Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2020, a juvenile wardship petition was filed charging D.C. with committing a murder in 2016, when he was 16 years old. The probation officer’s report reviewed the statutory factors relevant to a transfer out of juvenile court and recommended transfer, finding D.C. exhibited criminal sophistication, that D.C. was 20 years old and it was difficult to predict how he may mature in the next five years, that D.C.’s delinquent history included a 2014 wardship referral for battery involving a physical fight at school. D.C. also had “a pattern of delinquency” at school, D.C. admitted to abusing alcohol, marijuana, and Xanax, and that the circumstances and gravity of the alleged offenses were serious compared to other homicides.The juvenile court granted a motion to transfer him from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code 707(a)(1)). The court of appeal denied a petition challenging the transfer. The juvenile court did not err in considering D.C.’s 2017 burglary or the behavior documented in his school records. The finding that he was not likely to be rehabilitated before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence. The court also rejected challenges to expert testimony and evidentiary rulings. View "D.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A wardship petition charged Y.C., then 17 years old, with assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Y.C. allegedly shot a suspected rival gang member in the leg. Arrested, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile Assessment Center, where he met with a probation officer and invoked his Miranda rights. Y.C. agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s detention hearings.The court of appeal dismissed Y.C.’s writ petition as moot to the extent that it sought relief relating to his detention During the pendency of the proceeding, Y.C. entered a change of plea and was released from detention. The court otherwise denied the petition, rejecting arguments that the disclosure of the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court, and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as HIPAA and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. View "Y.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court committing seventeen-year-old D.S. to the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 26-8C-7 after adjudicating him of first-degree rape, holding that the court committed reversible error because its findings and conclusions were insufficient to permit meaningful review.In announcing its disposition, the circuit court did not address whether the recommendations before it for community supervision and outpatient treatment were viable alternatives to DOC custody or whether commitment to the DOC was the least restrictive alternative in D.S.'s best interest. The day after the deposition hearing, the court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law stating simply that there were no other viable alternatives and that commitment to the DOC was the least restrictive alternative. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to make findings on the viability of a community-based supervision and treatment alternative and to reimpose a disposition consistent with the requirements of section 26-8C-7. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services in 2017, following a domestic violence incident. Mother did not work. Father was the sole financial provider for the family. They were not married but had been in a relationship for over 14 years. Father denied any domestic violence or drug use. The children denied witnessing any domestic violence. The family had prior referrals for physical abuse by mother in 2010, emotional abuse and neglect by mother and father in 2012, and a prior dependency case in 2014 based on domestic violence and mother’s substance abuse. In 2021, the court terminated father’s parental rights to the children, now 13, 10, and six years old.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court abused its discretion when it applied the wrong legal standard in finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply (Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i); the court did not have the benefit of new authority, In re Caden C. (2021), concerning the benefits to the children from continuing the relationship with father, or the detriment to the children of terminating the relationship. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting the State's motion to transfer this juvenile case to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to W. Va. Code 49-4-710, holding that there was no error.Petitioner, the juvenile in this case, was seventeen years and seven months old when he was charged with child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and child neglect resulting in serious bodily injury. The state police filed a juvenile petition alleging that Petitioner was a delinquent child. The State filed a motion to transfer Petitioner's juvenile proceedings to the circuit court's criminal jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the State's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in transferring the case to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court. View "In re C.B." on Justia Law

In Alaska, a child was presumed to be at substantial risk of sexual abuse (and therefore in need of aid) if the parent knowingly leaves the child with a person convicted of or under investigation for a sex offense against a minor. After an adjudication hearing, a superior court found a child to be at substantial risk of sexual abuse based on evidence that she was left with her mother’s boyfriend, who had been indicted for sexual abuse of a minor. The mother appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by not acknowledging that an indictment was weaker proof than a conviction and by not making findings about the likelihood that the conduct underlying the indictment actually occurred. Because the statute did not require the superior court to draw such distinctions or make such findings, and because the findings the court did make are not clearly erroneous, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed its ruling that the child was in need of aid. View "Cynthia W. v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

M.S. and J.G. argued during a high school class. J.G. hit M.S. with a small book. J.G. was suspended for two days. About a month later, J.G. accused M.S. of taking her backpack. M.S. pulled a rectangular device with protruding antennas out of her bag, turned it on, and said “[t]ry that again, I’m going to tase you.” A spark erupted from the device. J.G. thought the device was a taser and retreated. The principal learned of the incident.The school resource officer, Reed, took custody of the device, identifying it as an “over-the-counter” stun gun. He did not know the weapon’s voltage and testified that the “capability” of a stun gun depended on its voltage. He initially opined that M.S.’s stun gun probably could not immobilize a person but later noted that it could immobilize a person of smaller stature, and, depending on their size, age, and medical condition, could “in some cases even cause death.” The juvenile court found that M.S. brought a stun gun into school, sustained the Penal Code 626.10(a) allegation, reduced the offense to a misdemeanor, adjudicated M.S. a ward of the court, and placed her in her mother’s custody with probation conditions. The court of appeal reversed. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the weapon was capable of temporarily immobilizing a person and, therefore, that it qualified as a stun gun under sections 626.10(a) and 244.5(a). View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

A New Hampshire circuit court issued an adjudicatory order finding that G.B., a minor, had been neglected, but that respondents, G/B/'s adoptive parents, were not at fault for the neglect. Subsequently, the court issued a dispositional order awarding legal custody of G.B. to the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) and requiring DCYF to seek placement for G.B. in a residential treatment facility. DCYF appealed both orders, and G.B.’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA), joined in appealing the dispositional order. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that the respondents did not neglect G.B. The Court further concluded that, although the circuit court did not err by ruling G.B. a neglected child and ordering G.B.’s placement in a residential treatment facility, it failed to identify legally permissible primary and concurrent case plans in its dispositional order. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

Appellant T.W. appealed a superior court order affirming a court of common pleas order denying his motion to suppress physical evidence and adjudicating Appellant delinquent for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance arose from a vehicle stop and a subsequent Terry frisk. Upon frisking Appellant, a police officer of the Philadelphia Police Department felt a hard object in Appellant’s left pants pocket. Fearing that the unknown object could be a weapon, the officer reached into Appellant’s pocket and removed the object. Appellant was arrested for possessing the object and a subsequent search incident to arrest led to the discovery of a controlled substance on Appellant’s person. Before trial, Appellant made a motion to suppress the physical evidence recovered from his person, arguing that the police officer exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk by reaching into Appellant’s pocket and removing an object during the frisk. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this matter to address the standards by which a police officer may remove an object from within a suspect’s clothing during a Terry frisk. The Court previously addressed this issue in Pennsylvania v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2001) (plurality). The Court's review in that case resulted in a plurality decision whereby the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court held that a police officer conducting a lawful Terry frisk could remove an object from within a suspect’s clothing if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the object is a weapon. "In light of the fact that Taylor did not produce a majority opinion, we reexamine the issue anew." View "In the Interest of: T.W." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) and (j)), alleging Deshawn’s and Clairessa’s history of substance abuse and current use of marijuana placed one-year-old Y.W., and one-month-old Y.G., at risk of serious physical harm. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and declared the children. dependents of the court, removed them from parental custody, and ordered the parents to complete substance abuse and domestic violence programs and to have monitored visitation with the children. At a hearing to select a permanent plan, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights, finding that returning the children to the parents would be detrimental, that the parents had not maintained regular and consistent visitation and contact, and that the children were adoptable.Based on the parents’ allegation that the Department failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901, the court of appeal conditionally affirm the orders terminating parental rights, with directions to ensure the Department complies with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law. Deshawn and Clairessa had each completed Judicial Council form ICWA-020, Parental Notification of Indian Status. Clairessa checked: “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Deshawn checked: “I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe. View "In re Y.W." on Justia Law