Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law

Mother had legal and physical custody; Father had visitation. Mother obtained a restraining order, prohibiting Father from harassing or contacting Mother except to facilitate visitation, and requiring him to stay 100 yards away from her, her home, her workplace and her vehicle. In 2013, Mother submitted a declaration that Father contacted her through calls and texts every day; followed her; waited outside her house; harassed her in the street; picked up the children without informing her; and denigrated her to the children. The restraining order was made permanent. A month later, the Department of Children and Family Services received a report that Mother had left the children (ages 12 and 10) unsupervised and allowed them to ride their bicycles around the neighborhood unsupervised. In interviewing Mother, the caseworker learned of domestic violence committed by Father before their separation and that Father had repeatedly violated the restraining order, which was traumatizing to the children, especially when she called the police to report violations. Mother reported that Father did not mistreat the children. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction. A finding that Father’s conduct placed the children at risk of emotional injury could not support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b), which requires proof of physical harm or substantial risk of such harm. View "In re Jesus M." on Justia Law

In 1998, after being beaten by men in a park, G, age 17, and his friend took the friend’s father’s handgun to the assailants’ house. G held the gun to a woman’s head and threatened to shoot. Men, holding baseball bats, came out of the house. G threatened them, but then left. A juvenile wardship petition (Pen. Code 602(a)), alleged: assault with a handgun; criminal threats by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; and possession of a concealable firearm. The juvenile court committed him to the juvenile ranch facilities. G successfully completed the program and was released on probation four months later. He worked in the family business and attended community college. In 2006, he enlisted in the Army. He was promoted to the rank of sergeant and received Commendation Medals for service in Iraq and numerous other commendations and awards. G obtained a degree from California State University. In 2013, G unsuccessfully sought to seal his juvenile record. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that G is a valuable member of society; sealing his juvenile records would acknowledge his achievements. However, courts have no authority to rewrite a statute. G falls within an exception to Section 781(d) as a person who committed an offense listed in section 707(b) when he was over 14 years old. View "In re G.Y." on Justia Law

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law

In 2011, 16-year-old Roxanne exhibited signs of emotional problems. Her parents failed to pursue counseling, after being advised to do so. Roxanne later told her teachers that she had suicidal thoughts because she was being bullied. Despite a counselor’s advice, Mother was unsupportive and angry. Roxanne was taken to a hospital and placed on a section 5585 hold for psychiatric evaluation. Mother told the counselor that she was going to remove Roxanne f against medical advice. Roxanne did not continue with therapy. Roxanne was hospitalized three more times in 2013. Mother “appeared not [to] care and stated that she could not leave work because no one was going to pay her bills.” Mother did not visit Roxanne and refused home services. Father cursed at Roxanne about her hospitalization. Mother then began taking her to therapy and sought an individualized education plan at her school. Roxanne began consistently taking antidepressants and attending counseling. DCFS filed a section 300 petition, alleging that the Parents caused Roxanne serious emotional damage. The juvenile court found it had jurisdiction over Roxanne. The court of appeal affirmed, finding substantial evidence that Roxanne was suffering from serious emotional damage and at risk of further serious emotional damage due to Parents’ failure to obtain mental health services. View "In re Roxanne B." on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

Police officers detained and searched D.D. (a juvenile) and a companion after observing them apparently smoking marijuana in a private parking area. D.D. was found to be in possession of a concealed loaded handgun and charged with violation of Penal Code sections 25400(a)(2), and 25850(a). D.D.’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied, and the petition’s allegations were found true. The juvenile court also found the offenses to be mandatory felonies. The court of appeal reversed, holding that D.D.’s offenses were not automatically felonies by virtue of his status as a minor, but affirmed the denial of D.D.’s motion to suppress. View "In re D.D." on Justia Law

The state charged a 16-year-old (Jordan) with three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), alleging that he carried in a vehicle an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)); carried a handgun in a vehicle while under 21 years of age (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I)); and carried a firearm in a vehicle without a valid FOID card (24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C)). The UPF count alleged that Jordan, under 18 years of age, knowingly possessed a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person (24-3.1(a)(1). Jordan moved to dismiss, contending that the AUUW statute had been found unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in 2012, as violating the second amendment right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. The circuit court dismissed the AUUW counts, but denied the motion as to the UPF count. The state conceded that one count had been properly dismissed but argued that the remaining counts remained constitutionally valid because they required proof of independent aggravating factors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the first count based on section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), which it found to be facially unconstitutional in 2013; reversed dismissal of charges based on sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I), which are severable from the unconstitutional provision. View "In re: Jordan G." on Justia Law