Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, 13-year-old D.W. admitted misdemeanor battery on a school employee and in exchange for dismissal of two counts of making criminal threats. D.W. was adjudged a ward of the court in Contra Costa County, placed on probation and housed in a group home. D.W. committed probation violations necessitating new placements and was the subject of a Stanislaus County wardship petition charging vehicle theft and driving without a license. In 2013, the court ordered D.W. placed in the Youth Offender Treatment Program for two years 244 days, or until age 21. In 2013, Contra Costa County filed another petition, stating that D.W‘s adoptive parents were unable to accept responsibility for him and charging D.W. with felony battery by gassing on the person of an employee of the juvenile detention facility and felony possession of a dagger. The court allowed amendment to the petition during a contested jurisdiction hearing, adding a charge of battery with injury on a peace officer, The court of appeal amended the order to reflect that D.W. committed a battery against a peace office.. Amendment to the petition did not violate D.W.‘s due process rights, but the record did not contain substantial evidence that the battery caused an injury as defined by Penal Code 243 (f)(5). View "In re D.W." on Justia Law

Sellers was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 26 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. Application of the ACCA was error. Sellers’s 2001 state conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance did not qualify as one of the “three previous convictions” necessary to apply the ACCA because he was adjudicated as a youthful offender for that offense under New York law, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The youthful offender designation “set aside” the conviction. View "United States v. Sellers" on Justia Law

In 2009, E.J.D. entered a plea of no contest to battery on juvenile detention officers. The court determined that the proceedings should be designated as an extended-jurisdiction juvenile prosecution and sentenced E.J.D. to a term in a juvenile correction facility and to an adult criminal sentence. The court stayed the adult criminal sentence on the condition that E.J.D. not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence and on the condition that he not commit a new offense. The State subsequently moved to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence based on numerous disciplinary violations committed by E.J.D. Thereafter, E.J.D. moved for a lesser sentence and a durational departure from his sentence. The district court denied E.J.D.’s motion and ordered him committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme does not allow modification of an adult sentence after a determination that a juvenile has violated the terms and conditions of an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence supported the district court’s decision to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence. View "In re E.J.D." on Justia Law

In 2006, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) alleging Keith, then age 15, took and drove a van owned by Thomas (Veh. Code, 10851(a)) and received, withheld, or concealed the stolen van (count two, Pen. Code, 496). The juvenile court determined the amount of restitution was $2,180 and amended count two to charge misdemeanor receiving stolen property. Keith admitted that charge in exchange for dismissal of count one. The court adjudged Keith a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and ordered him to pay the restitution. Keith did not appeal. Keith appeared at status hearings, but defaulted on his restitutionary debt. In 2011, Keith failed to appear. The court issued a warrant for his arrest “to expire on [Keith’s 21st birthday, in December 2011].” The warrant was never served. Keith did not appear at any subsequent hearings. In 2014 the court ruled that it had authority to issue an abstract of judgment permitting collection of Keith’s unpaid restitutionary debt. The court recalled the outstanding warrant, terminated Keith’s probation “unsatisfactorily,” dismissed his wardship, and issued an abstract of judgment requiring Keith to pay restitution. The court of appeal held that the court had authority to do so. View "In re Keith C." on Justia Law

In 1992, while he was still a minor, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for committing the equivalent of an operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI) offense. Appellant was not represented by counsel during the adjudication. In 2011, Appellant was convicted of OVI offenses that became felonies under the enhancing provision of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The State added Appellant’s juvenile OVI adjudication to his four prior adult convictions to reach the “five or more” offenses threshold required to enhance his sentence under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of his juvenile adjudication, arguing that the adjudication violated his constitutional right to counsel. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant was subsequently convicted of two counts and used Appellant’s 1992 juvenile adjudication as an OVI enhancement tool. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that an adjudication of delinquency may not be used to enhance the penalty for a later offense under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) when the adjudication carried the possibility of confinement, the adjudication was uncounseled, and there was no effective waiver of the right to counsel. View "State v. Bode" on Justia Law

In 1999, Willover was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, mayhem, and giving false information to a peace officer. The jury found true special circumstances and firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Willover, who was 17 years old at the time he committed the offenses, to two consecutive terms of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murders and stayed the terms for the remaining counts and enhancements. The court of appeal modified the sentence for the attempted premeditated murder to life with the possibility of parole. In 2014, Willover filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court improperly presumed that LWOP was the appropriate sentence for the murders, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded. The transcript of the sentencing hearing does not “clearly indicate” that the trial court would have reached the same result if it had applied the Miller factors. View "In re Willover" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Employer at a store located on property owned by Casino (Employer and Casino henceforth referred to as “Casino”). Appellant was engaged to Fiancé when Fiancé filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) regarding some of Casino’s slot machines. Casino subsequently terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellant filed suit against Casino alleging that Casino terminated her employment in retaliation for Fiancé’s complaint to the NGCB. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because Nevada has not recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge, holding that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brown v. Eddie World, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014 the Third Circuit decided King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, rejecting a challenge brought by licensed counselors to the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371, a statute banning the provision of “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) counseling to minors. A similar challenge was filed by a 15-year-old minor seeking to undergo SOCE counseling and by his parents. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Having decided, in King, that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of those wishing to “speak” the message of SOCE, the court concluded that the statute does not violate the rights of those who wish to receive that message. The court also rejected a parental rights claim. The fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful. View "Doe v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Andrew is the biological father of Emilio, born in July 2013. Katherine is Emilio’s biological mother. Andrew and Katherine never married. Before Emilio was born, Andrew and Katherine had broken up. Katherine had become aware that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. In September 2012, he yelled at and pushed Katherine’s mother; he pled guilty to possession of metal knuckles and trespassing and was put on probation. After Katherine became pregnant, several incidents occurred that confirmed her belief that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. Katherine sought to have Emilio adopted by a couple in San Francisco, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Andrew. After a trial, the court found that although Andrew was Emilio’s biological father, he had not established that he was Emilio’s presumed father within the meaning of Adoption of Kelsey S., with the attendant right to withhold consent to Emilio’s adoption. The court concluded it would be would be in Emilio’s best interests to terminate Andrew’s parental rights. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported a finding that Andrew is not a “Kelsey S. father,” and that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Andrew’s parental rights. View "Adoption of Emilio G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court declared A.R., age four, a dependent of the court and ordered him to remain in the custody of both parents under the supervision of the Department of Family and Children’s Services. A.R.’s presumed father and mother were not married. At disposition in January 2014, the court ordered family maintenance services for both parents. In March 2014, father moved out of the home not pursuant to any court order. He eventually disengaged from services without addressing his alcoholism or marijuana use. Using the Request to Change Court Order form (JV-180), the Department requested modification of the dispositional order. A September 2014 order made removal findings, continued A.R. under the care, custody, and control of mother under the Department’s supervision, provided family maintenance services for only A.R. and mother, and provided supervised visitation for father. The court of appeal affirmed. There was evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to justify the court’s modification of its prior order. Although the removal findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the error was harmless. At the time of the findings, father had already moved out of the home and A.R. was no longer actually in father’s physical custody. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law