Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A firearm was discovered at the minor’s school. School administrators suspected his involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched the minor’s cell phone. Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of the minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, the minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them. The juvenile court found the minor had possessed an assault weapon, and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welfare & Institutions Code 602.1). The court of appeal affirmed in part, finding the search of the cell phone reasonable. Considering all the circumstances, the juvenile court properly found the search was justified at its inception and permissible in scope. The order must be modified to reflect his maximum term of confinement and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court so that it may calculate the custody credits to which he is entitled. View "In re Rafael C." on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, entered an unconditional admission to amended charges of public offenses based on his sexual conduct with his also-underage girlfriend. The district court entered an adjudication finding that Appellant committed the alleged conduct. The circuit court affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s motion for discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted the motion for discretionary review and vacated the decision of the circuit court, holding that because Appellant entered into his admission unconditionally, he waived his right to appeal, and therefore, the lower court should not have considered his claims. View "B.H. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated Appellant, a juvenile, delinquent on sex offenses. At disposition, the juvenile court did not record a finding regarding Appellant’s age at the time the offenses were committed. Upon Appellant’s release from the Ohio Department of Youth Services, the court scheduled a sex-offender-classification hearing. Appellant opposed his classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant, arguing that he was ineligible for classification because he was under the age of fourteen when the offenses were committed and because classification would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. After a hearing, the juvenile court found (1) Appellant had committed at least one offense when he was fourteen years of age, and (2) Appellant should be designated a juvenile offender registrant and classified as a Tier II offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a determination of a juvenile sex offender’s age at the time of the offense can be made at any time prior to or during the classification hearing; and (2) the imposition of classification upon release from a secure facility and for a time period beyond the juvenile offender’s attainment of age eighteen or twenty-one does not violate the offender’s due process rights or the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The Alameda County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602, 2 alleging that 17-year-old A.S. committed a misdemeanor assault (against her mother) by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, (a)(4)). The court declared her a ward of the juvenile court. Her probation conditions required to submit her “electronics including passwords under [her] control” to warrantless searches by the probation department and law enforcement (electronic search condition) and prohibited her from unauthorized or unsupervised presence on school property (school grounds condition). The court of appeal modified the order. Under the particularized facts of this case, the electronic search condition is reasonable under the test established by People v. Lent, and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The school grounds condition, however, was unconstitutionally vague because it did not incorporate a “knowledge” requirement so as to prohibit the unauthorized or unsupervised presence on property she knows is school property. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

In 1993, Kristopher Kirchner, age 16 at the time, and Damien Miller, age 15, executed a plan to rob a gun store in Vista owned by Ross Elvey. Once inside the store, Kirchner repeatedly hit 59-year-old Elvey in the head with a metal pipe causing severe trauma that ultimately resulted in Elvey's death after languishing in a coma for 40 days. Kirchner was initially charged in juvenile court, however, the court found Kirchner unfit to be prosecuted as a juvenile and he was charged as an adult. Kirchner was found guilty of one count of first degree murder, and remanded to the California Youth Authority (CYA). CYA concluded there was a reasonable probability that Kirchner's likelihood to commit further crimes could be reduced or eliminated within the available confinement time if sentenced as a juvenile. The trial court declined to follow the recommendation of the CYA and sentenced Kirchner to LWOP on the murder conviction, plus one year consecutive for the weapon enhancement. Kirchner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in October 2014 contending that under "Miller v. Alabama" and "California v. Gutierrez," his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The district attorney's return argued Miller and Gutierrez could not be applied retroactively and Kirchner was, therefore, barred from collaterally attacking his sentence. The court granted the request to file a supplemental return. Kirchner filed a supplemental denial. In 2015, the superior court granted Kirchner's petition. The district attorney appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the trial court correctly concluded the holdings of Miller and Gutierrez applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings such as the one presented here and that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution required that when inmates, such as Kirchner, were serving life terms for crimes committed while they were juveniles, they must, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be given an opportunity to seek parole. However, where, as was the case in California, a legislature has provided inmates serving life sentences for crimes committed while they were juveniles with an opportunity to obtain a parole hearing, the state has remedied any constitutional defect in the inmate's sentence. View "In re Kirchner" on Justia Law

Relator was seventeen years old at the time two delinquency complaints were filed against him. Respondent was the judge of the juvenile division of the county court of common pleas. After a bindover hearing was scheduled, Respondent ordered the state to comply with Relator’s discovery request for several police reports, and the state disclosed all requested documents except for one police report. Relator moved to dismiss the case as a sanction for the failure to produce the report. Respondent dismissed the cases with prejudice as a sanction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state was required to produce the requested documents. The state then filed a request to schedule a bindover hearing. Respondent granted the state’s motion. Relator sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondent from proceeding with the hearing, arguing that his cases had been dismissed with prejudice and had been reviewed by the Supreme Court without remand. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal, and Respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel. R.W. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Nicole, a minor, arranged for a friend to lure the victim, E.Y., to Heron Park in Brentwood. A school official obtained from an anonymous student a video depicting an attack on E.Y. by four females, including Nicole, who admitted her involvement but blamed others for arranging the assault. She said she gave her phone to another individual to record the fight. Following a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Nicole a ward of the court and ordered that she be removed from her father‟s custody and detained in juvenile hall pending placement. The court imposed probation conditions, including a condition permitting searches of Nicole’s cell phone and other electronic devices. Nicole was placed at the Warner Mountains Group Home, approximately 340 miles from her father’s home, although there were closer facilities. The court of appeal upheld removal of Nicole from her home, but concluded no substantial evidence justified her distant placement. On remand, the trial court is to modify the search condition and specify the maximum time of confinement. View "In re Nicole H." on Justia Law

Four children were referred to the Mendocino County Human Services Agency, based on neglect. Their mother, who had a substance abuse problem, disappeared for days and left the children with their maternal uncle, Rafael, who was unable to provide adequately for their needs due to disabilities. The Agency had received seven prior referrals for mother and her children, members of the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians. The Agency contacted Cloverdale's Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, who stated that Cloverdale Rancheria opposed placement with Rafael. Mother was eventually arrested; the children were taken into protective custody. Rafael indicated that he loved the children and had provided care since they were born. Social workers helped him apply for relative placement. No Indian homes were available. Mother initially requested that Rafael be considered for placement. The children, who were found to have multiple developmental, physical, and emotional problems, were ordered into long-term foster care. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Rafael’s claims that he was not given mandatory ICWA notices as an Indian custodian; that active efforts were not provided to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; that the detriment finding was defective; and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the juvenile court failed to promptly investigate his Indian custodian status, any errors were harmless, given that mother revoked the custodianship. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

In 1993, Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other charges. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, claiming that recent scientific findings concerning juvenile psychology and neurology were newly discovered material facts that entitled him to post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to present a colorable claim because the advancements in juvenile psychology and neurology offered by Defendant merely supplement then-existing knowledge of juvenile behavior that was considered at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. View "State v. Amaral" on Justia Law