under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq. The court agreed and held that the maximum term of supervision that a court may impose under section 5037(d)(6) is determined by the requirements in section 5037(d)(2), using the juvenile's age at the time of the revocation hearing. As a result, the maximum total period of detention and supervision that may be imposed upon revocation of a previously imposed term of supervision for a juvenile who is under age 21 at the time of revocation is (i) 3 years, (ii) the top of the Guidelines range that would have applied to a similarly situated adult defendant unless the court finds an aggravating factor to warrant an upward departure, or (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult, whichever is least, "less the term of official detention ordered." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "United States v. E.T.H." on Justia Law

Ana, age 17, was arrested following a chase and a crash involving a stolen car. Ana falsely reported to the arresting officer that she had been driving. The officer determined that her boyfriend, Eduardo, had been driving, which was confirmed following Eduardo’s arrest. Ana had been drinking. The district attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Ana admitted two misdemeanor counts (resisting arrest, and falsely reporting a crime); the remaining counts were dismissed. Ana was declared to be a ward of the court with a maximum confinement of 14 months, detaining her in the custody of her mother, and imposing conditions of probation. The court of appeal modified a condition that Minor “shall not possess any drug paraphernalia” to state that Minor “shall not possess any item that she knows is drug paraphernalia.” A condition that “Minor shall not possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that device” was vacated, subject to reinstatement in narrower form. A condition that Minor shall “obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program” was modified to provide that Minor shall “obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program, as posted on the probation department’s website, as approved by the court, and as explained to her by her probation officer.” View "In re Ana C." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering two teenage boys with intent to inflict torture, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner committed the murders when he was 15 years old. Petitioner contends his counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the prosecution’s statements as either improper comments on petitioner's decision not to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, or improper shifting of the burden of proof to the defense. The court concluded that, because there was no actual prosecutorial error, defense counsel’s decision to rebut the prosecution’s comments directly rather than object at trial or on appeal was adequate, and this strategy did not undermine the reliability of petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner also contends that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it is the "functional equivalent" of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, and he was a juvenile offender. The court concluded that there is a reasonable argument petitioner’s sentence is constitutional because it actually allows for the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Demirdjian v. Gipson" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Clifton Gibson was tried as an adult and convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, assault with a firearm, and robbery. These offenses were committed when he was 17 years old, with two adult codefendants. Gibson was ultimately sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder, consecutive to a determinate term of 12 years, four months, in prison. In 2014, he filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), which was denied by the trial court on the ground he failed to demonstrate he had been rehabilitated or that he was remorseful. Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court: (1) improperly limited applicability of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) relief to juvenile defendants who did not actually kill the victim; (2) abused its discretion in denying the petition despite evidence to support the existence of all the statutory factors; and (3) “flouted Miller [v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)] and Gutierrez[58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)].” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gibson" on Justia Law

What began as a fight between two students, C.W. and D.W., ended in the death of one of them. N.H., who was seventeen years old at the time, attended the fight to support his friend, D.W. N.H. allegedly grabbed a handgun from another individual and shot C.W. four times, including once in the back of the head. A video captured parts of the incident, and several witnesses made statements to the police that implicated N.H. N.H. also spoke to the police and said that he had shot only at the ground. At oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the State explained that it had not disclosed certain items in its possession which it did not intend to rely on at the waiver hearing. Those materials included additional witness statements, other police reports, and other videos of the event taken from different angles. N.H. moved for full discovery before the waiver hearing, and the trial court granted the request. The court analogized the filing of a juvenile complaint to the filing of a criminal indictment, which would trigger full discovery under Rule 3:13-3(b). The trial court stayed its order pending the outcome of the State's motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. The issue raised by the State's appeal in this matter was whether a juvenile was entitled to full discovery when the State sought to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. The Supreme Court held the State is indeed required to disclose all discovery in its possession when it seeks to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. View "New Jersey in the Interest of N.H." on Justia Law

After his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, Heidi, in Alexander’s presence, Alexander, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition. At the time, Donald, Alexander’s biological father, Joel, and Michael, the man with whom Heidi was living at the time of Alexander’s birth, had competing motions pending. Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, the family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualified as presumed parents and designated both under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. Considering itself bound by that order, the juvenile court found both Michael and Joel to be presumed parents, but subsequently denied Michael visitation. The court found that Donald also satisfied the requirements for presumed parent status and designated him as such. The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition, the family court order on which the juvenile court relied, issued subsequent to the filing, was void. The court found no error in the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, which was supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law