Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the family court that the prosecution had proven that DM, a minor who stabbed another minor, had committed attempted assault in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the family court inadequately assessed the circumstances from DM's perspective in rejecting DM's self-defense defense.After a bench trial, during which DM argued that he lacked intent and acted in self-defense, the family court adjudicated DM as having committed attempted assault in the first degree. DM appealed, challenging the court's self-defense-related findings and conclusions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court wrongly rejected DM's defense by inadequately assessing his conduct from his perspective and by misapplying key self-defense elements; and (2) there was not substantial evidence to support the family court's conclusion that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that DM's use of deadly force was unjustified. View "In re DM" on Justia Law

Defendant My Ngo was a “shotcaller” in a Vietnamese gang. At age 19, he was paid $2,000 to commit a murder for hire. In 2021, he filed a motion for a “Franklin hearing”: a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), for a juvenile offender to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for purposes of a youthful offender parole hearing to be held in the future pursuant to Penal Code section 3051.2 Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders were entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were not. Defendant was a youthful offender sentenced to LWOP, and the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing. Defendant contended that section 3051’s distinction between youthful offenders with LWOP and non-LWOP sentences violated equal protection. Alternatively, he contended he should have been granted a hearing to preserve evidence of youth-related mitigating factors for other purposes, such as a hypothetical future resentencing under section 1172.1. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both contentions and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "California v. Ngo" on Justia Law

Father M.M. and mother J.M. pled no contest to a dependency petition regarding their minor children, J. and M. (along with their now-adult sibling Mi.), based on the parents engaging in repeated conflicts in the children’s presence. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and removed them from both parents’ custody, finding that the ongoing conflict caused a substantial risk of harm to the children, including serious mental health issues for J. The court returned the children to mother and father in October 2020 but maintained jurisdiction. In May 2021, the court terminated jurisdiction at a section 364 status review hearing with an exit order granting shared legal custody of J. and M. to mother and father, but sole physical custody to mother. Father appeals from that exit order, arguing that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction and applied the wrong standard to remove the children from his custody.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that awarding sole physical custody to mother was in the children’s best interest, as recommended by DCFS and requested by mother and the children, and where J. stated she was not comfortable visiting or living with father at all. The court’s order was further supported by the evidence that father had failed to comply with on-demand drug testing, failed to meet with the CSW for assessment for months, blamed mother for his relationship issues with J., blamed DCFS and mother for his lack of conjoint counseling, and was frequently absent. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

Over the objection of 12-year-old M.M.’s mother (“mother”), the juvenile court authorized the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or the congregate care facility where M.M. was placed to vaccinate the child against the SARS-CoV-2 virus once his pediatrician approved. Several weeks later mother asked the court to rescind its order, explaining in greater detail her religious objection to M.M. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding insufficient evidence it was in the child’s best interest not to be vaccinated.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record at the section 388 hearing amply justified the court’s conclusion it would not be in M.M.’s best interest to revoke the vaccination order despite mother’s unsupported concerns about possible adverse side effects. As established by the Department’s response to mother’s petition, COVID-19 was one of the ten leading causes of death for children as of October 2021, COVID-19 infections were then increasing, M.M. was in contact with multiple individuals at his placement and his school, the Pfizer vaccine had been found safe for children his age and M.M.’s pediatrician had determined there were no known contraindications to M.M. receiving the vaccine. Moreover, as discussed, M.M. was not averse to receiving the vaccination, leaving it to the court to decide. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude its authorization to vaccinate M.M. should stand. View "In re Matthew M." on Justia Law

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleges that about 10 years ago, while he was a minor, Petitioner committed a lewd act upon a child. This matter came to the attention of law enforcement only because Petitioner voluntarily admitted to the police that he committed the lewd act. He now seeks relief from the juvenile court’s order granting deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Petitioner contends that the order must be vacated and the juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated because “he [is] well beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.”   The Second Appellate District agreed and granted the petition. The court construed section 607, subdivision (h)(2) as applying to the discharge from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction after the court has retained jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to subdivisions (a) through (c). Pursuant to section 607, subdivision (a), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner because he was over the age of 21 years. The court wrote that common sense compels the conclusion that Petitioner is just too old to be “treated” as a “minor” and the section 602 petition must be dismissed. View "M.E. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In these dependency proceedings, T.M. (Father) appealed from a juvenile court exit order awarding sole physical custody of minors N.M. and S.M. to E.S. (Mother), contending no substantial evidence supported the order.   The Second Appellate District agreed and therefore reversed the order insofar as it grants sole physical custody to Mother. The court explained that here, the juvenile court made no express finding that granting sole physical custody to Mother would be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the court stated, “It’s not appropriate to reward a parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going to make it joint legal.” The court thus granted Mother sole custody to avoid rewarding Father, who had refused to participate meaningfully in the case plan. This was an abuse of discretion because an exit order must serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or another for failing to comply with the case plan.   The court explained that while it does not condone ignoring the court’s orders, there has been no express finding that these factors impacted the children’s interests, and no grounds appear for an implied finding. Father has never been deemed an offending parent, and no evidence suggested that his drug use, lack of a parenting class, or visitation practices impacted the children in any way. View "In re N.M." on Justia Law

South Carolina law makes it a crime for elementary and secondary school students to act “disorderly” or in a “boisterous manner,”; use “obscene or profane language”; or “interfere with,” “loiter about,” or “act in an obnoxious manner” in (or sometimes near) a school. Four students who had been referred or charged under the disorderly conduct or disturbing schools laws, and a nonprofit organization that advocates for at-risk youth filed a putative class action challenging both laws as unconstitutionally vague. After denying a motion to dismiss, the district court certified one main class and two subclasses under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The court held that both laws were unconstitutionally vague as applied to elementary and secondary school students, and it permanently enjoined future enforcement of the disorderly conduct law against those students. South Carolina’s Attorney General—appealed, lodging multiple challenges to the district court’s rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the district court committed no abuse of discretion here—not just because the challenged laws are facially invalid as applied to elementary and secondary school students but also because the subclasses demonstrated ongoing injury by the retention of existing records. A delinquency adjudication under South Carolina law may impair a minor’s future practice of law, application for military service, use of a driver’s license, and educational opportunities. Having concluded the laws may not be constitutionally enforced against South Carolina’s elementary and secondary students, the court saw no reason for allowing such continuing injuries to stand. View "Carolina Youth Action Project v. Alan Wilson" on Justia Law

The Bureau filed a dependency petition with respect to L.B., Welfare and Institutions Code 300, due to Mother’s failure to protect L.B. from ongoing domestic violence between Mother and her long-term partner, T.Y., and her inability to provide support for L.B. due to her hospitalization for leukemia and consumption of high doses of pain medication. Mother had a history of arrests and had attempted suicide. Despite many reports to the contrary, Mother denied domestic violence, claimed she had no mental health issues, and denied using nonprescribed drugs. L.B.’s school attendance had been poor. L.B. was detained with Father.At the dispositional hearing, Mother testified about her intervening arrest for assault with a deadly weapon and denied telling a social worker that L.B. had seen domestic violence between her and T.Y. The juvenile court found Mother unable to protect the child from ongoing domestic violence and that Mother presented an ongoing risk to L.B. given her domestic violence history, her propensity to engage in violent acts, and her failure to take any preventative steps to allay the court’s concerns. The court granted sole physical custody of L.B. to Father, joint legal custody to both parents, and supervised visitation for Mother. The court of appeal affirmed. There was substantial evidence that L.B. would otherwise be at substantial risk of serious harm. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law