Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

G.C. brings this interlocutory appeal from a family division order denying his request for youthful-offender status. The State charged youth with felony sexual assault in October 2021. On appeal, G.C. argued the evidence did not support the court’s finding that there was insufficient time to meet youth’s treatment and rehabilitation needs. After review of the family division order, the Vermont Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In re G.C." on Justia Law

In May 2022, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer defendant minor T.A. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. T.A. argued the Court of Appeal should remand so the juvenile court could reconsider its ruling in light of recent ameliorative changes to the law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The State conceded that the changes applied retroactively to a minor, like T.A., whose case was not final when they took effect. Nevertheless, the State argued, no remand was necessary here because there was no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the amended law. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

Appellant Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing for family reunification review and disposition from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871 petition on November 15, 2021. The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered the department to provide additional reunification services to L.V. (mother) for her dependent children Damian L. and Jesse A. (collectively “the children”).   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the juvenile court’s order continuing mother’s reunification services. The court remanded to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order continuing mother’s family reunification services. The court explained that the juvenile court erred in failing to consider the entire time period since the children’s initial removal when it calculated the 18-month statutory limit on reunification services. By the time the juvenile court ordered mother’s reunification services to continue in November 2021, mother had received approximately 26 months of services, which was well over the 18-month limit. View "In re Damian L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court adjudicating Appellant delinquent on two charges of attempting to burn a public building, holding that that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 5A, the attempted arson statute, is a specific intent crime.Appellant was arraigned in the juvenile court after he performed the TikTok "penny challenge" twice at his school, leading to his adjudication. On appeal, Appellant argued that section 5A requires proof of specific intent and that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he acted with the specific intent to burn or set fire to the building. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) attempt to burn a public building is a specific intent crime; and (2) the evidence demonstrated that Appellant specifically intended his conduct and its consequences. View "Commonwealth v. Qasim Q." on Justia Law

After determining that Father’s delusions and paranoia put A.G.(age 14) at risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, ordered that A.G. be removed from Father’s custody, and ordered reunification services and a psychological evaluation. At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had received his case plan several months earlier but had not signed the plan nor engaged in recommended services. Father also resisted psychological evaluation. At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had made moderate progress. The court granted an extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable services. At the 18-month hearing, the Agency reported that returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being and recommended a permanency planning hearing. The court found that the Agency had not provided reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month hearings but declined to exercise its discretion to continue the case, noting Father’s uneven progress.The California Supreme Court affirmed. Reasonable reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for a minimum of six or 12 months, depending on the child’s age, and generally may be extended for up to 18 months. The court was not automatically required to grant a further extension based on its finding that reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to 18-month extension. Once a child has been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan. View "Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

Minor S.S. (minor) appealed an order transferring him from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1. Minor contended: (1) the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) subsequent legislation applies retroactively and requires reversal because the juvenile court did not comply with new requirements for transfer hearings. The State conceded the second argument. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the new law applied retroactively and therefore reversal and remand was appropriate for an amenability hearing in compliance with the new law. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Almost 15 months elapsed from the time the juvenile court found Petitioner K.R. incompetent to stand trial and referred him for remediation until the court determined that he had been restored to competency and reinstated the proceedings. K.R. remained in juvenile hall for that entire period. He filed a writ petition arguing that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make a final ruling on his competency by the one-year deadline for remediation services and was required to dismiss the case at that point. In the alternative, he argues the court erred by allowing the prosecution to employ its own expert to examine him and asks us to order the juvenile court to strike the expert’s testimony.   The Second Appellate District disagreed and denied the petition. The court held that although section 709 establishes a maximum period of one year of remediation, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues for a reasonable period afterward for the court to resolve any dispute still existing at the end of that period over whether the minor has attained competency. Even if this was not the case, section 709 permits a court to keep juveniles accused of certain serious offenses (including several with which K.R. was charged) in secure confinement past the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings. The court also found that section 709 does not preclude the parties from seeking the appointment of their own expert(s) after the initial competency hearing. View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting the petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the State prohibiting the district court from enforcing a "taint team" order, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was implicated in this case.Appellant, a juvenile at the time of his offense, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release. After Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, Appellant was granted resentencing. At issue during the hearing was copies of recorded calls made by Appellant while he was incarcerated. The district court ordered the State to use a taint team to review the recorded calls for attorney-client communications on the ground that Appellant's the constitutional right to counsel was implicated. The court of appeals granted the State's petition for a writ prohibiting the court from enforcing the taint team order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief was not warranted because (1) the Sixth Amendment was not implicated here; and (2) the State would be injured and without any adequate remedy to correct the unauthorized action of the court. View "State v. Flowers" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged against E.P. alleged two counts of murder, two counts of  attempted murder, and one count of street terrorism. The juvenile court held a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707. The court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. Since the hearing, section 707 has been amended.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for a new fitness hearing pursuant to section 707 as amended. The court explained that the amended section 707 requires the juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the minor is amenable to rehabilitation. Under the amended statute, like the previous version, the court has the discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result. The prosecution is entitled to a new fitness hearing so that the court can determine, considering all five factors, whether E.P. is amenable to treatment. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law