Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Between December 11, 2011 and January 1, 2012, the Billings Police Department responded to more than 200 reports of vandalism. B.W., a youth, admitted to having committed acts of vandalism on December 22, 2011 and December 29, 2011. The youth court adjudicated B.W. a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief, common scheme and ordered B.W. to pay $78,702 in restitution, which represented the total damages sustained over the eleven-day vandalism spree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court erred in concluding that B.W. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages where the State did not establish that B.W. was accountable for the crimes of others in which Defendant did not participate. Remanded for a new restitution hearing.View "In re B.W." on Justia Law

Officer Woelkers saw 15-year-old J.G. walking across a parking lot toward his brother, D.G. Woelkers parked his patrol vehicle, without turning on lights or siren, and “casually” approached the brothers. He was wearing his uniform. J.G. said they were going to a party. Officer Klier arrived in his patrol vehicle to “assist.” Woelkers asked D.G. for identification, and D.G. gave him a Honduran identification card. J.G. stated that he had no identification and gave a name. J.G. Woelkers ran a check and learned that no California driver’s license or identification card had issued to either boy. The boys consented to a pat-down and the officers found nothing illegal. Meanwhile, two more officers arrived, displaying a gun. J.G. agreed to a search of his backpack. Woelkers located a semiautomatic pistol inside. The D.A. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) alleging felony possession of a concealed firearm by a minor. J.G. first admitted that allegation, then successfully moved to withdraw his plea, and moved to suppress the pistol from being introduced into evidence. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed. The totality of the circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person—juvenile or adult—that he was not free to refuse the request. Woelkers clearly conveyed that he suspected the brothers of unlawful activity. He asked them whether they had anything “illegal,” conducted a records check, and searched them, physically restraining them, while the police presence and show of force grew. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Juvenile J.M. argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon(La. R.S. 14:95(A)), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile (La. R.S. 14:95.8), failed to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should have been severed from the statute. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the juvenile court erred in both of its rulings. The Supreme Court held both statutes constitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the interest of J.M. " on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered at the last contested section 364 of the Welfare and Institutions Code hearing at which the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over her 17-month-old son despite the recommendation of the Department to terminate jurisdiction. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence submitted by the Department and in the record that supports the juvenile court's determination not to terminate jurisdiction. Among other things, Mother still struggled with providing the son with everything he needed; a counselor reported that Mother will benefit from continued treatment; the parenting and mental concerns that brought Mother to the attention of the Department and Children's court remain a work in progress; and there is no evidence concerning mother's capacity to live independently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

The question presented in this case was when a juvenile court can conduct an Ohio Rev. Code 2152.83(B)(2) hearing regarding the appropriateness of juvenile-offender-registrant classification for a juvenile adjudged delinquent. Specifically, at issue was whether a juvenile court can conduct a classification hearing at the time of disposition in a case in which a juvenile is committed to a secure facility or whether the court must wait to conduct the hearing until the juvenile is released from the secure facility. The juvenile court in the instant case committed a juvenile to the Department of Youth Services during a disposition hearing and then, at the same hearing, classified the juvenile as a Tier III sex offender/child-victim offender. The juvenile appealed his classification, arguing that it violated section 2152.83(B)(1). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if a court commits a child to a secure facility, section 2152.83(B)(1) permits the court to conduct a classification hearing at the time of disposition. View "In re I.A." on Justia Law

S.L., the daughter of Julia, born in 2002, was adjudicated abused or neglected in 2007, and was made a ward of the court in January 2008, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b). The conditions that gave rise to her removal were insect bites, apparent dog bites, substantial bruising to her shoulder and groin, and unclean living conditions. At each of five subsequent permanency hearings, the goal was for S.L. to return to Julia within 12 months, while custody remained with the Department of Children and Family Service. In July 2010, the goal was changed to substitute care pending termination of parental rights. Julia was continuously represented by counsel. In November 2011, the state sought termination of parental rights, alleging that Julia failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal and was unable to discharge parental responsibilities de to mental impairment. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of unfitness because the state did not file a separate notice under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii), identifying which nine-month periods were the subject of the termination proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the finding, noting that Julia did not allege any harm as a result of the defect in notice. Failure to file the separate notice pleading was a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and was forfeited by Julia because she failed to raise the issue in the trial court.View "In re S.L." on Justia Law

When he was seventeen years old, Appellant committed the crime of first-degree robbery. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years. Appellant was sentenced under a statute that required him to serve at least seventy percent of his sentence before he was eligible for parole. Appellant appealed, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing, holding that, for the reasons express in State v. Lyle, filed on this same date, the mandatory sentence violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Appellant was a seventeen-year-old high school student when he took a small plastic bag containing marijuana from a fellow student outside the high school. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of robbery in the second degree. Appellant was prosecuted as an adult and was sentenced under a statute that required the imposition of a mandatory seven-year minimum sentence of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum was unconstitutional as applied to him. During the pendency of the appeal, the United States decided Miller v. Alabama. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether Appellant’s sentence was constitutional in light of the cases the Court handed down subsequent to Miller. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that a statute mandating a sentence of incarceration in a prison for juvenile offenders with no opportunity for parole until a minimum period of time has been served is unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution. View "State v. Lyle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jaryd Schroeder sought treatment from the respondents, Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging. Schroeder was nine years old at the time and suffered from headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness in his legs, and double vision. He underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which Weighall reviewed and found to be normal. Schroeder's symptoms persisted. On either November 9 or 19, 2009, when he was 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI. This time the radiologist who reviewed the image found an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation. On January 13, 2011, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party subsequently dismissed by stipulation. Weighall asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations codified at RCW 4.16.350 and subject to the minority tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2). Schroeder and his mother discovered Weighall's alleged omission November 2009 when Schroeder was still a minor. If not for RCW 4.16.190(2), the one-year statute of limitations applicable to his claim would have tolled until his 18th birthday. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of RCW 4. 16. 190(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution, and therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing Schroeder's medical malpractice action. View "Schroeder v. Weighall" on Justia Law