Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. Defendant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes. After imposing an initial sentence, the district court resentenced Defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole after serving for twenty-five years on the felony murder charge, to run consecutive to the previously imposed sentence for aggravated burglary of twenty to twenty-five years, and concurrent to the sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to resentence on all counts, holding that sentencing courts are required to provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a juvenile’s diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform when, as in this case, the aggregate sentences result the functional equivalent of life without parole. Remanded for resentencing. View "Bear Cloud v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings. Appellant was age seventeen when the offenses were committed. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was proper under Miller v. Alabama because the sentence imposed in this case was not mandatory but, rather, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion; and (2) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Appellant’s youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for homicide, and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed; and (2) because Appellant might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, his sentence did not comport with the procedural strictures of Miller.View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

I.T., who admitted to conduct that would be a Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult, was ordered by the trial court to undergo therapeutic polygraph examinations. During one of those exams, I.T. admitted to molesting two other children. Based on those statements, the State filed a new delinquency petition. I.T. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Mental Health Statute, which bars a child’s statement to a mental health evaluator from being admitted into evidence to prove delinquency, barred the State’s evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal a juvenile court order that suppresses evidence if doing so terminates the proceeding; and (2) the Statute’s limited immunity prohibits both use and derivative use of a juvenile’s statements to prove delinquency. View "State v. I.T." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court here was what evidence a juvenile is entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. In this case, the State filed a motion asking the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have the Juvenile bound over to the general division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. Because the State failed to obey a court order during discovery to turn over police reports relating to the juvenile’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Juv. R. 24 applies in bindover hearings, which imposes a duty on the prosecuting attorney to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the State’s possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, or punishment; and (2) it is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv. R. 24. Remanded. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Samantha C. was a juvenile as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. Samantha argued that the juvenile court could not adjudicate her under section 43-247(3)(b) because her school had failed to comply with the remedial measures set forth in the compulsory education statutes. The juvenile court rejected Samantha’s argument and entered an order adjudicating Samantha as being habitually truant from school. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was not required to first prove Samantha’s school’s compliance with the compulsory education statutes because the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the compulsory education statutes are separate statutory enactments with distinct purposes and goals; and (2) the State met its burden of proving that Samantha was habitually truant from school under section 43-247(3)(b). View "In re Samantha C." on Justia Law

While imprisoned after being convicted of several offenses, defendant J.S. was declared a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 2962. In Spring 2012, J.S. was placed on parole and began her initial one-year term of involuntary treatment. After the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) rejected her challenge to her MDO classification and initial commitment, she filed a petition requesting counsel and judicial review, pursuant to section 2966 (b). That petition, however, was not heard within the initial year of commitment. A year later, the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss the petition as "moot" on that basis. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that she was entitled to have her petition heard on the merits, because it was filed during the initial year of commitment, and even though the initial term was already completed, her petition was not moot. The Court of Appeal agreed, and therefore reversed the order dismissing defendant's petition. View "California v. J.S." on Justia Law

In 2007, a juvenile court adjudicated Mendez guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm. If committed by an adult, the offense is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. In 2012, after Mendez had become an adult, a park ranger found him in possession of a shotgun. Based on the juvenile adjudication, the federal government charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm if he View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law

The employers were formerly contributing members of the Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan. In 2007-2008 each employer reached an agreement with the Plan to terminate its membership. They were required to pay, and have paid, “withdrawal liability” reflecting each employer’s share of unfunded, vested pension benefits under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381–1461. Under the Act, if the plan is terminated altogether by a “mass withdrawal” of the remaining members within three years, the earlier withdrawing members may be subject to additional “reallocation liability.” Disputes about the amount of such reallocation liability are subject to mandatory arbitration. The employers claim that a 2009 mass withdrawal was expedited to occur within the three-year period in order that they would be subject to reallocation liability. The Plan trustees sought more than $12 million in additional funds from the employers. The district court dismissed their suit for failure to complete arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the claim of “sham” mass withdrawal be arbitrated. View "Knall Beverage, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan" on Justia Law

On March 1, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated Marcella G. for a misdemeanor law violation and committed Marcella to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). On July 5, 2013, DHHS filed a motion seeking to transfer Marcella from a group-home to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center (YRTC) as a condition of intensive supervised probation (ISP). The juvenile court sustained the motion and approved the transfer of Marcella to a YRTC without making the transfer as a condition of ISP. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247.02(2), on and after July 1, 2013, a juvenile court can commit a juvenile to OJS for placement at a YRTC only as part of an order of ISP; and (2) but because Marcella had already been committed to OJS for placement at a level less restrictive than a YRTC before July 1, 2013 and transferred to a YRTC after July 2, 2103, subsection (2) did not apply; and (3) therefore, the juvenile court acted within its authority when its transferred Marcella to the YRTC without making the placement as part of an order of ISP. View "In re Marcella G." on Justia Law

Sacramento Police received a call from Kennedy High School that there was "an uncontrollable, irate student in the hallways." While in the principal's office, the minor called his mother; he became more and more irate as he talked, "screaming [and] yelling" and pacing the floor. The responding officer asked the minor to sit down and calm down, but the minor did not listen. The minor slammed or threw the phone down on the table. About three to five seconds after the minor failed to obey the order to sit down and calm down, the officer detained him "based on [the officer's] safety and safety of the school and also the [minor]'s." The officer advised the minor he was being detained and ordered him to put his hands on his head with his fingers interlaced. In an attempt to put a control hold on the minor by grabbing the minor's interlaced hands with one hand and grabbing the minor's elbow from underneath with the other hand, the minor turned, pulled away, and started to walk away. The officer performed an arm bar takedown on the minor and detained him on the floor; he then handcuffed him and took him out to his squad car. After obtaining briefing from the parties on the legal and factual issues, the juvenile court issued a ruling sustaining both charges. As to the resisting charge, the court found that the minor's conduct before his detention was sufficient to justify the detention. The minor appealed the order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court, arguing that one of the two allegations the court sustained was supported by sufficient evidence and that the other was founded on an unconstitutional statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law