Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

D.J.B. was adjudged a juvenile delinquent for acts that would be considered crimes had they been committed by an adult. As an adult, D.J.B. pled guilty to fourth-degree receiving stolen property in 1996. In 2011, D.J.B. filed a petition seeking to expunge his 1996 criminal conviction. The trial court denied the petition, finding that “[t]he combination of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 served to prevent a petitioner with an indictable crime from obtaining expungement if that petitioner has a prior juvenile record.” The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the same reasons. The following month, another appellate panel analyzed a similar question and reached the opposite conclusion about the effect a juvenile adjudication has on an attempt to expunge an adult conviction. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that based on its language and legislative history, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) applied only to the expungement of juvenile adjudications and did not transform a juvenile adjudication into a “crime” that would bar a later attempt to expunge an adult conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2. View "In the Matter of the Expungement Application of D.J.B." on Justia Law

Anthony S., then 15 years old, admitted an assault with a firearm, in which he and a co-defendant seriously wounded Houston, resulting in a hospital bill of more than $400,000. The hospital has not attempted to collect from Houston, having determined that he was indigent and the debt was uncollectable. At a hearing to set restitution, a hospital representative testified that after a debt is written off as uncollectable, the hospital generally makes no further attempt to recover it. Nevertheless, the juvenile court t set restitution at 20 percent of $412,546.89 with a credit of $1,000 for the amount that Anthony had already paid to the victim restitution fund, with Anthony and his parents jointly and severally liable. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the restitution order was contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 because there was insufficient evidence of economic loss to Houston. View "In re Anthony S." on Justia Law

In August 2012, then-sixteen-year-old Appellant Stephen W. was charged with possession of marijuana. At the adjudicatory hearing, Appellant moved for a jury trial, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. The family court denied Appellant's motion. The family court adjudicated Appellant delinquent and ordered that Appellant spend six consecutive weekends at the Department of Juvenile Justice, complete an alternative educational program, and continue with his prior probation for a period of time not to exceed his eighteenth birthday or until he obtained a G.E.D. Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that the family court erred in denying his motion for a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding. Because there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of Stephen W." on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Without holding a hearing, the juvenile court denied two requests by a mother (Karen) to modify an order denying her services to reunify with her three-year-old son and seven-month-old daughter, who had 13 fractures. Later, after holding a hearing, the court terminated her parental rights. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the failure to hold a hearing on the modification requests did not amount to reversible error. On the first request, Karen failed to allege a prima facie case. On the second request, Karen was given an opportunity to be heard, and the court made findings negating the appropriateness of reunification services. Her parental rights were properly terminated because substantial evidence supports showed that the potential benefit to the children from a continuing relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

Defendant committed murder when he was seventeen years old. Defendant was subsequently convicted in the superior court of murder in the first degree and related weapons charges. While Brown was awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. The statutory sentencing scheme in Massachusetts requires, however, that all defendants over the age of fourteen who are convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Consequently, Defendant's sentencing was stayed until the Maine Supreme Court could render an opinion regarding the issue. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of Miller and Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, in which the Court held that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Consequently, the Court held that Defendant may not be sentenced to life without parole. Remanded for sentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed five delinquency complaints against Defendant when he was seventeen years old based on the alleged sexual abuse of a victim. Defendant was summonsed into court on the complaints while he was still seventeen, but Defendant had turned eighteen by the time of his first scheduled court appearance and arraignment. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained youthful offender indictments against Defendant based on the portion of the alleged abuse that took place when Defendant was between fourteen and seventeen years old. The juvenile court subsequently reported to the Supreme Court questions concerning issues of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) the term "apprehended" in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 72 is marked by the commencement of process, typically through a summons, provided the individual is able to the court at that time; (2) an individual may not be indicted as a youthful offender after he has turned eighteen for offenses he allegedly committed between the ages of fourteen and seventeen; and (3) a youthful offender indictment may not issue against an individual after his eighteenth birthday, regardless of whether a delinquency complaint on the same facts has been filed before the individual's eighteenth birthday.View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinski" on Justia Law

A series of burglaries occurred over several months in Bismarck involving more than $65,000 in stolen property and property damage. D.O. is a juvenile thought to be involved with the crimes. While investigating D.O.'s involvement, Detective Matthew Fullerton performed a probation search of D.O.'s residence, obtained information from a tipster and a confidential informant, searched publicly available information on D.O.'s Facebook page and performed a "cell tower dump" showing cell phone activity in the area of the burglaries at the time they occurred. D.O. appealed the juvenile court's order granting the State's motion to transfer D.O.'s case to the district court and denying D.O.'s suppression motion. D.O. argued law enforcement offered false or misleading testimony in support of the search warrant, that insufficient probable cause existed to justify the search warrant's issuance, that the juvenile court relied on out-of-court statements in violation of his statutory right to confrontation and that his case was inappropriately transferred to the district court. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of D.O." on Justia Law

Judge Tracie Hunter of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas presided over the twelve cases against six juvenile defendants underlying this appeal. Judge Hunter issued entries revoking the Cincinnati Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record courtroom proceedings. The appellate court granted the Enquirer an alternative writ of prohibition ordering Judge Hunter to stay the enforcement of the documents revoking the Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record the courtroom proceedings. Judge Hunter subsequently allowed the Enquirer's reporters into the courtroom but did so subject to certain express conditions, including the condition that the Enquirer not publish the juveniles' names. The Enquirer filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Judge Hunter violated the appellate court's order by making the Enquirer's access to the courtroom subject to conditions. The court of appeals granted the Enquirer's contempt motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in granting the contempt motion for Judge Hunter's noncompliance with the appellate court's alternative writ. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law