Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

After an adjudication, Respondent was found delinquent for engaging in second-degree child molestation sexual assault. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the family court ordered that Respondent register as a sex offender. Respondent appealed, arguing that legally sufficient evidence did not exist to support the finding that he was delinquent because his actions were motivated by sexual arousal or gratification. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication of the family court, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial justice’s finding that Respondent touched the complainant for the purposes of sexual gratification. View "In re Kyle A." on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, minor Y.A. had two petitions filed against her alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, she was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. Y.A. satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for only the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and all records pertaining to it sealed. Records relating to the prior petition were not sealed. The issue in this appeal was whether, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court could seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not. View "In re Y.A.." on Justia Law

Defendant, 16 years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of felony murder and related charges resulting in a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Miller v. Alabama subsequently held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) on resentencing. The court concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonably competent attorney would have found the services of the requested expert necessary to provide adequate representation at defendant’s resentencing. By precluding defendant from developing this potential mitigating evidence, the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that a reasonable attorney would have considered an up-to-date neuropsychological evaluation necessary had defendant been a nonindigent defendant. And because a current evaluation could have provided mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence, defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by the failure to appoint a psychological expert before resentencing. Therefore, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court further concluded that defendant has not shown the district court erred by calculating the Guidelines’ recommended base offense level as 43; defendant has not demonstrated that the district court committed prejudicial error when it considered the PSR’s calculation of criminal history points attributed to his juvenile offenses; and, even assuming that defendant’s objection to the district court’s calculation of his criminal history category based on his juvenile offenses was forfeited, as opposed to waived, and assuming the district court committed plain error by attributing criminal history points to three of his juvenile offenses, defendant has not shown prejudice as a result of the error. View "United States v. Pete" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found true allegations that 17-year-old Jorge G. committed public intoxication, a misdemeanor, and minor in possession of tobacco, an infraction. Jorge argued on appeal that: (1) there was insufficient evidence he was publicly intoxicated and the detaining officer did not comply with Penal Code section 647, subdivision (g); and (2) there was insufficient evidence he was a minor in possession of tobacco because a lighter is not punishable under section 308, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal agreed with Jorge that the detaining officer did not comply with section 647, subdivision (g), and that possession of a lighter was not punishable under section 308, subdivision (b). Therefore, the Court reversed the order. View "In re Jorge D." on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

In 2010, 15-year-old Turner fired a gun at a group of young men, killing Allen, and grazing two others. Turner knew the victims from high school. A jury convicted Turner of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187(a)), and two counts of attempted murder, and found true the allegations that Turner, personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court sentenced Turner to an aggregate state prison term of 84 years-to-life. The court of appeal affirmed the convictions, but modified the sentence, so that Turner will be entitled to a parole hearing after 25 years. The court upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the theories imperfect self-defense and justifiable homicide based on self-defense; its use of the instructions on a kill zone theory. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment below and failure to present readily available mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

The principal of a Pleasanton high school observed that P.O., who was then 17 years old, appeared to be under the influence of drugs. P.O. admitted to using hashish oil earlier that morning, and a search revealed 11 tablets of Xanax in his pockets. The juvenile court order declared P.O. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of public intoxication. A condition of his probation required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” The court of appeal modified the condition and struck two other conditions. While electronic search condition is reasonably related to future criminality, the condition was overbroad. Another condition, requiring him to “be of good behavior and perform well” at school or work and another requiring him to “be of good citizenship and good conduct” are unconstitutionally vague. View "In re P.O." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for sixty years to life. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court properly instructed the jury that it would be required to deliberate until 9 p.m. before it could break for the day; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the sentencing process complied with proper juvenile sentencing principles, and the court did not impose an excessive sentence. View "State v. Cardeilhac" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for sixty years to life. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court properly instructed the jury that it would be required to deliberate until 9 p.m. before it could break for the day; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the sentencing process complied with proper juvenile sentencing principles, and the court did not impose an excessive sentence. View "State v. Cardeilhac" on Justia Law

A firearm was discovered at the minor’s school. School administrators suspected his involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched the minor’s cell phone. Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of the minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, the minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them. The juvenile court found the minor had possessed an assault weapon, and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welfare & Institutions Code 602.1). The court of appeal affirmed in part, finding the search of the cell phone reasonable. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court properly found the search was justified at its inception and permissible in scope. The order must be modified to reflect his maximum term of confinement and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court so that it may calculate the custody credits to which he is entitled. View "In re Rafael C." on Justia Law