Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A juvenile was involved in an altercation at the Barnstable District and Juvenile Court, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The incident was captured on video, showing the juvenile and the victim engaging in a physical fight. The juvenile had a prior continuance without a finding (CWOF) after admitting to sufficient facts for an assault and battery charge.The Juvenile Court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on both charges and sentenced him to one year of probation for each. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge because a CWOF after an admission to sufficient facts should not count as a prior offense under G. L. c. 119, § 52. The Appeals Court did not review the case as it was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts is sufficient to establish a first offense under § 52. Therefore, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency for both disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The court affirmed the adjudications, concluding that the juvenile did not act in self-defense and that his actions met the criteria for disorderly conduct. View "Commonwealth v. Fayad F." on Justia Law

J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

Jennifer Harmon’s son, N.J., died by suicide while residing at the Bruce Normile Juvenile Justice Center (BNJJC) under the care of the Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri. Harmon filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her son’s death, including various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state wrongful death claims against the Second Circuit, several named defendants from both the Second Circuit and BNJJC, Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH), and several named defendants from PFH. All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Second Circuit and Government Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the claims against the Second Circuit were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and the state tort claims against the Government Defendants were barred by official immunity. Harmon appealed these immunity judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Harmon’s claims against the Second Circuit, holding that the Second Circuit is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Missouri has not waived. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants, concluding that the Government Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Harmon failed to show that any constitutional violation was clearly established. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s state tort claims against the Government Defendants, holding that the Government Defendants were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because Harmon failed to plead both the existence of a department-mandated policy and a breach of that policy. View "Harmon v. Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Rene V., a minor, was removed from the custody of his legal guardian, Dora V., by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Dora was appointed as Rene's legal guardian by the juvenile court. After Rene's removal, the juvenile court ordered family reunification services for Dora, including visitation. However, Rene refused to participate in overnight visits and eventually refused all visitation with Dora.The juvenile court sustained the petition for Rene's removal and provided Dora with reunification services. At the 18-month review hearing, the court terminated Dora's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. Dora filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the juvenile court erred by allowing Rene to refuse visits and that no substantial evidence supported the finding that she received reasonable reunification services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that different statutory procedures apply to legal guardians appointed by the juvenile court compared to those appointed under the Probate Code. Legal guardians appointed by the juvenile court are not entitled to a presumption of reunification and may receive reunification services at the court's discretion if it is in the child's best interest.The Court of Appeal held that Dora, as a legal guardian appointed by the juvenile court, was not entitled to reunification services as a matter of right. The court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional reunification services, given Rene's refusal to visit Dora and his expressed desire to remain with his current caregivers. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Dora V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In January 2008, Ignacio Ruiz, Jr., participated in an attack on rival gang members, resulting in one death. Ruiz, who was 16 at the time, was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism, with several gang and firearm enhancements. In August 2010, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder charge, a consecutive life term with the possibility of parole for attempted murder, and a consecutive 25-year term for the firearm enhancement. Ruiz was resentenced in 2016, receiving nearly the same sentence.Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing in March 2023 under section 1170, subdivision (d), which allows individuals sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as minors to petition for resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court denied the petition, calculating Ruiz's incarceration period from his sentencing date in August 2010, and found he had not been incarcerated for 15 years.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Ruiz's argument that his incarceration period began in January 2008 when he was taken into custody for the charges, not from his sentencing date. The court found that Ruiz had been incarcerated for over 15 years by the time he filed the petition. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the petition, clarifying that the period of incarceration for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), begins when the individual is placed in custody, not when they are sentenced. View "People v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

A minor, V., was removed from her mother's care at birth due to the mother's drug abuse. V. and her half-brother, N., were initially placed together with a relative, but N. was later moved to his non-offending father's custody. V. was placed with her aunt, who became her legal guardian in 2019. N. was eventually returned to their mother's custody. The aunt sought to adopt V. in 2022, but the mother opposed the termination of her parental rights, citing the parental relationship exception to adoption.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother did not meet her burden to demonstrate the parental relationship exception. However, the court, without input from the parties, held that adoption would not be in V.'s best interest under the sibling relationship exception, and selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for V. Both the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and V. appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standards and by relieving the mother of her burden to prove that an exception to adoption applied. The appellate court found that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the sibling relationship exception applied. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's orders and instructed the juvenile court to enter a new order stating that there are no exceptions to adoption and to select adoption as the permanent plan for V. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the single incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, voluntarily tested for drugs and alcohol, and agreed to participate in services. The court also highlighted that Elizabeth's children were healthy, well cared for, and showed no signs of abuse or neglect.The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(D). The court reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law

In 2018 and 2019, the appellant, a minor, committed a series of crimes, including seven street robberies, two burglaries, an attempted robbery resulting in murder, and the sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. The appellant was 16 and 17 years old at the time of these offenses. The People filed an 18-count petition against the appellant, including charges of murder, robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and sought to transfer the appellant to adult criminal court.The juvenile court held a transfer hearing and considered extensive evidence, including the appellant's family and social history, conduct in custody, and expert testimony. The court found that the appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system's timeframe and ordered the transfer to adult criminal court. The court's decision was based on the severity and sophistication of the crimes, the appellant's delinquent history, and the lack of sufficient time for rehabilitation before the juvenile court's jurisdiction expired.The appellant appealed the transfer order, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion and that the evidence did not support the transfer. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court found that the juvenile court had properly considered the statutory criteria for transfer and that substantial evidence supported the finding that the appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system. The order transferring the appellant to adult criminal court was affirmed. View "People v. J.S." on Justia Law

M.L., a 17-year-old, challenged a civil harassment restraining order issued to protect E.G., her mother's former romantic partner. E.G. sought the restraining order after M.L. posted E.G.'s personal information on social media, alleging E.G. supported M.L.'s mother in abusive conduct against M.L. and her younger brother, S.L. The restraining order prohibited M.L. from publishing E.G.'s contact information online and from defaming or harassing her. M.L. contended there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment and argued the trial court failed to consider circumstances making it unlikely the alleged harassment would continue or recur.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order and later granted a three-year civil harassment restraining order against M.L. The court found that M.L.'s social media posts constituted harassment, causing E.G. to receive threats and harassment from third parties. The court concluded that E.G. had met her burden by clear and convincing evidence, noting that M.L.'s conduct was likely to continue absent a restraining order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the imposition of the restraining order against M.L. but determined that the order should not extend beyond M.L.'s 18th birthday. The court modified the restraining order to expire on M.L.'s 18th birthday and affirmed the order as modified. The court directed the trial court to transmit a copy of the modified order for entry into the California Restraining and Protective Order System. View "E.G. v. M.L." on Justia Law