Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Alejandro, a minor, admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales and was found to be a ward of the court. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and his use of social media. The court of appeal modified that condition. The condition, while valid, is overbroad as imposed. Any probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition.The juvenile court should limit searches to sources of electronic information reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor is boasting about his drug use or otherwise involved with drugs, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social media accounts, so that data related to matters such as medical care and personal finances are not subject to search. View "In re Alejandro R." on Justia Law

In March 2013, when the minor (K.R.) was 13 years old, a delinquency petition was filed alleging he had committed the crimes of robbery, criminal threats, and brandishing a knife. In August 2013, Judge James Arguelles presided over a jurisdictional hearing on the petition in Department 97 and found the allegations true. At a disposition hearing in Department 97 in September, Judge Arguelles granted the minor probation with a number of conditions, including 150 days of confinement. In April 2015, the minor’s probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by remaining away from his home overnight without parental permission; failing to keep his probation officer informed of his address and telephone number; using marijuana; and committing the crimes of having marijuana on a school campus, falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer, and being a disruptive presence on a school campus. A week later, the People filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by committing the crimes of brandishing a firearm and brandishing a replica firearm. The parties appeared before Judge Jack Sapunor in Department 97 for a settlement conference. The minor’s attorney told the court the minor was prepared to admit the allegation in the first petition that he remained away from his home overnight without parental permission and the allegation in the second petition that he brandished a replica firearm. Judge Sapunor was a “regular visiting judge” in juvenile court. The settlement conference was continued, and when it resumed, Judge James Arguelles presided. He noted that there was “a minute order saying that May 28th the minor admitted a violation of probation” and “[a]pparently, probation is recommending that [the minor] just be shipped off to Vegas to live with his mother.” Judge Arguelles disagreed with that proposal and stated that his intention was “probably to send him to DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice]." The matter was continued again, and upon the resumption of the conference, the minor’s attorney objected to Judge Arguelles presiding over the disposition because “we have not affirmatively asserted an Arbuckle waiver in this case.” She requested that the matter be set for hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. Judge Arguelles reiterated his disagreement with the proposed disposition, set a schedule for the parties to brief the application of Arbuckle, and continued the matter to July 2. On June 25, the minor commenced the proceeding underlying this appeal, essentially requesting that the Court of Appeal order Judge Arguelles to either: (1) impose the disposition the parties had agreed upon in front of Judge Sapunor or (2) set the case for a disposition hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. The Court of Appeal denied the minor's petition for a writ of mandate: "[w]hile the minor certainly had a reasonable expectation that he would receive the agreed-upon disposition that was part of the plea agreement approved by Judge Sapunor, and the refusal by Judge James P. Arguelles to impose that disposition certainly entitles the minor to withdraw his negotiated plea, the minor has failed to show that he entered into the plea agreement in expectation of and reliance upon Judge Sapunor conducting the disposition hearing. Thus, the minor is not entitled to have the disposition hearing set in front of Judge Sapunor, nor is he entitled to an order requiring Judge Arguelles to impose the agreed-upon disposition." View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law

A family member reported to Michigan Children’s Protective Services (CPS) that Barber was neglecting J.B. Miller, a CPS social worker, interviewed J.B. at his public elementary school without a court order or Barber’s consent. Miller interviewed Barber, who defended his marijuana and prescription-drug use as medically authorized. Days later, Miller again interviewed J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent and spoke with J.B.’s paternal grandmother. Miller obtained a court order, placing J.B. in protective custody pending a hearing, Mich. Comp. Laws 722.638, and picked J.B. up from school. After a hearing, the judge found probable cause to support the petition, but returned J.B. to Barber’s custody conditioned on: Barber’s abstaining from marijuana, submitting to drug screening, and ensuring that J.B. has constant adult supervision. Barber sued Miller under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his substantive due process rights by interviewing J.B. without a court order or parental consent; falsehoods in the petition; and removing J.B. from school, and challenged the statute as facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity and found that Barber lacked standing for his constitutional challenge to the statute. View "Barber v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case centered Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Although a Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, subsection (a.1)(1) elevated the offense grade to a felony of the second degree where the defendant was “convicted” of any felony offense enumerated in subsection (b). In 2011, Appellee was convicted, among other things, of a Section 6105 offense, apparently based upon his possession of a firearm and the fact of a previous juvenile adjudication in 2005 for conduct which would give rise to an aggravated assault conviction if committed by an adult. Prior to sentencing, the prosecution apparently took the position that the finding of delinquency should be considered a “conviction” for purposes of the subsection (a.1)(1) enhancement. On appeal, however, the Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. The intermediate court explained that the term “conviction” carried a discrete legal connotation that is not generally understood to encompass juvenile adjudications. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether juvenile adjudications of delinquency qualify as “convictions” for purposes of grading within a particularized sentencing regime. The Court held that the concept of convictions, as embodied in Section 6105, did not encompass juvenile adjudications. View "Pennsylvania. v. Hale" on Justia Law

Appellant Chase C. (a minor) was charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. An adjudication hearing was held, at which the juvenile court found the allegation against Chase to be true. The court adjudged Chase a ward of the court and placed him on formal probation for one year or until Chase's 18th birthday, whichever was longer. These proceedings were instituted over an incident in May 2014, when a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy was conducting a foot patrol through Turtle Park, in the Forest Ranch area of San Diego. The deputy was not in full uniform at the time, but was wearing either an external raid vest with "Sheriff" written on it, or a Sheriff shirt with patches. The deputy was approached by a group of middle school children, who told him that two high school aged children had tried to sell them drugs. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a novel issue regarding whether Chase (once the deputy caught up with a group of teens matching the middle schoolers' descriptions) who allegedly urged his cohorts not to cooperate with a police investigation, rose to the level of a violation of Penal Code1 section 148. This case called for the Court to determine when a refusal to cooperate with police becomes unlawful interference with police activity under section 148. The Court concluded that refusal to cooperate only becomes criminal when it obstructs lawful police activity. Here, substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding with regard to section 148(a)(1), and reversed. View "In re Chase C." on Justia Law

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

When he was fifteen years old, Z.L. was charged as an adult of rape. An Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) adjudication order was entered, and Z.L. was committed to the Arkansas Division of Youth Services (DYS). When Z.L. was twenty-one, DYS released him, and Z.L.’s case was set for a hearing in the circuit court to consider imposition of an adult sentence. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order in the juvenile division finding that Z.L.’s case should be transferred to the criminal division. A second juvenile order was subsequently entered finding that an adult sentence was appropriate. Z.L. was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Z.L. appealed, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to impose an adult sentence because he had reached the age of twenty-one before the EJJ review hearing was scheduled and conducted and before the sentencing order was entered. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an EJJ review hearing and impose an adult sentence on Z.L. View "Z.L. v. State" on Justia Law

The state sought adjudication of wardship against Michael, charging him with misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen. Count 2 alleged that he committed theft by deception. Following Michael’s conviction on Count 2, the probation officer recommended that Michael be placed on supervision for one year. The state recommended a sentence of one year’s probation and restitution of $160. The court continued the case under supervision for one year, referred Michael for evaluation, and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution. The continuance was memorialized in a “Supervision Order” and a “Sentencing Order.” On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box for “No finding or judgment of guilty entered.” The court did not adjudge Michael a ward of the court, but advised Michael of his appeal rights, and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent him. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. While a recent statutory change allows supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of guilt (705 ILCS 405/5-615(1)(b)), the change did not make such interlocutory orders appealable under any supreme court rule. View "In re Michael D." on Justia Law

The minor approached a parked vehicle, banged on the window, and demanded that the occupants open the door. Both saw a gun. The minor demanded their wallets and cell phones. The victims complied. The minor fled. Police located and stopped the getaway car. In the police car, the minor told his friend that he had used a loaded gun, and might and “have to go away.” One victim identified the minor and both identified their property. A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 . The minor admitted one robbery charge with a modified enhancement and admitted possession of a firearm capable of being concealed. The court committed the minor to Division of Juvenile Facilities for six years on the robbery charge, staying an additional period of eight months on the possession charge. The court of appeal affirmed. Despite the “near-absurdity of the rule,” a minor is only eligible for DJF if his “most recent offense” is DJF eligible. This minor was found to have committed robbery, which, alone, would expose him to a DJF commitment. He was also found to have committed gun possession, which is not DJF-eligible. The possession offense arguably occurred before the robbery, but even if the offenses were simultaneous, the “most recent offense” rule did not eliminate a court’s discretion to imposeDJF commitment if a minor is currently violent. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law