Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

After Cesar, who was then 17 years old and who did not have a driver’s license, pleaded no contest to allegations of alcohol-related reckless driving, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to conditions, including that he submit to warrantless searches for alcohol and controlled substances and attend DUI programs.The court of appeal upheld the warrantless search condition, rejecting Cesar’s argument that the condition imposed a heavy burden on his privacy with little justification. The court noted that after he started drinking alcohol at age 16, Cesar would regularly engage in binge drinking. Cesar continued to drink and purchase alcohol after the crash and his arrest. He rejected his parents’ efforts to impose limits on his conduct. The search condition is reasonably related to Cesar’s future criminality. The juvenile court could not order Cesar to pay for his attendance at the DUI-related programs, so the court erred in declining to order the probation department to pay the fees for the DUI programs Cesar was required to attend. View "In re Cesar G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court committing D.S., a fourteen-year-old male, to the Department of Corrections (DOC), holding that the circuit court did not err.D.S. was adjudicated for possessing a stolen motor vehicle and aggravated eluding. After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court denied D.S.'s request for a probationary sentence based on an expert's opinion that D.S. could be treated in the community and granted the State's request that D.S. be placed with the DOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in finding that there was no viable alternative to DOC commitment and that a DOC commitment was the least restrictive alternative in this case. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the juvenile court ordering S.F. to attend school regularly without any suspensions as a condition of probation, holding that there was no error.S.F. entered an Alford plea to charges of second-degree assault and misdemeanor theft in the juvenile court. The juvenile magistrate in each case recommended probation, and an identical condition of probation for each case was for S.F. to attend school regularly without suspensions. The juvenile court denied S.F.'s exceptions and ordered the no-suspension condition of probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering no school suspensions as a condition of probation. View "In re S.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's conviction and vacated the conviction, holding that no adult court had jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court.Appellant was sixteen years old when he was charged with committing the category-two offense of aggravated robbery while possessing a deadly weapon. Binding Appellant over to adult court would have been mandatory for counts one and two upon a finding of probable cause. The juvenile court found probable cause as to counts one through three and count five, a misdemeanor. After the case was transferred to the adult court, Appellant pled guilty to several charges. On appeal, Appellant argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a juvenile court's finding probable cause or making a finding that the juvenile is unalienable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to continue his arraignment for a competency evaluation and denying Juvenile's petition for expungement pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100K(a)(5), holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.In two separate cases, Juvenile was charged with several offenses, including multiple counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Prior to arraignment, Juvenile filed a motion to continue so that he could undergo a competency evaluation and also filed a motion to dismiss. The judge denied the motions. Following an evaluation of Juvenile, the judge determined that Juvenile was incompetent to stand trial and was unlikely to become competent within the foreseeable future. The judge then dismissed all pending charges. Juvenile filed petition for expungement, which the juvenile court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Juvenile was not eligible for expungement under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100K(a)(5), and therefore, the juvenile court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Juvenile's petition. View "Commonwealth v. Carson C." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Defendant was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on his multiple prior felony convictions, including three predicate serious drug offenses. The court rejected defendant's contention that his ACCA enhancement based on a prior juvenile offense violated the Eighth Amendment. Rather, under this court's established precedents, using the juvenile conviction as an ACCA predicate does not violate the Eighth Amendment, U.S. v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546,553 (8th Cir. 2009) and U.S. v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1349 (2017). View "United States v. Winfrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for third-degree sexual assault and false imprisonment, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court.Defendant was eighteen years old when the State charged him with offenses that he allegedly committed when he was seventeen years old. When Defendant moved to transfer his case to juvenile court, the State argued that the juvenile court lacked concurrent jurisdiction because Defendant was an adult when the charges were filed against him. The district court dismissed Defendant's transfer motion, concluding that the juvenile court's jurisdiction depended on Defendant's age when he was charged rather than his age when he committed the offense at issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a juvenile court's concurrent jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-203(c) depends on an offender's age at the time of the offense, rather than at the time charges are filed. View "Rosen v. State" on Justia Law

Leon, age 15, was declared a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to six felonies, including sex crimes. He was placed at a residential treatment facility. Leon turned 18 years old and was returned to juvenile hall after a probation violation. He was later committed to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program. Leon then transitioned into juvenile court as a nonminor dependent through the extended foster care program and entered into a transitional independent living plan, which required him to attend an education program, or be employed. In 2019, Leon moved into a transitional housing placement plus foster care (THP+FC) facility. The juvenile court later terminated Leon’s nonminor dependency, finding that he was not participating in AB12 in good faith and was not residing in his THP+FC placement. California's Fostering Connections to Success Act (AB12), allows nonminor dependents to remain under juvenile court dependency jurisdiction and receive financial assistance until age 21 if they comply with statutory requirements. Leon is now 21 years old.The court of appeal concluded the appeal is not moot because a reversal could still afford Leon effective relief in the form of certain documentation. While the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Leon failed to meet AB12 eligibility requirements, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction must be remanded to ensure compliance with the procedural requirements of section 391(a)–(c), (h) in the form of the provision of certain information, documents, and services. View "In re Leon E." on Justia Law

Johnathan was adjudicated a delinquent minor under 705 ILCS 405/5-701 after he was found guilty of 10 counts of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a seven-year-old victim. During his sex offender evaluation, Johnathan stated that his lawyer did not return calls, that they “didn’t talk” and that he was never prepared for the stand. On appeal, Jonathan argued that the circuit court erred because it did not conduct a “Krankel” preliminary inquiry regarding his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in not conducting a “Krankel” hearing. The Krankel procedure applies in juvenile proceedings and is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A pro se defendant only has to bring his claim to the trial court’s attention and is not required to file a written motion. The procedure applies even though the defendant has retained counsel. Johnathan clearly stated that his attorney was not doing something that he should have been doing. A juvenile in a juvenile delinquency proceeding need do nothing more than bring his pro se claim to the attention of the court. View "In re Johnathan T." on Justia Law