Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

J.B. and other minors happened upon the juvenile victim Joey, then shot and killed Joey, “in the context of gang activity.” They were not specifically looking for Joey. J.B. admitted to committing second-degree murder. Welfare and Institutions Code section 733(c) prohibits commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) if “the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described” in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707(b) or Penal Code 290.008(c). The juvenile court dismissed two adjudicated petitions involving more recent non-707(b) offenses, pursuant to section 782, which allows a juvenile court to dismiss a petition “if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal,” or if it finds that he “is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.”J.B. argued that the juvenile court lacked the authority to dismiss the adjudicated petitions for the sole purpose of committing him. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 733(c) did not bar the juvenile court from exercising its discretion under section 782 and dismissing the adjudicated petitions in the interests of justice and in J.B.’s welfare in order to commit him to DJF. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

The victim was listening to earphones and looking at his cell phone while walking. He saw individuals with bicycles outside of a 7-Eleven. Minutes later, someone tapped him on one side while another individual, on a bicycle on the other side, grabbed his cell phone. The victim chased and tackled him. After the victim released the thief, someone punched the victim. The victim was surrounded by three individuals in hoodies who were yelling at him. The victim’s boss arrived on the scene; the three left. Police quickly arrested three minors with bicycles: Kevin, age 15, Angel, who had the cell phone in his backpack, and Armando. The victim identified Angel as having taken his phone, and Armando as having punched him. The victim had trouble identifying Kevin.A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Kevin committed second-degree robbery. The victim identified Kevin in court and recalled seeing Kevin among the people at the 7- Eleven and as one of the people who yelled at him after he tackled Angel. The victim otherwise had no clear memory of Kevin. He did not know whether Kevin was there when his phone was taken. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that Kevin had aided and abetted the robbery. The court of appeal reversed. The determination was not supported by substantial evidence. View "In re K.M." on Justia Law

In winter 1996, defendant Samuel Ryan (then aged 23) robbed a Bridgeton, New Jersey gas station at gunpoint, stealing $100 and shooting a store clerk in the process. The offense resulted in defendant’s third first-degree robbery conviction, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, known as the “Three Strikes Law.” In this appeal, defendant contended the Three Strikes Law violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. He alleged that, by allowing courts to count crimes committed while under the age of eighteen as predicate offenses in sentencing defendants to mandatory life without parole, the Three Strikes Law ignored the constitutional constraints embodied in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and New Jersey v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), which prohibited imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences or their functional equivalent on juvenile offenders. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that because defendant committed his third offense and received an enhanced sentence of life without parole as an adult, this appeal did not implicate Miller or Zuber. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence was affirmed and the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law. View "New Jersey v. Ryan" on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

After Cesar, who was then 17 years old and who did not have a driver’s license, pleaded no contest to allegations of alcohol-related reckless driving, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to conditions, including that he submit to warrantless searches for alcohol and controlled substances and attend DUI programs.The court of appeal upheld the warrantless search condition, rejecting Cesar’s argument that the condition imposed a heavy burden on his privacy with little justification. The court noted that after he started drinking alcohol at age 16, Cesar would regularly engage in binge drinking. Cesar continued to drink and purchase alcohol after the crash and his arrest. He rejected his parents’ efforts to impose limits on his conduct. The search condition is reasonably related to Cesar’s future criminality. The juvenile court could not order Cesar to pay for his attendance at the DUI-related programs, so the court erred in declining to order the probation department to pay the fees for the DUI programs Cesar was required to attend. View "In re Cesar G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court committing D.S., a fourteen-year-old male, to the Department of Corrections (DOC), holding that the circuit court did not err.D.S. was adjudicated for possessing a stolen motor vehicle and aggravated eluding. After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court denied D.S.'s request for a probationary sentence based on an expert's opinion that D.S. could be treated in the community and granted the State's request that D.S. be placed with the DOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in finding that there was no viable alternative to DOC commitment and that a DOC commitment was the least restrictive alternative in this case. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the juvenile court ordering S.F. to attend school regularly without any suspensions as a condition of probation, holding that there was no error.S.F. entered an Alford plea to charges of second-degree assault and misdemeanor theft in the juvenile court. The juvenile magistrate in each case recommended probation, and an identical condition of probation for each case was for S.F. to attend school regularly without suspensions. The juvenile court denied S.F.'s exceptions and ordered the no-suspension condition of probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering no school suspensions as a condition of probation. View "In re S.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Appellant's conviction and vacated the conviction, holding that no adult court had jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court.Appellant was sixteen years old when he was charged with committing the category-two offense of aggravated robbery while possessing a deadly weapon. Binding Appellant over to adult court would have been mandatory for counts one and two upon a finding of probable cause. The juvenile court found probable cause as to counts one through three and count five, a misdemeanor. After the case was transferred to the adult court, Appellant pled guilty to several charges. On appeal, Appellant argued that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a juvenile court's finding probable cause or making a finding that the juvenile is unalienable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to continue his arraignment for a competency evaluation and denying Juvenile's petition for expungement pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100K(a)(5), holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.In two separate cases, Juvenile was charged with several offenses, including multiple counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Prior to arraignment, Juvenile filed a motion to continue so that he could undergo a competency evaluation and also filed a motion to dismiss. The judge denied the motions. Following an evaluation of Juvenile, the judge determined that Juvenile was incompetent to stand trial and was unlikely to become competent within the foreseeable future. The judge then dismissed all pending charges. Juvenile filed petition for expungement, which the juvenile court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Juvenile was not eligible for expungement under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 100K(a)(5), and therefore, the juvenile court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Juvenile's petition. View "Commonwealth v. Carson C." on Justia Law