Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The state filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that D. had committed first degree murder. D. was nine years old; the victim was 14 months old. The circuit court found D. unfit to stand trial and subsequently found him “not not guilty” of murder. Thecourt remanded D. to the Department of Human Services for fitness restoration education, so that D. may become fit and be tried for murder. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in denying a suppression motion. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for “harmless error analysis,” noting that in interviewing D., a detective seized on D’s fear that his father or others in the household would go to jail, or that he, himself, would be taken away. The detective promised D that no matter what he said, no one was going to jail, no one would be in trouble, he would not be taken from his father and, at the end of the day, he could go to his grandmother’s house and “hang out” with his dad. The detective reinforced that no consequences would follow an admission that D hit the victim and rejected repeated denials, making plain that anything less than an admission was unacceptable. The detective stated that whatever happened was a mistake, and everybody makes mistakes, and was explicit about the admission that would suffice—an admission that D. hit the baby once .D eventually admitted to hitting the infant once. D., functioning at the level of a seven- or eight-year-old, was especially vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion. View "In re D.L.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in 2013 for criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, based on acts he allegedly committed in 2012, when he was 17 years old. At the time of the alleged offenses, the Juvenile Court Act only applied to those minors under 17 years of age, with limited exceptions. Effective January 1, 2014, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to apply to minors who were under 18 years of age, 705 ILCS 405/5-120, with a saving clause: “[t]he changes …apply to violations or attempted violations committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act.” Defendant filed, in 2014, a “Motion to Declare Adult Prosecution Unconstitutional,” alleging that the saving clause violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. Defendant argued that he was similarly situated to 17-year-olds who allegedly committed offenses on or after the amendment’s effective date and there was no rational basis to treat him differently. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, finding no rational basis for the different treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; it was reasonable for the legislature to distinguish between the two groups since applying the amendment to offenses committed before the effective date would require those cases to be transferred to the juvenile division and to begin anew. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The District Attorney filed a petition to declare sixteen-year-old R.V. (“Minor”) a ward of the juvenile court. When the juvenile court determined there was substantial evidence raising a doubt regrading Minor’s competency to stand trial, the court suspended proceedings and appointed a forensic psychologist to evaluate Minor. The expert’s report concluded that Minor was not competent to stand trial. The court rejected the expert’s opinion and concluded that Minor was competent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the juvenile court’s reasons for declining to accept the expert’s opinion were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 709, a minor is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) a claim of insufficient evidence to support a juvenile court’s determination in a competency proceeding is reviewed deferentially under the substantial evidence test; and (3) the juvenile court under the circumstances could not reasonably have rejected the qualified expert’s opinion that Minor was not competent to proceed to trial. View "In re R.V." on Justia Law

Appellant, who was fifteen years old at the time, was charged with third-degree sexual abuse. Appellant was released from detention on a conditional order of release. The district court ordered that Appellant’s case be “informally adjusted” on the condition that Appellant move out of state to Oklahoma to live with his father. The existing order of release with its conditions was then terminated. Appellant and his mother were forced to comply with the order to avoid formal juvenile prosecution. When Appellant returned to Kentucky with his mother, the district court re-docketed the charges. The trial court eventually removed Appellant from his home and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile sexual offender for placement in an “appropriate facility.” The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s adjudication and disposition in this case, holding that the trial court erred when it changed the case from an informal adjustment to formal proceedings because once a case has been determined to be appropriate for an informal adjustment, the case cannot be returned to formal proceedings. View "Q.M. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ashley M., mother of minor P.R., appealed juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights. Her sole contention was that the court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence that there was good cause to deviate from the adoption placement preferences of the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, the Court of Appeal found that Ashley did not argue that her parental rights were improvidently terminated. Because her parental rights have been terminated, and she made no argument as to how alleged placement errors might be related to the termination decision, she lacked standing to challenge matters related to the minor’s placement. Her appeal was dismissed. View "In re P.R." on Justia Law

T.W. became a ward of the juvenile court in 2010. The petition alleged felony robbery and receiving stolen property. T.W. robbed the victim of her purse and was found in possession of a stolen ATM card and cell phone. The order states: “The minor has waived [his] right to a trial, to remain silent … the admission is made freely and voluntarily. There is a factual basis for the admission. … Count 1 … Dismissed on motion of DA … Count 2 … True as admitted … with counsel’s consent.” In 2014, T.W. filed a petition for modification. His maximum term of confinement was three years four months. The petition states: “Pursuant to Proposition 47, a violation of Penal Code 496 and possessed property valued at less than $950 [sic] is now a misdemeanor and carries a maximum confinement term of 12 months.” The District Attorney argued that T.W. posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, so resentencing was not appropriate, and that “retroactive resentencing” did not apply to negotiated dispositions. The court ruled Proposition 47 applies to juvenile cases, but denied the petition because the sentence was based on a negotiated disposition. The court of appeal vacated, finding that T.W. is entitled to petition for modification of his sentence, notwithstanding the plea agreement, and remanded for a determination of unreasonable risk to public safety, View "T.W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his request to seal his juvenile records, which contain at least 14 incidents. Section 781, subdivision (a) grants the court discretion to seal the juvenile's delinquency records unless the juvenile has committed an offense specified under section 707, subdivision (b). In this case, defendant has not committed any of the enumerated offenses that would render him statutorily ineligible to have his records sealed. The court found no error in the trial court's consideration of the seriousness of the offense in deciding whether to seal defendant's records; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant was not yet rehabilitated; the trial court did not violate due process by refusing to seal the juvenile records; and, therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's petition to seal his records. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

After his 18th birthday, Robert Wheeler was charged with, and pled guilty to, first degree child rape and first degree child molestation for offenses he committed when he was 13 or 14 years old that came to light when he was 17 and a half. His convictions had been final since 2006. The Court of Appeals held that the validity of Wheeler's guilty plea was not an appealable issue because the trial court did not independently review and rule on it; rejected Wheeler's claim of ineffective assistance, reasoning that counsel was not obligated to advance an argument that was unlikely to succeed; and dismissed Wheeler's personal restraint petition as untimely. Wheeler contended on appeal that the Washington Supreme Court had the authority to, and should have, revisited his previously rejected claim that his plea was involuntary because he was misinformed of the maximum sentences for his crimes. He also challenged his convictions as the product of unconstitutional preaccusatorial delay and sought to avoid the time bar for collateral attack by claiming he had newly discovered evidence that the State delayed filing charges until Wheeler aged out of juvenile court. The Supreme Court rejected Wheeler's arguments, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law

In 2010, 13-year-old D.W. admitted misdemeanor battery on a school employee and in exchange for dismissal of two counts of making criminal threats. D.W. was adjudged a ward of the court in Contra Costa County, placed on probation and housed in a group home. D.W. committed probation violations necessitating new placements and was the subject of a Stanislaus County wardship petition charging vehicle theft and driving without a license. In 2013, the court ordered D.W. placed in the Youth Offender Treatment Program for two years 244 days, or until age 21. In 2013, Contra Costa County filed another petition, stating that D.W‘s adoptive parents were unable to accept responsibility for him and charging D.W. with felony battery by gassing on the person of an employee of the juvenile detention facility and felony possession of a dagger. The court allowed amendment to the petition during a contested jurisdiction hearing, adding a charge of battery with injury on a peace officer, The court of appeal amended the order to reflect that D.W. committed a battery against a peace office.. Amendment to the petition did not violate D.W.‘s due process rights, but the record did not contain substantial evidence that the battery caused an injury as defined by Penal Code 243 (f)(5). View "In re D.W." on Justia Law