Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Movant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole. He was 17 years old when the conspiracy began and the conspiracy continued until he had turned 18. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, movant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) seeking authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion. The court denied the motion, concluding that, even assuming that movant qualified as a juvenile offender, his proposed motion would necessarily rely on a right that became available to him in 2010 with the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, which held that sentencing a juvenile who did not commit a homicide to life imprisonment without parole violated the Eighth Amendment, and not on Miller, which extended the Graham rule to prohibit mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of committing homicide. Because Graham was decided more than one year before movant filed his section 2255(h) motion, the successive section 2255 motion he sought leave to file would be barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3). View "In re: Tadd Vassell" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ronald Watts and Kevin Aguirre were charged by way of complaints issued in district court with criminal offenses that Petitioners allegedly committed when they were each seventeen years old. The Governor subsequently signed St. 2013 ch. 84 (Act), which extended the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to persons who were seventeen years old at the time of committing an offense. Petitioners moved to dismiss the district court charges against them pursuant to the Act, claiming that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings had begun. The Supreme Judicial Court denied Petitioners’ motions, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the superior court or district court were begun prior to, and were pending on, the effective date of the Act. View "Watts v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

MF was adjudicated a child in need of supervision (CHINS) shortly before his sixteenth birthday. Four months before MF's seventeenth birthday and after MF twice violated his probation, the juvenile court ordered that MF remain in the custody of the Department of Family Services and on probation until his eighteenth birthday. MF appealed, arguing that any CHINS order must terminate when the minor child turns seventeen. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the juvenile court's order to the extent the order purported to have effect beyond MF's seventeenth birthday, holding that the juvenile court did not have the authority to issue a CHINS order that imposed conditions beyond MF's seventeenth birthday.View "In re MF" on Justia Law

Defendants in these cases were both seventeen-year-old offenders who were convicted of special circumstance murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under Cal. Penal Code 190.5(b). After Defendants were sentenced, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama. On review, the California Supreme Court held (1) section 190.5(b), properly construed, confers discretion upon a trial court to sentence a juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without parole, with no presumption in favor of life without parole; (2) Miller requires a trial court, in exercising its sentencing discretion, to consider the distinctive attributes of youth before imposing life without parole on a juvenile offender; (3) section 190.5(b) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it authorizes and requires consideration of the distinctive attributes of youth highlighted in Miller, once the statute is understood not to impose a presumption in favor of life without parole; and (4) because the trial courts in these cases sentenced Defendants without awareness of the full scope of their discretion conferred by section 190.5(b) and without the guidance set forth in Miller, the cases must be remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was fifteen at the time of the crimes, was charged as an adult with nine felonies. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to transfer his case from district court to juvenile court, which the district court denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of review, claiming that the district court improperly placed the burden on him to establish that the case should be transferred to juvenile court. The Supreme Court granted the review. The Court then reversed, holding that the district court erred in failing to assign the burden of persuasion to the State to establish that the case should not be transferred to juvenile court. Remanded.View "JB v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a juvenile charged as an adult with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon. After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida, Petitioner filed a motion to have a bond set. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) the Florida Constitution provides for pretrial release as a matter of right for a noncapital offense or an offense that does not carry the possibility of a life sentence, and (2) because Graham prohibits the State from sentencing him to life without an opportunity for parole, he was entitled to bond under the provisions of the State Constitution. The court of appeal denied the petition, concluding that Graham does not impact a juvenile defendant's entitlement to bond because the Florida Constitution considers only the classification of the offense, not a defendant's eventual sentence. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that juvenile offenders such as Petitioner were entitled to bond under the Florida Constitution because they cannot be charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment under Florida's current statutory scheme and Graham. View "Treacy v. Lamberti" on Justia Law

While still a minor, appellant Marcus More was indicted on two counts of malice murder and other crimes relating to two fatal shootings. The State gave appellant notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and of the aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty on which it intended to rely. A jury found appellant guilty on all charges, and rather than proceed to sentencing, he entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed (inter alia) to waive his rights to appeal and all post-conviction review of his convictions and sentences. For that waiver, the State recommended (and the trial court accepted) a life sentence without the possibility of parole on one malice murder county, and consecutive sentences on the remaining counts. Four years after appellant received his sentence, the federal Supreme Court decided "Roper v. Simmons" (543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Based on that holding, appellant filed a motion to correct void sentence, claiming that Roper removed the death penalty as a sentencing option due to appellant's age. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding both that appellant waived his right to challenge his sentence and even if he had not waived the right, Roper did not apply so as to retroactively invalidate his sentence of life without parole. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) appellant, despite signing the plea agreement, cannot, according to Georgia case law, "bargain away" the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence; (2) appellant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was void as a sentence not allowed by law and the trial court's order denying the motion to correct void sentence was reversed.View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

After the Forest Service denied Ark's Emergency Petition seeking "roadless" designation for roughly 1,000 acres on Burnt Mountain and suspension of the Aspen Skiing Company's authorization to cut trees on that land, Ark filed suit against the Service in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Service and denied reconsideration. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that Ark had Article III standing to challenge the Service's final action denying the Emergency Petition. On the merits, the court concluded that the Service's denial of the Emergency Petition was not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, and Ark failed to show an abuse of discretion on reconsideration. View "Ark Initiative, et al. v. Tidwell, et al." on Justia Law

Because Petitioner tested positive for drugs prior to a hearing in the juvenile drug court, the judge held Petitioner in contempt of court. Petitioner moved to stay the contempt order, contending that she could not be held in direct contempt because she did not not cause any disturbance in the presence of the court or violate any court order. The juvenile court refused to change its contempt ruling. One month after Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, the juvenile court vacated its order finding Petitioner in direct contempt. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition as moot, holding that because the district court vacated its contempt order, the proceeding was moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applied.View "Paley v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution applied to a restitution determination in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The youth-defendant in this case argued that he was entitled to a jury trial because recent constitutional and statutory amendments transformed the juvenile restitution statute, ORS 419C.450, into a civil device through which victims of crime could recover monetary damages for their injuries. The Supreme Court held that a restitution determination pursuant to ORS 419C.450 was not civil in nature and that Article I, section 17, therefore did not require a jury trial in the defendant's case. View "Oregon v. N. R. L." on Justia Law