Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

"Kyle" had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3)'s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months' incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). Kyle's participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle's sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal. The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The Court reversed the extended-term sentence. View "New Jersey in the Interest of K.O." on Justia Law

M.G. was charged in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with felony carrying of a concealed firearm on his person. After the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, M.G. entered an admission he committed the charged offense, but declined to stipulate the offense was a felony rather than a wobbler. The trial court rejected his argument, declared a wardship, and placed M.G. with his parent subject to conditions of probation. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for proceedings to determine whether M.G. is suitable for deferred entry of judgment and, if not, whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

R.S., a teenaged child under eighteen years of age, engaged in an evening of “teenage shenanigans,” in which he and a group of contemporaries painted offenses messages on cars parked at a memorial service. Following hearings in juvenile session, a district court adjudicated R.S. guilty of second-degree criminal mischief by complicity and order him alone to pay the full amount of restitution to the owner of one of the defaced cars that was damaged in the incident. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the adjudication and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the adjudication of R.S.’s juvenile public offender status; and (2) the district court may, in weighing the best interest of the child in a juvenile disposition, order one party to pay the entire amount of restitution, despite other individuals’ possible involvement in the acts of vandalism.View "R.S. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Wershe was 17 years and 10 months old when he was arrested in Detroit and charged with various drug crimes. He was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, and, in 1988, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, Wershe was 18 years and 7 months old. In 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the life-without-parole penalty for simple possession unconstitutional. Wershe’s first opportunity for parole was denied in 2003. In 2012, the Parole Board determined that it had no interest in taking action on his case and scheduled Wershe’s next interview for 2017. Wershe brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Michigan Parole Board members, alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Wershe’s due-process claim, but vacated with respect to the Eight Amendment because the district court failed to consider the impact of Wershe’s youth at the time of the crime and his arrest. View "Wershe v. Combs" on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile male, appealed the district court's adjudication of delinquency on six counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile delinquency proceedings and that section 2241(c) is not unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court erred applying the means rea element of section 2241(c), denying the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 3 and 5 because there was insufficient evidence of anal penetration, and admitting the hearsay statements of a victim through the testimony of a social worker under Rule 803(4). The court remanded the portion of the district court's judgment to allow specific consideration of defendant's suspension request where Rule 35(a)'s fourteen-day time limit had expired and there was no record of whether the district court weighed factors bearing on the suspension while it had jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's disposition decision, remanded for consideration of all disposition options, including a suspension of delinquency, and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her two daughters dependents of the court based on mother's failure to provide for the children. The court concluded that, because jurisdiction was proper based on Father's conduct, the court need not consider whether it was also proper based on Mother's conduct. In the alternative, the court concluded that Mother waived the issue of whether substantial evidence supported jurisdiction based on her failure to provide. Further, there was sufficient evidence regarding Mother's failure to protect the minors from Father's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional order. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Respondent was charged as a juvenile with several firearms-related offenses. The State filed a motion seeking a discretionary transfer of Respondent’s case to the regular criminal docket of the superior court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-127(b)(1). The trial court granted the State’s motion. Respondent appealed. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the a transfer order made pursuant to the discretionary transfer provision in section 46b-127(b)(1) is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, as the clear intent of the Legislature is to prohibit interlocutory appeals from discretionary transfer orders. View "In re Tyriq T." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, contending that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, did not apply. Mother had the right to appeal the juvenile court's order at the dispositional hearing but she did not do so. She only challenged the juvenile court's failure to provide notice under the ICWA approximately one and a half years later which was after the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Accordingly, the court held that Mother failed to timely appeal the juvenile court's order and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law

A.M.M.-H. was sentenced in an extended juvenile jurisdiction proceeding in which he was given both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence. The adult sentence was stayed pending successful completion of his juvenile sentence. After A.M.M.-H. violated the terms of conditional release on his juvenile sentence the district judge revoked conditional release and ordered A.M.M.-H. to serve his adult prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, the district judge had discretion to determine whether A.M.M.-H.’s violation of the terms of conditional release warranted revocation of the stay of the adult sentence; and (2) because the record was unclear as to whether the district judge knew he had discretion not to execute the adult sentence upon a finding of violation of the terms of A.M.M.-H.’s conditional release, the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the State’s motion to revoke. View "In re A.M.M.-H." on Justia Law

Mother challenged a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her son and ordering regular visitation for the son's paternal grandmother, contending that the visitation order impermissibly infringed on her fundamental parenting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mother also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition requesting that the court terminate or modify the order for the son to visit the paternal grandmother. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate Mother's fundamental parenting rights by issuing an order granting the paternal grandmother visitation where the juvenile court was authorized by statute to issue a visitation order, the visitation order did not infringe on Mother's fundamental right to parent; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's petition seeking modification of the visitation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law