Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Among the issues in this appeal was whether a juvenile court has authority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of the district attorney. In this case, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that Respondent, a juvenile, committed unlawful acts that would be felony and gross misdemeanor charges if committed by an adult. The juvenile court dismissed the State's petition without the district attorney's written approval and referred Respondent to the probation office for informal supervision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62C.230(1)(a) grants the juvenile court the authority to dismiss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only if the district attorney gives written approval for placement of the juvenile under informal supervision where the acts alleged in the petition would be a felony or gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult; and (2) the juvenile court is limited by the provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes Title 5 when exercising its authority to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile justice matters. Remanded. View "In re Steven P." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on drug charges. His privately retained attorney appeared at the initial trial court hearing, during which a trial date was set. The trial did not proceed on that day. Defendant continued pro se at the next hearing and the subsequent trial date. Defendant was then assigned a public defender. The court set a hearing date for defendant’s motion to suppress. The public defender informed the court that she could not try the case, but did not formally request an adjournment for change of counsel. Defendant's new public defender was told that he was being transferred from the OPD’s juvenile unit to a new trial team and that he would serve as defendant’s trial counsel. The trial judge denied counsel's request for a continuance to allow counsel additional time for preparation. Defendant’s attorney spent ten to eleven hours preparing for trial, but had no contact with defendant. At issue in this appeal was the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a request for adjournment by a defendant who met his appointed counsel for the first time on the day of trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s denial of an adjournment did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation, was not an abuse of discretion, and did not violate principles of fundamental fairness.View "New Jersey v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2001, Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct and first-degree premeditated murder. Respondent was a juvenile when he committed the crime. The district court sentenced Respondent to life without the possibility of release (LWOR) under the mandatory sentencing scheme in Minn. Stat. 609.106(2)(1). After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Respondent filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court granted Respondent’s petition and resentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Chambers v. State, which held that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose sentence of LWOR under section 609.106(2)(1) became final before the Miller rule was announced. Thereafter, in the instant case, the Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court’s order and reinstated the original sentence of LWOR, holding that the postconviction court’s legal conclusion was in direct conflict with Chambers, and the circumstances of this case did not warrant granting relief to Respondent under the Court’s supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice. View "Roman Nose v. State" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old was the subject of a petition to have her adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful consumption of alcohol and other offenses. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Later that year, the state filed a petition to revoke her probation, claiming that drug testing revealed that she had consumed marijuana and cocaine. She was conveyed to a Department of Juvenile Justices facility. Her sentence has been served. Addressing the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute does not permit a minor to be committed to the Department after being adjudicated delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, being placed on probation with conditions, and then having that probation revoked for violation of those probation conditions. Sentencing for underage drinking is limited by a Juvenile Court Act provision stating that a minor may be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice “only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Underage drinking is not an offense of which an adult may be guilty. The court rejected a claim that this juvenile could be incarcerated for having “violated a court order” by noncompliance with probation terms.View "In re Shelby R." on Justia Law

B.A.H. was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. 609.342(1)(g) for acts he committed with his cousin, then age thirteen, when B.A.H. was age fourteen. After a bench trial on stipulated evidence, the district court found B.A.H. guilty of the charge and adjudicated him delinquent. The court of appeals reversed, holding that subdivision (1)(g) violated B.A.H.’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that B.A.H.’s deliquency adjudication did not violate his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, as (1) subdivision (1)(g) was not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the State’s reasons for charging B.A.H. and not his cousin were rational, and therefore, constitutional. View "In re Welfare of B.A.H." on Justia Law

In 2011, Gabriela A., who was fifteen years old, was adjudicated a person in need of supervision (PINS) and placed on probation. Gabriela was later remanded to a detention facility from which she absconded. Several probation officers eventually took Gabriela into custody after Gabriela resisted the officers. Gabriela was then served with a juvenile delinquency petition based on her confrontation with the probation officers. After a fact-finding hearing, Family Court found that Gabriela had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration. The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s subsequent dispositional order, vacated the underlying fact-finding order, and dismissed the petition, concluding that Gabriela’s conduct was consistent with PINS behavior, not with juvenile delinquency, and that Family Court “may not do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly - placing a PINS in a secure facility.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division’s factual findings more nearly comported with the weight of the evidence than Family Court’s findings. View "In re Gabriela A." on Justia Law

The State sought certiorari for review of a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals that reversed the Juvenile Court's decision to deny G.M.'s motion to suppress evidence that G.M. argued was obtained pursuant to an illegal search. The matter was one of first impression for the Supreme Court: whether evidence of a public-school student's association with an individual known to be involved in criminal activity and suspected of being affiliated with a gang, without more, constituted reasonable grounds for a search of the student by a school official under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.View "G. M. v. Alabama " on Justia Law

Minor Nicholas Proulx was injured in a car accident and treated for his injuries at Memorial Hospital at Gulfport. Nicholas' parents Timothy and Hope Proulx obtained letters of guardianship and petitioned the chancery court for authority to compromise and settle Nicholas' personal injury claim. The guardians also asked the court to dismiss claims against the settlement proceeds made b several medical providers, including Memorial. Memorial appealed the dismissal of its claim against the settlement. Because Memorial had no assignment, lien or other legal right to payment from the settlement proceeds, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's dismissal of Memorial's claim.View "Memorial Hospital at Gulfport v. Proulx" on Justia Law

Following the denial of her motion for new trial, Chanell Pitts appealed her convictions and misdemeanor sentences for 2011 violations of OCGA 20-2-690.1(the "mandatory education statute"). Her sole challenge was to the constitutionality of the statute. Finding no error in the trial court’s denial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pitts v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Alonzo J. was charged in a juvenile court delinquency petition with two felony counts of assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The juvenile court appointed attorney Jo Ann Harris to represent Alonzo on the charges. The prosecution offered a plea deal under which Alonzo could return home on probation if he admitted to committing one felony assault. Alonzo wanted to accept the offer, but Harris refused to consent. The juvenile court would not accept Alonzo’s admission of guilt without Harris’s consent, and, after a hearing, sustained all charges against Alonzo. The court then directed that Alonzo be placed in a foster or group home, a residential treatment center, or the home of a friend or relative. The court of appeal reversed, holding that although Harris’s consent was required for an admission of the charges, it was not required for a no contest plea, and the juvenile court should have allowed Alonzo to accept the plea offer by pleading no contest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in a delinquency proceeding, the consent of the child’s attorney is required for a no contest plea, just as it is for an admission of the charging allegations. View "In re Alonzo J." on Justia Law