Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Atkins, age 16, found his mother crying. Atkins claim his step-father regularly abused him and his mother. Atkins went into the step-father’s bedroom, carrying a baseball bat. The step-father reached for what Atkins believed to be a gun. Atkins swung the bat several times, killing the step-father. Atkins was convicted of first-degree murder. Atkins unsuccessfully appealed without raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims. In unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, he alleged IAC. In 2009, Atkins, pro se, sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that juvenile counsel failed to explain his right to testify and that such testimony would not be used against him; refused the state’s motion for a mental evaluation; and failed to raise an insanity defense after Atkins stated he was “hearing voices.” Atkins asserted that trial counsel failed to: move to suppress Atkins’s statement to police; object to the prosecutor’s extracting an improper promise from the jury during voir dire; request a curative instruction concerning improper testimony; object to descriptions of graphic photos after the photos themselves were ruled inadmissible; adequately cross-examine as to how long the step-father may have survived after the attack; call Atkins’s mother as a witness; question whether the step-father’s medical problems could have contributed to his death; call any expert witness; rebut evidence concerning the step-father’s peaceable character; seek “reckless homicide” and “criminally negligent homicide” jury instructions; and raise an insanity defense. The court denied Atkins’s petition finding that all but one claim procedurally defaulted. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding certain claims not defaulted. View "Atkins v. Holloway" on Justia Law

A.D.T. was adjudicated as a delinquent youth and juvenile offender. A.D.T. was later transferred to district court pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-208 for supervision by the Department of Corrections when he reached his eighteenth birthday. Thereafter, the district court imposed forty-one new conditions to A.D.T.’s probation and supervision. The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke A.D.T.’s probation. A.D.T. moved to dismiss the State’s revocation petition, arguing that imposition of the forty-one conditions violated section 41-5-208(4) and exceeded the scope of the youth court’s disposition and transfer order. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, found that A.D.T. had violated terms of his probation, and placed him on formal probation with Adult Probation and Parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying A.D.T.’s motion to dismiss the petition regarding those conditions which were not originally set forth in the youth court’s disposition or transfer order; but (2) correctly determined that there were conditions of the underlying youth court disposition that were violated and thus did not err in imposing conditions pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-201 through -203. View "In re A.D.T." on Justia Law

Defendant was seventeen years old when he committed first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole, as required by Iowa law. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Before the trial court heard the motion and shortly after Miller v. Alabama was decided, Iowa’s Governor commuted the sentences of all juveniles previously convicted of first-degree murder to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after sixty years. The trial court then granted Defendant’s motion to the extent his sentence was imposed without “individualized consideration of the circumstances.” The court upheld Defendant’s sentence of life with parole eligibility after sixty years as commuted by the Governor. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding (1) a court must use certain factors when it sentences a juvenile offender for first-degree murder; and (2) because the district court did not have the benefit of this decision when it sentenced Defendant, this case must be remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Seats" on Justia Law

This case began as a call for police assistance to E.J.J. 's house to help with his intoxicated, out-of-control sister, R.J. (a juvenile at the time). The police responded and began their intervention by escorting R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a nightstick. E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house. Initially, E.J.J. did not comply. When he did return to the home, he stood in an open doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. The officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to stand behind a closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive names. An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction. After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. E.J.J. challenged the obstruction statute as unconstitutional as applied to his behavior. "While E.J.J. 's words may have been disrespectful, discourteous, and annoying, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. View "Washington v. E.J.J." on Justia Law

On or about March 25, 1995, applicant shot and killed Alexander Lopez. Applicant was sixteen years of age at the time. As a result of that incident, the State filed a juvenile-delinquency petition. On April 26, the State filed a motion to waive jurisdiction in the juvenile court and a petition to certify applicant to be tried as an adult. The next day, the case was reset for magistrate warnings to be given to applicant on May 4 and for a transfer hearing to be held on June 7. Applicant received magistrate warnings on May 4, but the transfer hearing was subsequently reset to July 27. On July 27, both parties announced “ready,” and the parties and witnesses were sworn to return at 10:00 a.m. on August 1 for “trial.” On appeal, applicant argued he was not properly served with a summons to the transfer hearing in the juvenile court. He further claimed that, as a consequence of that failure, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to transfer him and the district court did not have jurisdiction to try him. The Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application “to determine whether the district court lacked jurisdiction and whether this claim should be barred under the doctrine of laches.” After review, the Court concluded that the record did not affirmatively establish the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and consequently, it denied relief. View "Ex parte Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during police questioning, Defendant pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. Defendant requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, arguing that his confession to police was involuntary and, alternatively, that the incriminating statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements were voluntary; and (2) the police violated Wis. Stat. 938.195 by turning off the device recording Defendant’s interrogation during questioning, but the error in not suppressing some of Defendant’s statements was harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Vickers appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction as a habitual offender. A jury found Vickers guilty of assault second degree as a lesser-included offense of assault first degree; attempted robbery first degree; home invasion; conspiracy second degree; and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Vickers did not dispute that he has been convicted of three violent felonies on three separate occasions, nor did he dispute that, at least as to all of the convictions, the requirements of the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. 4214(b), have been met by these offenses. Instead, Vickers argued on appeal that his conviction for the first of the three violent felony offenses, arson first degree, should not have been counted under the habitual offender statute because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and therefore affirmed. View "Vickers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were eighteen years old when they pleaded guilty to armed felonies. Both defendants were “youths” within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10(1), had never been convicted of a crime, and would be eligible to be granted youthful offender status but for the fact that their convictions to be replaced by youthful offender adjudications were armed felonies. At issue on appeal was whether the court in the case of each defendant was required to determine on the record if he was an eligible youth due to the existence of one or more factors set forth in section 720.10(3). The Court of Appeals reversed in each case, holding that, when a defendant who would otherwise be an eligible youth has been convicted of an armed felony, the court is required to make a determination on the record as to whether one or more of the section 720.10(3) factors exists and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, even if the defendant does not request it or has agreed to forgo youthful offender treatment as part of a plea bargain. View "People v. Middlebrooks" on Justia Law

In January 2008, S.J.C. pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation for offenses he committed at age 13. At S.J.C.'s disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered two years of community supervision and imposed other conditions such as regular school attendance, sexual deviancy treatment, and payment of a victim penalty assessment. After completing all of his conditions, in December 2011, S.J.C. moved to vacate his adjudication and seal his juvenile record under former RCW 13.50.050. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution required the court to apply the "Ishikawa" factors when a former juvenile offender has satisfied the statutory requirements of former RCW 13.50.050 (2011) to seal his or her juvenile court record. "Based on experience and logic," the Court affirmed the juvenile court's holding that it did not. Because it was undisputed that S.J.C. met all the statutory requirements, the Court affirmed the juvenile court's order sealing his juvenile court record. View "Washington v. S.J.C." on Justia Law