Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, J.M. did not comply with certain conditions of the Government Claims Act (Government Code, section 810 et seq.): he did not present a claim with the board of the Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) within six months of the date on which his causes of action accrued, as required by sections 945.4 and 911.2. He retained counsel, who presented an application under section 911.4 to present a late claim on the ground J.M. was a minor. The District did not act on the application, and, as a consequence, under the express language of section 911.6, subdivision (c), his application was deemed denied by operation of law. Still represented by counsel, J.M. filed a petition under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement. The superior court denied his petition as untimely because it was not filed within six months of the date on which his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M. appealed the superior court’s order denying his petition for relief under section 946.6. "The plain, unambiguous language of sections 911.6 and 946.6 compel[led]" the Court of Appeal to affirm: J.M.’s application to present a late claim was made under section 911.6, subdivision (b)(2) on the ground that he was a minor at the time he was required to present a claim. Because the District did not act, under the plain language of section 911.6(c), J.M.’s application was deemed denied by operation of law on the 45th day after it was presented. "When an application is denied by operation of law under section 911.6(c), a claimant can challenge that denial only by petition to the superior court under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement." J.M. filed his petition to the superior court more than six months after his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M.’s petition therefore was untimely, and the superior court did not err by denying it. View "J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

The Juvenile Court found R.G., a nonminor dependent within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 450), ineligible for extended foster care support payments between January 13 and March 13, 2015, because he was neither employed at least 20 hours per week nor participating in a program or activity that promoted or removed barriers to employment, as is required to receive financial support pursuant to section subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(3) of section 11403 of the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which certain youth in foster care may continue receiving financial assistance after turning 18. The court of appeal agreed and reversed. The undisputed evidence indicated that R.G.’s activities, which were primarily self-directed, included formulating a specific job search plan; applying online and in person to numerous jobs; following up with prospective employers; receiving feedback from an independent living skills program specialist on how to improve his resume and job applications; and maintaining contact with the social worker on his progress. This evidence showed that he was working toward his goals during the period in question as contemplated by the statute. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

Malik, age 17, and others assaulted and robbed three women near the BART station. Malik had admitted a robbery in 2012, and was on probation with a condition that he submit to search without a warrant. The Alameda County District Attorney filed a notice of probation violation alleging that Malik committed three robberies and possessed eight baggies of marijuana. Malik admitted the violations. The court ordered him detained and continued previously ordered terms of probation. Over a defense objection, the court added: “you’re to—and the family—is to provide all passwords to any electronic devices including cell phones, computers and notepads within your custody and control, and submit to search of devices at any time .... And also provide any passwords to any social media sites, including [F]acebook, Instagram, ... with or without a warrant.” The signed order omitted references to Malik’s family and social media sites. The court of appeal modified the condition to omit reference to family and passwords to social media sites, and to authorize warrantless searches of electronic devices in Malik’s custody and control only after the device has been disabled from internet or cellular connection and without utilizing equipment designed to retrieve deleted information that is not readily accessible to users of the device. View "In re Malik J." on Justia Law

After a school counselor found a bag containing 30-45 orange pills, in Erica's purse, left in the counselor's office during a meeting, the counselor took one pill and called the police. The pill tested positive for amphetamine. A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a)), alleged that Erica had possessed ecstasy (Health and Safety Code 11377(a)), a felony. The petition was amended to allege misdemeanor possession of ecstasy, which Erica admitted. The juvenile court adjudged Erica a ward of the court and placed her under the supervision of the probation office, with conditions, including that she submit to blood, breath, or urine tests to detect the presence of drugs and to searches of her vehicle, residence, or electronics. The court stated that “part of that search will include giving your passwords to your [probation officer.]” Erica’s counsel objected that the electronic search condition was overbroad, that there had not been any “issue with social media,” and that Erica did not have a cell phone. The court of appeal struck the condition as unreasonable because there was no evidence connecting an electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. View "In re Erica R." on Justia Law

The state filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Q.P. with obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)). Officer Irving testified that he responded to a report of a vehicle burglary in progress, arrived at the scene, and observed a person (Q.P.) matching the description given in the report. Irving placed him in the squad car. Q.P. stated his name was Antwan Ellis and offered to direct Irving to his residence. At the address given by Q.P., Irving spoke to a woman who stated she did not know anyone named Antwan. They approached the squad car and the woman stated she had dated Q.P.’s father and she knew him as Q. P.. Q.P. then gave his correct name, but misspelled both names. Irving transported Q.P. to the police station and discovered that Q.P. was a runaway. The circuit court found Q.P. guilty of obstructing justice. The appellate court reversed, holding that Q.P. was already apprehended when he gave false information, and a person already apprehended cannot act with the intent to prevent apprehension. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. Q.P. gave false information shortly after he was placed in the squad car. At that point, Irving did not know about the juvenile warrant. Q.P. told a police detective that he gave the false name because he knew there was a warrant for his arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found Q.P. provided the false name with the intent to prevent his apprehension on the juvenile warrant. . View "In re Q.P." on Justia Law

Then 23-year-old Fiveash was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault, based on his sexual penetration of the vagina and mouth of his 6-year-old cousin, P.A., in 2003, when he was 14-15 years old. Fiveash was certified to teach grades 6 through 12 and had been teaching part-time at two schools. He moved to dismiss, arguing that the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-120) gave the juvenile court “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring prosecution in criminal court, and that he could not be prosecuted in juvenile court because he was over 21. The trial court dismissed, finding the result “unjust, absurd, and clearly unfair to the victim.” The appellate court construed the language in section 5-120 as barring criminal proceedings only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses they allegedly committed while under the age of 17. Because defendant was 23 when indicted, the court concluded section 5-120 did not apply, and reversed and remanded for trial in adult criminal court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Section 5-120 does not bar prosecution in criminal court for offenses allegedly committed when a defendant was 14 or 15 but not charged with until he was over 21 and not subject to the Act. View "People v. Fiveash" on Justia Law

J.B., age 12, got into a fight and brandished a homemade knife over a neighborhood girl, stating that could kill her. A parent called the state police. J.B. admitted to threatening to break a girl’s arms and to holding the knife. J.B.’s father was told that charges of terroristic threats and summary harassment would be filed. Three weeks later, a juvenile allegation was filed. J.B. was transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, processed, and subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy to look for signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.” J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the officer conducting the search could observe him, removed his pants and underwear for approximately 90 seconds, and was asked to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough. J.B. was detained for three days. He ultimately entered into a consent decree with an opportunity to have his record expunged. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and violations of due process, the Third Circuit concluded that defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court holding in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, that all arrestees committed to general population of a detention center may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed, applies to juvenile offenders admitted to general population in a juvenile detention center. View "J. B. v. Fassnacht" on Justia Law

Delinquent minor Albert W. timely appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). The minor was made a ward at age 12 based on his May 1, 2008, admission to second degree robbery, after which a petition alleging residential burglary and knowing receipt of stolen property was dismissed with the understanding those charges could be used at disposition. The minor was sent to live with his father in Louisiana under the supervision of the probation department. Two sustained Louisiana petitions followed, alleging simple burglary, simple criminal damage, and disturbing the peace. In Spring 2010, Louisiana authorities closed the minor's case and returned him to his mother in California. Throughout 2011 and 2012, the minor would have multiple run-ins with the law including threatening his mother with a sawed-off shotgun, more burglary charges, and taking a loaded firearm to school. At a dispositional hearing in 2013, the juvenile court committed the minor to DJF for up to five years. On appeal, the minor argued: (1) insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was competent; (2) the most recent sustained petition filed against him was a Louisiana petition that precluded a DJF commitment; (3) he was misadvised about the possible consequences of his admission; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the minor's commitment. View "In re Albert W." on Justia Law

J.T., a juvenile, was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon for carrying a broken pistol in his waistband that was no longer capable of firing a round. J.T. was found delinquent. The Supreme Court vacated the finding of delinquency, holding (1) an inoperable pistol that is not used as a bludgeoning implement is not a “deadly weapon” for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.12, which prohibits carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, there was insufficient evidence in this case to support J.T.’s finding of delinquency for carrying a concealed weapon. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

The State appealed the magistrate court's dismissal of the State's motion for contempt brought against Luis Juarez for failing to make payments ordered in a juvenile proceeding. In 2002, Juarez admitted to committing an offense that would have been a misdemeanor if he had been an adult. Much time passed and the court entered several orders directing Juarez to pay fees and restitution in varying sums. Eventually, on October 6, 2005, the magistrate court entered its Amended Financial Judgment and Order directing Juarez to pay restitution. Juarez failed to pay, and would fail to appear twice, resulting in bench warrants for his arrest being issued both times. By the second time Juarez came before the magistrate judge, he was over 26-years old, and outside of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that now that Juarez had been brought in for an adult felony charge, it could no longer hear the contempt proceedings for failing to pay restitution. The district court reasoned that contempt was not available to compel payment of a restitution obligation arising from a proceeding under the JCA because the magistrate court's jurisdiction was conveyed by operation of Idaho Code section 20-505 and withdrawn by operation of Idaho Code section 20-507. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding: (1) the magistrate court had jurisdiction over a charge of misdemeanor contempt under Idaho Code section 18-1801 (and if the offender was under eighteen years of age at the time of the criminal contempt, and the juvenile court exercises its discretion to treat the offense under the JCA, then Idaho Code section 20-507 would operate to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction as the proceedings would arise out of the JCA); (2) based on the State's own affidavit, the alleged crime was committed more than four years before these proceedings were commenced; (3) although this action was processed as a criminal case, no complaint was ever filed; (4) despite the lack of a complaint and without a finding of probable cause, the magistrate court issued warrants which resulted in Juarez's arrest; (5) the court's written "Statement of Rights and Explanation of Procedures for Contempt of Court" erroneously advised Juarez that the State bore the burden of proving the contempt "by a preponderance of the evidence;" (6) the court erroneously advised Juarez of the potential penalties upon conviction for misdemeanor contempt (18-1801 did not prescribe the penalty for misdemeanor contempt); (7) the magistrate court did not appear to recognize that Juarez had a right to a jury trial for misdemeanor contempt; and (8) Juarez appeared before the court without counsel, and Juarez discussed his case with the prosecutor without a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's order dismissing the State's motions for contempt. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Juarez" on Justia Law