Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In the summer of 2010, SD and DJ attended the Rock Solid Camp, a Shreveport day camp providing sports and other activities to children of varying ages. SD was an eight-year-old special education student with a mild case of Cornelia de Lange Syndrome (“CdLS”). At that time, fourteen-year-old DJ was on probation for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen in Texas and had been accused of a sexual assault in March 2010 at Northwest Regional Mental Health Center, where he had been receiving counseling. As a juvenile on probation, DJ was eligible for State-provided services. DJ’s case coordinator at the Shreveport region Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”), an arm of the State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”), approved the funding for DJ to attend Rock Solid Camp, and the State of Louisiana paid his camp tuition. Jared Green, a camp counselor, gave SD permission to use the men’s restroom. When SD took longer than expected to return, Mr. Green went into the restroom and discovered SD and DJ in a shower stall pulling up their pants. Camp officials reported the incident to the Shreveport Police Department, which conducted an investigation. SD was examined by a hospital sexual assault nurse examiner, but no physical injuries were noted. SD gave a taped video statement indicating that DJ anally raped him. DJ was arrested for aggravated rape and adjudicated delinquent. CD, individually and as tutor of his son SD, filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants, SC (mother of DJ); Rock Solid Camps, LLC; and the State of Louisiana, through DHH. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to consider whether the court of appeal erred by reducing the general damages awarded to SD, the minor victim of a sexual assault. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the jury did not abuse its discretion in assessing the amount of general damages, and the court of appeal erred in holding otherwise. The trial court’s award of general damages was reinstated in accord with jury’s verdict. In all other respects, the court of appeal’s judgment was affirmed. View "C.D. v. S.C., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court denying the Commonwealth's motion to revise Juvenile's sentence in this case, holding that a juvenile court judge may commit a youthful offender to the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his twenty-first birthday and then suspend that commitment with conditions of probation.Pursuant to a plea agreement, the juvenile court judge adjudicated Juvenile to be a youthful offender. The judge ordered Juvenile committed to DYS until he reached the age of twenty-one and then suspended the commitment with conditions of probation until the day before Juvenile's twenty-first birthday. The Commonwealth moved for a revision of Juvenile's sentence, challenging the judge's decision to suspend Juvenile's commitment to DYS and to place him on probation, but the judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile was within his discretion in suspending Juvenile's commitment pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 87. View "Commonwealth v. Dones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1), South Carolina's definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) was constitutional. However, in keeping with prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, the Court held circuit court judges had to consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars when sentencing. "Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Jones v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

J.N. was born in August 2013. On the eve of J.N.’s eighth birthday in August 2021, the State filed a petition alleging that J.N. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to lack of proper parental care (CHINS- B) after an incident during which mother had dragged J.N. by her arms, causing bruises. The court transferred temporary custody to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After a series of subsequent incidents at school and home, a trial court issued a disposition order that continued custody of J.N. with DCF, with a goal of reunification with her mother by June 2023. Mother appealed the CHINS disposition, Mother argued the State essentially used a CHINS petition to advance a claim of abuse, and that by accepting that framing, the trial court deprived her of notice and interpreted the statute in a manner that was unconstitutionally over broad. The Vermont Supreme Court determine the trial court’s findings did not fit the theory charged by the State. To the extent the State asked the Supreme Court to affirm the CHINS determination based on a theory of abuse, the Court agreed with Mother that this would create a problem of notice. Accordingly, the disposition was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating an adjudication of J.U. for simple assault and battery, holding that the juvenile petition supported each element of misdemeanor sexual battery.The State filed a juvenile petition alleging that J.U. committed simple assault and battery. The district court adjudicated J.U. delinquent for simple assault and battery and entered a Level II disposition order. The court of appeals vacated the lower court's adjudication order in part and the disposition order in its entirety, concluding that the juvenile petition was "fatally defective" and failed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition complied with statutory pleading standards and that no other jurisdictional defect existed. View "In re J.U." on Justia Law

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) governs state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian children, requiring placement of an Indian child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences absent a finding of “good cause” to depart from them, 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Indian families or institutions from any tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated non-Indians or non-Indian institutions. The child’s tribe may alter the prioritization order. The preferences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those set by statute or tribal resolution. In involuntary proceedings, the Indian child’s parent or custodian and tribe must be given notice of any custody proceedings, and the right to intervene. ICWA requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to remove an Indian child from an unsafe environment to satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services; a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates, by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is likely to suffer serious harm. A biological parent who voluntarily gives up an Indian child cannot necessarily choose the child’s placement. The tribe has a right to intervene and can enforce ICWA’s placement preferences. States must keep certain records and transmit specified information to the Secretary of the Interior.The Supreme Court concluded that ICWA is consistent with Congress’s Article I authority and that conflicting state family law is preempted. Requirements concerning “active efforts” to keep Indian families together do not command the states to deploy their executive or legislative power to implement federal policy. The provisions apply to “any party” who initiates an involuntary proceeding–private individuals, agencies, and government entities. Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and private actors does not typically implicate the Tenth Amendment. ICWA’s requirement that state agencies perform a “diligent search” for placements that satisfy ICWA’s hierarchy also applies to both private and public parties. Congress can require state courts to enforce federal law and may impose ancillary record-keeping requirements related to state-court proceedings without violating the Tenth Amendment.The Court did not address an equal protection challenge to ICWA’s placement preferences and a non-delegation challenge to the provision allowing tribes to alter the placement preferences, citing lack of standing to raise the challenges. View "Haaland v. Brackeen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal of his delinquency adjudication, holding that Juvenile's appeal of the issue of whether he "knowingly and voluntarily" admitted to the conduct alleged in the juvenile officer's amended petition was untimely.The juvenile officer filed an amended petition alleging that Juvenile committed second-degree burglary, first-degree trespass, and two counts of second-degree property damage. After a restitution hearing, the juvenile division set restitution at $4,000. Juvenile appealed, seeking review of the adjudication hearing and order of disposition. The Supreme Court dismissed Juvenile's appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely. View "P.D.E. v. Juvenile Officer" on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed the youth court’s denial of her motion to transfer for lack of jurisdiction and motion for recusal. In 2019, Jane was arrested in Natchez, Adams County, Mississippi, and charged with possession and sale of a controlled substance. At the time of her arrest, Jane was pregnant and homeless. As a condition of her bond with Adams County, Jane was placed at Born Free, a residential facility in Hinds County that provided substance abuse treatment to pregnant mothers. Jane entered Born Free on May 30, 2019. On July 16, 2019, Jane gave birth to Karen at the University of Mississippi Medical Center in Hinds County. Jane later returned to Born Free with Karen. On August 19, 2019, Jane was negatively discharged from Born Free for various program violations. The Adams County Sheriff’s Department was contacted, and Jane was transported back to Adams County. The Adams County Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) was also contacted and took Karen into custody. Karen was placed in an approved foster home where she remained under the supervision and control of CPS. Upon her return to Adams County, Jane rented an apartment in Adams County. On December 10, 2019, the Adams County County Court, sitting as a youth court,2 adjudicated Karen a neglected child. As part of the permanency plan of reunification, CPS developed a service agreement with Jane. Jane failed to comply with the service agreement and further failed to maintain contact with CPS. As a result, on December 10, 2020, the youth court found that it was in Karen’s best interests for the permanency plan to change from reunification to adoption. CPS ultimately filed a petition to terminate parental rights. Jane moved to transfer her case to Hinds County since she was in court-ordered rehabilitation in Hinds County, and that the judge presiding over her case should have recused because he concluded termination of her parental rights was proper. Jane's motions were denied and she appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error in the court's denial of Jane's transfer motion and recusal and affirmed. View "Jane Doe v. Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law