Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries
In re R.M.
In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law
State v. Taylor
Jesse Taylor, Jr. was charged with murder and aggravated assault after his case was transferred from juvenile court to district court in October 2022. In August 2023, a seven-day jury trial was held, and Taylor was found guilty of both charges. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for the murder charge and a concurrent five-year sentence for the aggravated assault charge.Taylor appealed the judgment, raising three issues: the jury's verdict was not unanimous, the district court abused its discretion by denying the defense the ability to properly cross-examine a State's witness, and the court imposed an illegal sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found that the jury's verdict was unanimous, as confirmed by the district court on multiple occasions, including a hearing held after the case was remanded. The court also determined that Taylor failed to preserve the issues regarding the evidentiary rulings for appeal, as he did not make an offer of proof or inform the district court of the desired actions or objections.Regarding the sentence, the court noted that Taylor was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, requiring a determination of his life expectancy. The district court used the age of 15 to determine Taylor's life expectancy, as there was no exact calculated life expectancy for the age of 18 in the mortality table. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court acted within the limits of the statute and did not rely on any impermissible factors in determining the sentence.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, upholding Taylor's conviction and sentence. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law
B.D. v. Super. Ct.
A mother (B.D.) sought extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order that terminated her family reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. The case involved her two children, S.R. and O.R., who were removed from her custody due to allegations of serious physical harm and failure to protect. The mother argued that the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau did not provide reasonable reunification services and that the juvenile court erred in concluding she failed to make substantive progress in her court-ordered treatment plan.The juvenile court found that the mother had not made substantive progress in her treatment plan and terminated reunification services. The court noted that despite the mother's participation in various services, she continued to struggle with parenting skills and judgment, and the children remained at risk. The court also found that the Bureau had provided reasonable services tailored to the mother's special needs, including referrals to parenting classes, counseling, and individual therapy.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the juvenile court's finding that the Bureau had provided reasonable services. However, it found that the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother had not made substantive progress was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court noted that the mother had completed multiple parenting courses, engaged in therapy, and regularly visited her children without resorting to physical discipline.Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court's error was harmless. Given the imminent 12-month review hearing and the heightened standards for continuing reunification services, the court found it unlikely that the mother would be able to demonstrate a substantial probability of the children's return to her custody within the extended period. Therefore, the petition for extraordinary relief was denied. View "B.D. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Juvenile Law
Kelly v. State of Indiana
McKinley Kelly, at sixteen, was convicted of murdering three young adults. The trial court vacated one conviction and sentenced him to 110 years in prison. Kelly's appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals allowed him to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief, focusing on new scientific understandings of adolescent brain development, arguing for a resentencing or a more lenient sentence.The Lake Superior Court denied Kelly's petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Kelly then appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which granted transfer to address procedural and substantive issues related to juvenile sentencing. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's decision, concluding that the post-conviction court appropriately allowed Kelly to amend his successive petition without requiring appellate screening.The Indiana Supreme Court held that the state and federal constitutional provisions cited by Kelly did not mandate a more lenient sentence. The court found that Kelly's sentence was not inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. The court emphasized that the legislature had recently amended the sentence modification statute to allow juvenile offenders to have their sentences reexamined after twenty years, providing an opportunity for review based on rehabilitative progress.The court concluded that Kelly's new evidence on adolescent brain development was cumulative and unlikely to produce a different result. The court also rejected Kelly's claims under the Indiana Constitution, finding that his sentence did not violate provisions related to cruel and unusual punishment, proportionality, reformation, unnecessary rigor, or equal protection. Similarly, the court found no violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, the court declined to revise Kelly's sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), finding it appropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. View "Kelly v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law
Care and Protection of Adele
A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law
In re L.S.
In October 2019, Khrysta Turk reported to the Kalispell Police Department that her stepson, L.S., then 13 years old, had inappropriately touched her four-year-old daughter, E.T. L.S. admitted to the inappropriate touching during a police interview. Following the report, L.S.'s mother placed him in various residential treatment facilities for a total of 728 days. The investigation concluded in December 2019, and the matter was referred to the Eleventh Judicial District Court Office of Youth Services in January 2020. The Youth Court decided to monitor L.S.'s treatment informally without initiating formal proceedings.The State filed a formal petition on January 3, 2022, alleging that L.S. committed acts consistent with felony sexual assault. L.S. was appointed counsel, and the District Court set a trial date. L.S. moved for a continuance due to a discovery violation by the State, which delayed the trial. L.S. also filed motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and for the discovery violation. The District Court denied both motions, noting that the case was atypical due to L.S.'s mother's proactive placement in treatment facilities. The trial was rescheduled multiple times, and L.S. eventually admitted to the allegations while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and conducted a speedy trial analysis. The Court determined that the delay of 329 days from the filing of the petition to L.S.'s admission was not extraordinary given the serious nature of the allegations. The Court found that the delays were either institutional or due to L.S.'s request for a continuance. L.S. consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial but failed to demonstrate that the delay prejudiced his defense. The Court concluded that no speedy trial violation occurred and affirmed the District Court's denial of L.S.'s motion to dismiss. View "In re L.S." on Justia Law
People v. K.D.
In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was arrested shortly after and found with the stolen items. K.D. admitted to taking the car and knowing the child was inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D.'s defense counsel raised doubts about her competency, leading to evaluations that diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disability. She was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for treatment. After being declared competent in August 2022, K.D. requested developmental disability diversion.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for diversion, citing her lack of ties to the community, her criminal history, and concerns about her ability to comply with diversion requirements. The court also noted that K.D. had never received services from the regional center and had a history of probation violations. Despite acknowledging her developmental disability, the court concluded that her disability was not related to the charged offense and that she would not benefit from diversion.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering the relationship between K.D.'s developmental disability and the charged offense. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to ensure that the regional center provided a proper report and diversion plan tailored to K.D.'s needs. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new diversion eligibility hearing, instructing the trial court to comply with statutory requirements and consider whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. If K.D. satisfactorily completes diversion, the charges should be dismissed; otherwise, her conviction should be reinstated. View "People v. K.D." on Justia Law
GARCIA VS. STATE
Jonathan Eluterio Martinez-Garcia, a juvenile offender, attacked his 11th-grade English teacher and subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted murder, attempted sexual assault, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The district court sentenced him to two consecutive prison terms of 8 to 20 years and a concurrent term of 6 to 15 years, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 years with parole eligibility after 16 years. Martinez-Garcia moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was illegal and that he was entitled to parole eligibility after 15 years under NRS 213.12135(1)(a). The district court treated the motion as one to correct an illegal sentence and denied it.Martinez-Garcia appealed the district court's decision, contending that his sentence should reflect parole eligibility after 15 years as mandated by NRS 213.12135(1)(a) for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. He argued that the sentence imposed was illegal because it provided for parole eligibility after 16 years, contrary to the statute. The State argued that the sentence complied with the statutes governing the offenses to which Martinez-Garcia pleaded guilty.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 213.12135(1)(a) provides for parole eligibility for juvenile nonhomicide offenders after 15 years by operation of law, without requiring resentencing or amendment of the judgment of conviction. The court concluded that the statute does not render a sentence illegal if it otherwise conforms to the sentencing statutes for the offenses committed. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order denying Martinez-Garcia's motion to correct an illegal sentence, acknowledging that he will be eligible for parole after 15 years despite the longer parole-eligibility period stated in the judgment of conviction. View "GARCIA VS. STATE" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Rajiv R.
A juvenile was found delinquent on firearm charges and guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses. At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother to testify about events that occurred when he was seventeen. The juvenile argued that the parent-child witness disqualification statute, which prohibits testimony by a parent against their minor child, should have precluded his mother's testimony even though he was no longer a minor at the time of trial. He also claimed that the trial judge made several errors in admitting other evidence and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional.The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, and improper storage of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender for the large capacity feeding device charge. The juvenile filed a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute. The motion judge denied the motion, reasoning that the statute applied only to testimony against a minor child, and the juvenile was no longer a minor.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent against their minor child does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen. The court found no prejudicial error in the admission of other evidence, although it concluded that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements. Regarding the juvenile's sentence, the court agreed that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the sentence but concluded that this error did not prejudice the juvenile. The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and declined to vacate his sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Rajiv R." on Justia Law
Howard v. Coonrod
A class of incarcerated juvenile offenders in Florida, all sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole under a now-defunct sentencing scheme, sued the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Offender Review. They claimed that the parole system violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights. The plaintiffs argued that the parole system did not provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment to the Commissioners, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Florida's parole system did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Florida's parole system does not violate the Eighth Amendment for either homicide or non-homicide juvenile offenders. For homicide offenders, the system is not a sham and provides a genuine possibility of parole, satisfying the requirements set forth in Miller v. Alabama. For non-homicide offenders, the system offers a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, as required by Graham v. Florida.Regarding the due process claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole under either state law or the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, their procedural due process claim failed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioners. View "Howard v. Coonrod" on Justia Law