Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2013 the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition on behalf of Elizabeth’s three children, ages 10, eight and six, alleging Elizabeth had a history of substance abuse and had tested positive for methamphetamines and marijuana; the father of Heather (Allan) had abused marijuana; and the home Allan shared with Elizabeth and the children was filthy and unsanitary. The detention report indicated previous referrals had been received in 2004 and 2006 alleging drug use by Elizabeth. The juvenile court entered jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring the children dependents of the juvenile court, removing them from Elizabeth’s care and custody and placing them with their respective fathers under the supervision of the Department. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Elizabeth’s arguments that the juvenile court deprived her of due process by assuming the function of an advocate rather than an impartial tribunal; violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 3521 by continuing the jurisdiction/disposition hearing without good cause; and violated section 350(c), by improperly considering evidence submitted after the Department had presented its case-in-chief. View "In re Emily D." on Justia Law

Following a 2012 Los Angeles shooting Castaneda died; Barragan and Villanueva survived. Two surveillance cameras recorded the shooting. Police directed their attention to Art, who was then 13 years old. Art’s custodial interrogation was videotaped and subsequently transcribed. After viewing a videotape of the shooting, Art said “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me." Art, denied a request to see his mother, subsequently made incriminating statements. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress, holding that the statement was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. A reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances known to the officer or that would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, including the juvenile’s age, would understand the statement by the juvenile to be a request for an attorney. The error was not harmless. View "In re Art T." on Justia Law

Welfare and Institutions Code section 727.1 (b)(1) provides that a court “may not” order placement of a ward at an out-of-state facility unless “[i]n-state facilities or programs have been determined to be unavailable or inadequate to meet the needs of the minor.” After appellant, born July 1998, admitted an allegation in a section 602 petition that he committed involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code 192 (b)), the juvenile court placed him in a facility in Iowa, based on a desire to remove him from "negative influences" and a belief that he constituted a flight risk and a danger to the community. The court of appeal reversed, finding that there was no substantial evidence in-state facilities were unavailable or inadequate to meet his needs. View "In re Khalid B." on Justia Law

B.C. (a juvenile) was fourteen years of age when she was arrested for shoplifting merchandise from "Claire's," a discount jewelry store in the Rockingham Mall. She was transported, in handcuffs, to the Salem Police station. The arresting officer telephoned the juvenile's mother to pick her up. While in the booking room, the juvenile asked if she could use the bathroom. An officer allowed her to use the bathroom in one of the holding cells. Another officer observed her via a closed circuit monitor in the supervisor's office flush the toilet. The arresting officer asked the juvenile "what she had flushed down the toilet." The juvenile told the arresting officer "that it was a necklace that she had taken and . . . had concealed in her pants." The officer did not inform the juvenile of her Miranda rights before questioning her or at any other time. The juvenile remained at the police station until her mother picked her up. After she admitted to flushing the necklace down the toilet, the juvenile was charged with falsifying evidence. After a hearing in August 2011, she was found delinquent. During the merits hearing, she moved to suppress her admission on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation and that she was not advised of her Miranda rights before making it. The court denied her motion, and the juvenile appealed. The State appealed the circuit court's grant of the juvenile's motion to suppress. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.C. " on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft, and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority for a maximum term of eight years two months, including four months imposed as a result of Ruelas’s prior admission of annoying or molesting a child. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his Penal Code 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate arguing that his equal protection guarantees were violated by the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The court of appeal reversed. Requiring registration for those adjudicated of violating section 647.6 as juveniles only if they are committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice because they have committed another nonsex crime violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Ruelas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2011, the New Albany Police Department received a report that shots had been fired in the vicinity of Madison Street, Garfield Street, or Hayes Street. The Union County prosecuting attorney filed a petition alleging that S.S. should be adjudicated a delinquent child for resisting arrest following his detention at the scene of the shooting by the responding police officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Union County Youth Court’s adjudication of thirteen-year-old S.S. as a delinquent for resisting arrest, and the Supreme Court granted S.S.’s petition for certiorari. After review, the Court found no error in the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, and affirmed. View "In the Interest of S.M.K.S. v. Youth Court of Union County" on Justia Law

In 1995, Wilson, White and Carr, all age 17, approached a Pomona bank, wearing masks and carrying handguns. One of them fired at the security guard who stood outside the bank. The guard fled and alerted police. Inside the bank, they told the customers to “hit the deck.” Theresa Hernandez, a bank employee, was shot and killed during the robbery. The three fled in a car driven by Smith. Another car occupied by Brown also waited nearby. White later admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot Hernandez during the robbery because he thought she was activating an alarm. Brown was arrested. Wilson, Carr and White turned themselves into the police a few days after the robbery. Wilson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, sought habeas relief in 2013, asserting, that under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that he is entitled to be resentenced based on the individual sentencing factors that the Miller Court directed trial courts to consider when sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide conviction. The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re: Wilson" on Justia Law

A.L., a minor, was charged with felony second degree robbery of another minor, personally using a handgun. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing; testimony focused on the sequence of events and on A.L.’s relative culpability. During closing argument, the juvenile court noted that it “didn’t think there was any evidence” of the section 12022(b) enhancement, which requires personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The prosecutor indicated that A.L. had been mistakenly charged under section 12022(b) and should have been charged with the section 12022(a) enhancement, for vicarious liability when another principal is armed. She moved to amend the petition to conform to proof. A.L.’s attorney objected. The judge concluded that A.L. would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the change, permitted the amendment, sustained the second degree robbery allegation, and found true the section 12022(a) enhancement. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged A.L. a ward of the juvenile court with a maximum period of confinement of six years, including one year for the section 12022(a) enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated A.L.’s due process rights by allowing amendment of his delinquency petition during closing arguments. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

E.W. was fifteen years old, in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and living in a foster home when in 2013, a Vermont state trooper in uniform arrived at E.W.'s foster home to investigate a break-in and motor-vehicle theft. E.W.'s foster father then spoke privately with E.W. and told him not to say anything to the officer until the foster father contacted DCF. When asked what he and E.W. discussed, the foster father responded, "[h]onesty," explaining that he was "trying to encourage E.W. to be honest," and how "[i]t's not always easy to do the right thing." He denied specifically directing E.W. to do the right thing, however, or telling him that he had to speak with the officer. The foster father telephoned for guidance from E.W.'s guardian ad litem (GAL), who told him that "[u]sually the attorneys do not like the children interviewed unless they are there." The GAL then attempted to reach E.W.'s attorney, leaving a voice mail, and then spoke with the foster father again. The GAL advised him to be present during any conversation between E.W. and the police officer. The GAL could not reach E.W.'s attorney. The interview was not recorded; no Miranda warnings were given. The foster father was present throughout. He recalled that the officer "asked E.W. about where the car was," informing him that the police "were aware" he had taken it to Derby "but didn't know where it had gone after that." The foster father also recalled that he twice interrupted the officer's questioning to speak privately with E.W. when it appeared that "the floodgates . . . opened" and E.W. started making admissions to offenses beyond those that the officer had described. E.W. was subsequently charged with two counts of burglary, four counts of unlawful trespass in an occupied residence, three counts of petit larceny, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of operating a vehicle without owner consent. He moved to suppress his statements to the officer and dismiss all counts, asserting violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that E.W. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. E.W. then entered a conditional plea to all counts except the unlawful-mischief count, which was dismissed by the State, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, E.W. argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted under both the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that E.W. was in custody, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. The trial court's judgment was reversed. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Israel was born in Mexico in 1999 and is not a U.S. citizen. He came to the U.S. with his mother in 2005 and has no contact with his father in Mexico He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court as a result of admitting to misdemeanor receiving of stolen property. Israel requested that the court make findings that would qualify him for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under federal law (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), which would allow Israel to pursue regularization of his immigration status. The juvenile court declined to make findings that reunification “with one or both” parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; that Israel was a dependent of a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency; and that it was not in his “best interest” to be returned to Mexco. The court of appeal remanded. USCIS currently interprets and applies section 1101(a)(27)(J) to include, as “SIJ eligible children” those who may be living in this country “with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive parent” and the trial court did not make a finding on whether it is in Israel’s best interest to return to Mexico. View "In re Israel O." on Justia Law