Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Arturo Hernandez was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and five other charges and sentenced to 61 years to life in prison for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. On appeal, he argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) his attorney did not move to suppress his confession; and (2) his attorney did not object to his sentence as violating the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. After review, the Court of Appeal found no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to move to suppress the confession because such a motion would have had no merit. The Court did conclude, however, that under recent decisions from the United States and California Supreme Courts, defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with those decisions. View "California v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant K.S. was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. As he was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station, defendant struck and attempted to spit blood onto the arresting officer. In addition to the above offenses, defendant was charged and ultimately indicted for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Following his indictment, defendant sought admission into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI). The PTI director recommended denial of defendant s PTI application because of the assaultive nature of the offense and because of defendant s pattern of past anti-social behavior. After denial of his PTI application, defendant filed a motion to compel admission claiming that the prosecutor failed to consider whether his bipolar disorder and mental illness contributed to his conduct. The trial court remanded the matter to the prosecutor for consideration of the medical report provided by defendant. The prosecutor responded by letter explaining that the report had been considered and confirming the denial of defendant s admission into PTI. The trial court subsequently denied defendant s motion, concluding that the denial of his PTI application was not an abuse of discretion. After his motion was denied, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the State s recommendation to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The State also agreed to recommend a non-custodial probationary sentence, community service, and restitution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and later appealed, challenging the denial of his PTI application. Because the record included no admissions of conduct to support the truth of the allegations in defendant's dismissed adult charges and diverted and dismissed juvenile charges, those charges were not appropriate factors to be considered in deciding whether to admit defendant into PTI. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the prosecutor for reconsideration of defendant s eligibility for PTI. View "New Jersey v. K.S." on Justia Law

In March 1985, a juvenile court found true the allegation that Luis Ramon Aparicio committed battery with serious bodily injury after he dislocated a victim's nose by pushing the victim's head onto concrete. Aparicio was 15 years old at the time. In August 1986, Aparicio attacked a victim with a knife. In October 1988, Aparicio suffered his first strike conviction for robbery when he and three cohorts robbed two victims of their stereos. During the struggle, one of the assailants stabbed one of the victims. Aparicio was sentenced to 365 days in jail and three years of formal probation, but probation was ultimately revoked and he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June 1989, Aparicio suffered his second strike conviction after he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after trying to rob three victims with an ice pick. He received a two-year prison sentence. In 1992, Aparicio received a three-year prison term for possessing PCP and marijuana. In 1996, Aparicio was convicted of battery and resisting a police officer. He received probation, but probation was later revoked. In 1997, Aparicio was convicted of his commitment offense after burglarizing a car. During the reading of his guilty verdict, Aparicio attacked a marshal and attempted to remove his gun. He received a 27-years-to-life prison sentence under the Three Strikes Law. Aparicio received nine write-ups while incarcerated. In February 1998, he received administrative punishment after pinching a female prison employee on the buttocks and grabbing her thigh. In June 1998, he headbutted another inmate. In October 1998, he flooded his cell. In February 1999, he flooded his cell and threw urine at an officer. In December 2000, he obstructed a peace officer by refusing to accept a new cellmate. In 2001, 2005 and 2007, he engaged in mutual combat with other inmates. In November 2012, he stole desserts from the dining hall. A psychologist examined Aparicio, finding that he suffered from antisocial personality disorder and posed a low-moderate risk of committing a future violent offense. Nonetheless, she concluded that Aparicio did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. In November 2013, the trial court denied Aparicio's petition for recall of sentence after reviewing the petition, Aparicio's criminal history, prison history and mental health evaluation. Aparicio appealed. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order. Appellant subsequently sought rehearing arguing section Penal Code section 1170.18 (effective November 5, 2014) as part of Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act) changed the definition of "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" as it applied to inmates petitioning for recall of their third-strike life sentence under section 1170.126. The Court of Appeal declined to address that new issue and affirmed the order without prejudice to appellant petitioning for relief from the superior court under section 1170.18. View "California v. Aparicio" on Justia Law

The issue central to this appeal centered on the filing of a type of report about a juvenile offender: whether a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) evaluation should be filed in the official juvenile court file and therefore be open to the public. The legislature has explicitly defined the contents of the official juvenile court file as "the petition or information, motions, memorandums, briefs, findings of the court, and court orders." Since the SSODA evaluation does not fit within any of these categories, the Supreme Court held that it was not a part of the official juvenile court file. Consequently, it was subject to the general rule that all juvenile records not in the official juvenile court file must be kept confidential. View "Washington v. A.G.S." on Justia Law

In December 2012, a reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested the court docket showing the cases Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judge Tracie Hunter had presided over during December. The juvenile court administrator sent to the Enquirer the requested documents, but the documents were redacted to provide only the initials of the juveniles. The Enquirer filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ ordering Judge Hunter to reveal the names of the juveniles. The First District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Enquirer and ordered Judge Hunter to produce unredacted copies of her docket. In January 2014, the Supreme Court disqualified Judge Hunter from acting as a judge. The Court then dismissed this appeal, as a live controversy no longer existed here because Judge Hunter no longer had power to provide access to the requested records. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court erred in holding the right of a juvenile accused to be confronted with a witness against him conferred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated where the juvenile court admitted into evidence an out-of-court, video-taped, forensic interview of a child complainant under the Tender Years Hearsay Act (“TYHA”), even though defense counsel did not cross-examine the child complainant who had taken the witness stand at the juvenile’s contested adjudication hearing. In light of the unique circumstances of this case (wherein the Commonwealth conceded continued questioning of the unconversable child complainant on direct examination would have been futile, and the juvenile court suggested she be removed from the witness stand), the Supreme Court held the admission of the recorded forensic interview of the child complainant violated the juvenile accused’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of: N.C." on Justia Law

In 2009, C.B. (an adult male), along with his fiancee K.M.H (“the victim”) and her two daughters, J.H. (age 7) and A.H (age 4), and C.B.’s 11-year-old son J.B. were living together in a two-story rented house in a rural area surrounded by farmland and woods, and situated near the town of Wampum. K.M.H. was found dead with a single shotgun wound to the head shortly after C.B. had left for work for and J.H. and C.B. had left for school. K.M.H. was pregnant at the time of her death. The focus of the police investigation turned from K.M.H.'s ex-boyfriend to J.B., when police found that the ballistics of the shotgun pellets found in the victim matched that found on the shotgun seized from the residence. It was determined that J.B. had learned how to shoot this gun for hunting, and that the clothes J.B. wore to school the morning of the shooting had trace gunshot residue on them. The juvenile court issued written findings of fact adjudicating J.B. delinquent of criminal homicide for the death of K.M.H. and of her unborn child. J.B. filed a notice of appeal from the dispositional order, following which the juvenile court directed J.B. to prepare and file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. The juvenile court did not find J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim waived due to his failure to file a post-dispositional motion. Instead, the juvenile court ruled that J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim had been “adequately addressed . . . in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued on April 13, 2012 and supplemental Opinion issued on April 20, 2012.” The Supreme Court found that J.B. faced procedural rules that made optional the filing of a post-dispositional motion, and which did not otherwise specify how a weight of the evidence claim was to be presented in the first instance to the juvenile court in order to preserve it for appellate review. Furthermore, J.B. presented his weight of the evidence claim to the lower court by raising it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, in which he comprehensively set forth specific reasons why, in his view, the juvenile court’s adjudication was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that a finding of J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim to be waived under the circumstances of this case would have been manifestly unjust. The Court remanded this case back to the juvenile court to allow J.B. to file a post-dispositional motion nunc pro tunc. View "In the Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with committing criminal mischief for damaging the property of Cedars Teaching, Learning, & Connecting group home (Cedars Home) while she was a participant in its program. While the charges were pending final disposition, Appellant ran away from other placements several times. Although another group home accepted Appellant at its location, the juvenile court ordered intensive supervised probation at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC), pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(ii), finding that all levels of probation supervision and options for community-based services had been exhausted and that intensive supervised probation was appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 43-286 requires that before a juvenile is placed in YRTC, the Office of Probation Administration must consider what would be a reliable alternative to commitment at YRTC and report its findings to the court; and (2) applying section 43-286 to the present case, Appellant’s placement at YRTC was premature. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Nedhal A." on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant J.M. was charged with simple battery and simple criminal damage to property. On February 25, 2013, J.M. appeared to answer the petition and entered a denial of the allegations. Pursuant to La. Ch. Code art. 877, the state had ninety days from the date of the answer hearing to adjudicate the case (here, until May 26, 2013). The juvenile court set a trial date of March 26, 2013. Defendant failed to appear for trial and an arrest warrant was issued for her arrest. Service was never rendered on the defendant. On April 17, 2013, the warrant was recalled when defendant appeared in court and a new trial date of May 14, 2013 was set. On May 13, 2013, for reasons unclear from the record, the State expressly requested an extension of the adjudication deadline from May 26, 2013 to May 28, 2013 without objection. The juvenile court granted the extension and set a hearing date of May 28, 2013. On that date, the state requested a second continuance of the adjudication hearing. The juvenile court denied the state’s motion to continue, noting the State had already been granted additional time and finding no good cause to grant an additional continuance. Critically, the State did not object to or seek review of this ruling, but instead entered a nolle prosequi and dismissed the case. The same day, the State filed a new petition alleging the same delinquent acts. An answer hearing for the refiled petition was set for June 11, 2013. On June 11, 2013, the record reflected service was not made on the defendant and a new hearing date was set for June 25, 2013. On that date, the juvenile court judge was absent and the matter was delayed until July 16, 2013. On that date, 141 days from the original answer hearing, J.M. appeared in court to answer the refiled petition. J.M. once again denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the state violated the time limitations found in Louisiana Children’s Code Article 877. The juvenile court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. J.M. noticed intent to seek review of that ruling and appealed. The court of appeal granted defendant’s writ application and reversed the ruling of the juvenile court, dismissing the case on the basis that the state failed to adjudicate the matter within the time limitations provided in the Children’s Code. The State appealed the court of appeal’s decision, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal ruling. View "Louisiana in the interest of J.M." on Justia Law

Jose became a dependent of the Mendocino County juvenile court in 2008. He was placed in a group home, from which he ran away in 2013. Subsequent wardship petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) alleged that Jose, 15 years old, had committed the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in connection with his younger girlfriend running away from home; the felonies of battery for the benefit of a gang and participation in criminal street gang activity; and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing a peace officer. County probation and social services departments recommended that the court assume delinquency jurisdiction over Jose. The court found that Jose’s “needs [would be] best served by proceeding in the delinquency court” and terminated the dependency proceeding. The juvenile court granted Jose’s motion to dismiss the gang-activity count and reduced the battery count to a simple misdemeanor battery. The court ordered Jose to attend the Bar-O-Boys Ranch in Del Norte County with a maximum commitment term of one year and six months. The court of appeal held that Jose was properly treated as a delinquent, but that there was insufficient evidence he contributed to the delinquency of a minor, and remanded. View "In re Jose O." on Justia Law